Images of Immigrants and Refugees in Western Europe by d’Haenens, Leen et al.

Images of Immigrants and Refugees in Western Europe

Images of Immigrants and Refugees 
in Western Europe
Media Representations, Public Opinion,  
and Refugees’ Experiences
Edited by 
Leen d’Haenens, Willem Joris, and François Heinderyckx
Leuven University Press
Published with the support of the
KU Leuven Fund for Fair Open Access
and
Belspo (Belgian Science Policy Office), as part of the framework programme BRAIN-be 
(Belgian Research Action Through Interdisciplinary Networks), contract nr BR/165/A4/
IM2MEDIATE.
Published in 2019 by Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / Universi-
taire Pers Leuven. Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium).
Selection and editorial matter © Leen d’Haenens, Willem Joris, and François Heinderyckx, 
2019
Individual chapters © The respective authors, 2019
Every effort has been made to contact all holders of the copyright in the visual material 
contained in this publication. Any copyright-holders who believe that illustrations have been 
reproduced without their knowledge are asked to contact the publisher.
This book is published under a Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial Non-
Derivative 4.0 Licence.
The license allows you to share, copy, distribute, and transmit the work for personal and 
non-commercial use providing author and publisher attribution is clearly stated. Attribution 
should include the following information:
Leen d’Haenens, Willem Joris, and François Heinderyckx (eds.). Images of Immigrants and 
Refugees in Western Europe: Media Representations, Public Opinion, and Refugees’ Experiences. 
Leuven, Leuven University Press. (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)
Further details about Creative Commons licenses are available at http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/
ISBN 978 94 6270 180 9 (Paperback)
ISBN 978 94 6166 281 1 (ePDF)
ISBN 978 94 6166 282 8 (ePUB)
https://doi.org/10.11116/9789461662811
D / 2019/ 1869 / 15
NUR: 741, 811
Layout: Crius Group
Cover design: Frederik Danko
Cover illustration: Ruslan Shugushev/Shutterstock.com
 
Contents
Chapter 1. Images of Immigrants and Refugees in Western Europe : 
Media Representations, Public Opinion, and Refugees’ Experiences  7
Leen d’Haenens and Willem Joris
Part I – Policy on migration and integration in Europe
Chapter 2. Migration and integration policy in Europe: Comparing 
Belgium and Sweden  21
Paul Puschmann, Ebba Sundin, David De Coninck, 
and Leen d’Haenens
Part II – Media representations
Chapter 3. The Refugee Situation as Portrayed in News Media : 
A Content Analysis of Belgian and Swedish Newspapers – 2015-2017  39
Rozane De Cock, Ebba Sundin, and Valériane Mistiaen
Chapter 4. Depiction of Immigration in Television News : Public 
and Commercial Broadcasters – a Comparison  57
Valériane Mistiaen
Chapter 5. Agency and Power in the Dutch-Language News 
Coverage of the Summer 2015 Refugee Situation in Europe: 
A Transitivity Analysis of Semantic Roles  83
Lutgard Lams
Chapter 6. A Diverse View on the Promotion of Tolerance and 
Cultural Diversity through the Eyes of Journalists: Focus on 
Belgium and Sweden  101
Stefan Mertens, Leen d’Haenens, Rozane De Cock, 
and Olivier Standaert
Part III – Public opinion
Chapter 7. Discordance between Public Opinion and News Media 
Representations of Immigrants and Refugees in Belgium and 
Sweden  123
David De Coninck, Hanne Vandenberghe, and Koen Matthijs
Chapter 8. Online News Consumption and Public Sentiment 
toward Refugees : Is there a Filter Bubble at Play? Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden: A Comparison  141
Stefan Mertens, Leen d’Haenens, and Rozane De Cock
Chapter 9. The Effects of Dominant versus Peripheral News Frames 
on Attitudes toward Refugees and News Story Credibility  159
Willem Joris and Rozane De Cock
Part IV – Refugees’ experiences
Chapter 10. Beyond Victimhood : Reflecting on Migrant-Victim 
Representations with Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian Asylum Seekers 
and Refugees in Belgium  177




List of authors  203
Chapter 1 
Images of Immigrants and Refugees in 
Western Europe : Media Representations, 
Public Opinion, and Refugees’ Experiences
Leen d’Haenens and Willem Joris
There are no simple solutions to the European migration 
crisis
Europe has always been a continent of migration, but the numbers of refugees 
who entered the European Union reached an all-time high in 2015 and 2016 
and have remained elevated ever since. In 2015 EU member states received 
over 1.3 million applications for international protection—more than twice the 
previous year’s figure (Eurostat, 2018a). In 2016 more than 1.2 million asylum 
seekers entered the EU. In 2017, the number of applications (705,705) started 
to decline. Most applicants are male: 72 percent in 2015; 68 percent in 2016; 
and 67 percent in 2017 (Eurostat, 2018a). Since at least the summer of 2015, 
we Europeans have been struggling with the question of how many and which 
migrants we are willing to welcome to our welfare states. And we are faced 
with ethical questions: how can we reconcile our choices with our ethical 
standards? One crucial, albeit fraught distinction is that which separates 
‘economic’ migrants—looking for better living conditions—from refugees, 
who must leave a politically unsafe, war-torn country simply to survive.
The current refugee issue has turned on its head our complacent view of 
migration owing to the sheer numbers of people fleeing across the Mediter-
ranean Sea or through Southeast Europe, seeking shelter in EU member states. 
Most immigrants entering ‘Fortress Europe’ from the South are political 
refugees fleeing war or persecution in their home countries. The top three 
origins of applicants are countries in an ongoing state of civil war, i.e., Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq (Eurostat, 2018a). In addition, most ‘economic migrants’ 
come from parts of Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe in search of a better life 
(Park, 2015). Given the dual nature of this migration wave, the EU and its 
citizens have been of two minds over the issue, depending on the moment in 
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time, the country, its absorption capacity, and its government’s political hue. 
Despite the desperate state most refugees find themselves in, starting with the 
humanitarian disaster taking place in the Mediterranean, many developed 
countries in Europe have been reluctant to take them in and provide them with 
shelter, safety, employment, education, and permanent residence. Moreover, 
the overlapping gray areas in the categorization of migrants made it even more 
difficult for policy makers in the EU member states to take a clear stance with 
regard to refugees. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), a refugee is “any person forced to flee his or her country 
because of persecution, war or violence.” The organization estimated in 2016 
that more than half of all the 65.6 million refugees worldwide came from just 
three countries—Syria, Afghanistan, and South Sudan (UNHCR, 2018).
Governments, the news industry, and public opinion in Europe have 
been increasingly preoccupied with refugees seeking access to Europe. 
Highly interconnected with political agendas and audience perceptions, 
media depictions affect the public perceptions of both refugees/migrants 
and integration and migration policies (among others, Entman, 1993; Orgad, 
2012). Public opinion is split (if not wholly negative) and generally uninformed 
or misinformed (e.g., Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 
2014; Jacobs, Hooghe, & de Vroome, 2017; Meuleman, Davidov, & Billiet, 
2009; Rustenbach, 2010), while policies and politicians seem ineffectual when 
not downright hostile in the face of such dire needs.
There are no simple solutions because migration is a complex matter, 
perceptions of it are fraught with emotions, and it cannot be met with coldly 
‘rational’ decisions—while involving both national and international rules. 
The actors in this complex interplay are not only the people on the move, 
governments, and NGOs, but also often ruthless refugee smugglers. So solu-
tions will need to be creative and multifaceted. Although some progress 
has been made since the crisis in the autumn of 2015, the fault lines within 
Europe have so far prevented any revision of the Dublin Regulation,1 which 
was never meant to cope with massive migration anyway.
In Germany, by June 2018, the refugee and irregular migration issue had 
poisoned relations between Chancellor Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union 
(CDU) and the latter’s Bavarian sister party, the CSU, whose leader insisted 
migrants arriving in Germany should be returned to the European country 
where they were first registered. Merkel pleaded for a European-wide approach 
1 Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national.
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and managed to work out an arrangement with the other EU member states 
at the June 2018 European summit (see also Henley, 2018). An agreement 
was reached to set up ‘migrant control centers’ on European territory, where 
‘economic’ migrants are to be separated from ‘refugees’, after which the latter 
can be transferred to a member state other than the one where they first 
landed. Both the opening of such centers and the integration of refugees 
having entered the EU through a border state such as Italy or Greece will 
happen on a voluntary basis. There is also talk of ‘disembarkation platforms’ 
to be set up outside Europe under the supervision of the United Nations 
and financed with European money, where refugees will be able to apply for 
asylum. The decision of member states to spread migratory pressure through 
new reception centers over more countries than Greece and Italy only while 
reinforcing Frontex (the EU border security forces) is a positive outcome. 
However, the voluntary character of the arrangement is disturbing, as it shows 
once again that the EU does not have the political will to give fair and equal 
treatment to each and every refugee while breaking the business model of 
the people smugglers.
Attitudes toward migrants and refugees
The research we present in this book explores both the ways refugees—those 
fleeing the Syrian and Iraqi civil war and the continuing armed conflicts 
plaguing Afghanistan—are being received by the general populations and 
the perceptions of the people surrounding the resettlement of Syrians in 
Belgium and Sweden. We compare the attitudes of the public as well as the 
determinants—both individual-level opinions and macro-level social and 
economic factors—that may be shaping these attitudes.
For contextualization purposes we bring together selected evidence of op-
posing sentiments regarding the notion of accepting large numbers of refugees 
in a variety of countries as reported through polling results (see Table 1.1) as 
well as motives behind this reluctance to share one’s country with additional 
refugees. In a 2015 global survey on immigration attitudes conducted by Gallup 
for the International Organization for Migration, 52 percent of respondents 
across Europe stated that the number of immigrants should be reduced in 
their countries (Esipova et al., 2015). The largest percentages were found in 
Northern and Eastern Europe (56 percent in each case). Thirty-nine percent of 
Western Europeans also favored a decrease in immigration numbers (Esipova 
et al., 2015). Eurobarometer results (EB 85, fieldwork May 2016) show that 
immigration is the main concern at European level according to 48 percent 
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Table 1.1: Research results – opposing sentiments to accepting large numbers of 
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of Europeans, followed by terrorism and the economic situation (European 
Commission, 2016). This indicates a rapid change in public perception, as 
immigration was ranked only fourth on the concern list in 2014. In the EU28 
countries a majority of respondents (58 percent) have a negative feeling about 
immigration of people from outside the EU.
Several studies reveal an increase in negative attitudes toward refugees 
in EU countries (e.g., De Coninck, Matthijs, Debrael, Joris, De Cock, & 
d’Haenens, 2018). While such attitudes may have been relatively favorable at 
the start of the crisis, they grew more negative with increased numbers, de-
mands for increased resources to assist the refugees, and increased (perceived) 
threats to the destination countries’ way of life and economic prosperity. 
The literature on surveys of attitudes toward migrants and refugees tends to 
demonstrate that individual-level variables are the most important factors 
explaining negative or positive reception of refugees (e.g., De Coninck et 
al., 2018). In particular, age, occupation, education, and income levels are 
important. In general, the younger, better educated, and more professional 
respondents tend to be more accepting.
Do news media depictions influence public concern?
This book sets out to investigate the dynamic interplay between news media 
depictions of the current non-EU immigrant situation with a specific emphasis 
on the refugee situation on the one hand, and both governmental and societal 
(re)actions on the other. Policies have been put in place at both European and 
national levels to relocate and resettle asylum seekers among the EU member 
states, which generated more hostility toward migrants and their purported 
negative impact, while other voices were more supportive of such policies.
Refugees have taken a prominent place in news production, political 
discussions, policy formation, and public concern around the world in recent 
years. According to Gabrielatos and Baker (2008: 9) the print media should be 
viewed as “an excellent source of data for the examination of the construction 
of refugees and asylum seekers” because of their power “over the selection, 
extent, frequency, and nature of their reporting” and “the reciprocity of 
influence between readers and newspapers.” By way of an example, Gamson 
and Modigliani (1989: 2) argued that the media use their power of influence 
by interpreting ‘the reality’, emphasizing specific frames that help control 
the agenda based on “interpretive packages.” Our analysis of news stories 
departs from the idea that media makers “make conscious or unconscious 
framing judgments in deciding what to say, guided by frames” (Entman, 1993: 
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52). The news text “contains frames, which are manifested by the presence or 
absence of certain keywords, stock phrase(s), stereotyped images, sources 
of information, and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters 
of facts or judgments” (Entman, 1993: 52). One such frame in the unfolding 
humanitarian drama was the iconic image of Alan Kurdi, the Syrian toddler 
whose lifeless body washed up on a Turkish beach in September 2015. This 
shocking image brought the European refugee crisis into the spotlight and—at 
least for a while—generated more empathy for the refugees’ tragic journey. 
Previous agenda-setting research related the prominence of topics in news 
media (media agenda) to their ranking on the public agenda. In Belgium, a 
study by Jacobs (2017) showed a positive relationship between the amount of 
television news attention dedicated to migration and the public perception 
of this topic as an important societal issue in Belgium, with both variables 
fluctuating simultaneously in the 2003-2014 period.
As a complement to previous research on immigration, refugees, public 
opinion, and news media in Belgium, the field will benefit from an integrated 
approach given the currently fragmented content analysis view, with a focus 
on only one specific medium or news brand, time period, or media language. 
Moreover, asylum seekers framing data are now outdated (e.g., Van Gorp, 
2005), and inaccurate measuring of crucial media variables should be rem-
edied: the European Social Survey includes no more than two questions on 
television, and it relies on wide frequency use indicator categories, while the 
Eurobarometer ignores media variables altogether. Based on the combination 
of public opinion data and newspaper stories on the topic of immigration to 
the UK, a study by McLaren, Boomgaarden, and Vliegenthart (2018) shows 
that by emphasizing two concrete issues associated with immigration—the 
economy and education—the media appear to increase concerns about 
immigration. On the other hand, emphasis on more abstract themes elicits 
scant attention among the British public.
To our knowledge, this book is the first on this topic to incorporate all parts 
of the classic communication model: sender (journalistic culture), content 
(news messages), receiver (public), media effects—as well as an oftentimes 
forgotten group: giving a voice to the refugees who are themselves subjects 
of the news content makes it possible to reveal an endogenous side of the 
refugee situation alongside the official narrative.
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Focus on Belgium and comparison with Sweden
Although our focus is on Belgium, the research evidence presented in the 
chapters will always be placed in an international perspective, Sweden being 
the key country of comparison. The strong increase in asylum claims in 
Belgium since 2015 requires looking at good practices and long-term ap-
proaches. While population figures are comparable (9.9 million Swedes 
versus 11 million Belgians), Belgium and Sweden differ greatly in terms of 
migration policy and integration indicators, as illustrated in Table 1.2 by the 
2015 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). Both countries are also 
faced with a different reality when it comes to the actual number of incoming 
refugees. For Belgium, this meant an increase in 2015 of 178 percent compared 
to 2014 (38,990 applications), for Sweden a rise of 108 percent (156,110 ap-
plications). Both countries also differ as to their populations’ responses. 
Sweden (62 percent) is one of the EU28 countries (together with Ireland, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, and Spain) in which a clear majority of inhabitants 
have positive feelings about non-EU immigrants (European Commission, 
2018). In contrast, the Belgian population (43 percent) is less positive toward 
non-EU immigrants.
Sweden is also the European country par excellence, with a generous 
welcoming policy, a long history of tolerance and openness, and the highest 
Table 1.2: 2015 Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) scores (in %).
Belgium Sweden
Overall MIPEX-score 67 78
Labor Market Mobility 64 98
Family Reunion 72 78
Education 61 77
Health 53 62
Political Participation 57 77
Permanent Residence 86 79
Access to Nationality 69 73
Anti-discrimination 78 85
Note. Meaning of the scores: 0% Critically unfavorable; 1-20% Unfavorable; 21-40% Slightly 
unfavorable; 41-59% Halfway to Best Practice; 60-79% Slightly favorable; 80-99% Favorable; 100% 
Best practice (MIPEX, 2015).
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score on the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). The 2015 MIPEX 
is a tool created to cover eight policy areas based on 167 policy indicators 
which map out a migrant’s trajectory toward full citizenship in all European 
Union countries as well as several others. We will use the scores from both 
countries in this study to compare government policy with individual attitudes 
toward refugees. These policies cover labor market mobility, family reunion, 
education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to 
nationality, and anti-discrimination. Comparing six integration indices, 
Jedwab and Soroka (2014) argue that MIPEX offers the most comprehensive 
set of economic and social indicators, although it captures the ‘best practices’ 
in regard to policies and not actual integration outcomes.
With its 78 percent score Sweden is at the top of the MIPEX list, which 
is made up of 38, mostly Western, countries. Belgium ranks seventh with a 
67 percent score. The average score of integration policies is 52 percent, which 
means such policies remain major obstacles for immigrants keen to fully 
participate in economic, social, and democratic life. The EU migrant integra-
tion indicators (Eurostat, 2018b) also clearly show that Sweden does much 
better than Belgium in most respects. For example, policy in Sweden results 
in higher activity rates among immigrants (i.e., non-EU citizens by birth) 
(Sweden: 77.0 percent; Belgium: 60.3 percent) and fewer immigrants at risk 
of poverty and social exclusion (Sweden: 40.8 percent; Belgium: 52.6 percent).
Sweden’s policy approach and results with respect to media depictions and 
public opinion building will thus be essential input for Belgian policy makers, 
helping them do what is possible and/or needed to guarantee equal access and 
opportunities to the refugees in terms of targeted employment, education, 
and health support. At the same time, higher public trust levels should be 
gained and media workers should be inspired to produce less biased news.
How the refugee issue was studied
The theme and focus of this book are the result of a collaborative research 
project, Images of Immigrants in the Media: Thought-provoking Effects 
(IM²MEDIATE), which combines four complementary multi-stakeholder 
group perspectives:
1) analyzing the policy related to national governmental (re)actions across 
countries with emphasis on Belgium and Sweden as divergent cases;
2) analyzing the news media content in the context of a journalism culture;
3) studying societal reactions of the general public;
4) studying the push and pull factors in migration from a refugee perspective.
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It is the book’s ultimate goal to inventory the multiple public, policy, and media 
voices heard in Belgium on this crucial issue, while learning from practices 
abroad (with a focus on Sweden), and to formulate recommendations toward 
a more encouraging integration policy, while lowering anti-immigration and 
anti-refugee sentiment.
To study the interplay and the possibly pivotal role of the media in this 
complex societal challenge, the book compares the news media representations 
of non-EU immigrants—with a special emphasis on refugees in Dutch- and 
French-speaking Belgium and in Sweden—as potentially powerful public 
opinion-formation drivers on the issue. Based on their news selection, gate-
keeping, and (re)presentation of the situation and the individuals involved, 
news media can choose to either connect people or to sharpen differences 
by stressing ‘otherness’. The precise framing and reconstruction of everyday 
reality can shape public opinion in terms of evaluation of the present situation 
and the necessity of action, appropriate policy initiatives, and solutions. The 
news media under study include audiovisual and online media; both verbal 
and visual content are analyzed. The particularities of linguistic representation 
in each language under study (Dutch, French, and Swedish) are mapped and 
compared. In addition, qualitative in-depth interviews with journalists serve 
as a reflective feedback loop complementing the content analysis results. 
Comparisons with available cross-country data from the Worlds of Journalism 
project on the professional culture of journalism being influential in the media 
framing of immigrants with a focus on refugees are added.
To assess public opinion on non-EU immigrants and refugees, we con-
ducted a survey among a representative sample of adults (aged between 18 
and 65, accurately reflecting the Belgian population as to gender, SES, and 
education) as well as adolescents (aged between 15 and 18) in the regions 
under study. To investigate potential links between the content of news 
media (Chapter 3) and public opinion on the refugee situation in particular 
(Chapter 7), an experimental research design was set up (Chapter 9). News 
stories typical of the various news frames on refugees (based on content 
analysis results) were turned into experimental material including counter-
frames so as to test the potential effects of various framing approaches on 
the public’s mental pictures.
Further to the content analysis and the public opinion survey, Chapter 10 
is built around data collected among refugees in Belgium to inductively 
reconstruct their potentially manifold views on Belgium and Europe and 
explore their motivations for choosing this country as a temporary or final 
destination in their search of a new future. Based on the proportionate number 
of first-time asylum applicants in the EU (Eurostat, 2018a), the focus is on 
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interviewees coming from Syria (29 percent of total number in 2015), Afghani-
stan (14 percent), and Iraq (10 percent). These are the three largest groups 
of refugees who have arrived in Belgium since the latest immigration peak 
(summer of 2015). Issues related to religion will receive significant attention. 
This includes questions of perceived ‘islamophobia’ and the potential of 
faith-based group identities.
Book structure
The book is divided into four sections. The first section addresses the policy 
on migration and integration in Europe (Chapter 2); the second section 
focuses on media representations (Chapters 3-6); the third section looks at 
public opinion toward immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers (Chapters 
7-9); and the final section focuses on the refugees’ experiences (Chapter 10).
The first section investigates the policy on migration and integration in 
the light of the refugee issue. In Chapter 2, Paul Puschmann, Ebba Sundin, 
David De Coninck, and Leen d’Haenens compare different migration and 
integration policies in Europe, with a focus on Belgium and Sweden.
The second section of this book examines the media representations of the 
European refugee crisis. In Chapter 3 Rozane De Cock, Ebba Sundin, and 
Valériane Mistiaen analyze the portrayal of the refugee issue in news media 
through a content analysis of Belgian and Swedish newspapers between 
2015 and 2017. Furthermore, Valériane Mistiaen (Chapter 4) examines the 
differences between Belgian French-language public and commercial televi-
sion broadcasters regarding the refugee issue. In Chapter 5 Lutgard Lams 
investigates the verbal processes associated with the refugee as well as the 
non-refugee actors, such as political elites, governmental institutions, or 
NGOs. In Chapter 6 Stefan Mertens, Leen d’Haenens, Rozane De Cock, 
and Olivier Standaert study the journalists’ views on their role to promote 
tolerance and cultural diversity in societies with diverging migration and 
integration policies.
The third section analyzes public opinion toward immigrants, refugees, 
and asylum seekers. In Chapter 7 David De Coninck, Hanne Vandenberghe, 
and Koen Matthys examine the impact of news media consumption and trust 
on attitudes about immigrants and refugees in both Belgium and Sweden. 
Moreover, the chapter analyzes if and to what extent the level of importance 
of the migration issue and the presence of intergroup contact are mediators of 
news consumption. Chapter 8 investigates the filter bubble. Stefan Mertens, 
Leen d’Haenens, and Rozane De Cock test the assumption that online 
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news users will hold more outspoken viewpoints on refugees due to a more 
segregated, likeminded news consumption. Next, in Chapter 9, Willem Joris 
and Rozane De Cock analyze the possible effects of a set of commonly used 
and peripheral, atypical news frames on individuals’ opinions and attitudes 
on refugees. The effect study is based on a survey experiment among the 
general public of between 18 and 65 years old in Flanders (Dutch-speaking 
part of Belgium).
The fourth section explores the refugees’ experiences. This section gives 
voice to those who often remain voiceless, and reflects on representations 
of migration. In Chapter 10 Kevin Smets, Jacinthe Mazzocchetti, Lorraine 
Gerstmans, and Lien Mostmans concentrate on how asylum seekers and 
refugees make sense of how they are represented, and how those representa-
tions connect to broader issues of victimization, recognition, and identity.
Lenses of the research team differed across the chapters. At times the 
scope of the research presented in this book involves a comparison of four 
countries (C6, C8), or two with a focus on Belgium and Sweden (C2, C3, C7). 
Some chapters focus on news production or reception in one language area: 
the Dutch-speaking press in Flanders and the Netherlands (C5), Flanders 
(C9), or the French-speaking part of Belgium’s broadcast news (C4). The last 
chapter in the book (C10) looks at Belgium as a ‘host country’ for Afghani, 
Iraqi, and Syrian refugees from the perspective of the latter.
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Migration and integration policy in 
Europe: Comparing Belgium and Sweden
Paul Puschmann, Ebba Sundin, David De Coninck, 
and Leen d’Haenens
The events that followed the Arab Spring—the civil war in Syria, the rise 
of Islamic State, and the power struggle in Libya following the death of 
Gaddafi—were among the factors that triggered the largest refugee crisis 
since the Second World War. Other events such as the political crisis in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar, 
and the exodus that resulted from Venezuela’s economic collapse have since 
made matters even worse. As a result, some 68.5 million people worldwide have 
been on the move through no choice of their own according to the UNHCR’s 
latest figures; 25.4 million of those are refugees and 3.1 million are asylum 
seekers. Currently, the largest numbers of refugees worldwide originate from 
Syria (6.3 million), Afghanistan (2.6 million), and South Sudan (2.4 million). 
While most people who flee war and persecution remain within their country’s 
borders, a majority of asylum seekers and refugees —fugitives who had to 
cross a national border—move to neighboring countries. In relative terms, 
Lebanon is the country that hosts the largest number of refugees: one out 
of six inhabitants of this small eastern Mediterranean country is a refugee. 
With some 3.5 million refugees, Turkey is the number one host country of 
refugees in absolute terms (UNHCR, 2018).
While 85 percent of the world’s displaced persons are located in develop-
ing countries, the West has not remained unaffected. As a consequence of 
armed conflicts, political and religious persecutions, and poverty, hundreds 
of thousands of refugees and economic migrants—including vulnerable 
groups such as minors, pregnant women, and disabled, diseased and elderly 
people—from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia have attempted to 
reach Europe in recent years. This has led them on a long and deadly journey 
across land and sea. Starting in 2011 the numbers of asylum applicants in 
EU member states grew significantly, from 309,040 in 2011 to 1,322,844 in 
2015, after which a gradual decline set in (Eurostat; Asylum statistics 2018). 
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In absolute terms Germany has been Europe’s premier host country. In 
2015 (the year with the highest number of asylum-seeker applications in the 
EU) it registered 476,508 asylum applications, which is more than a third 
of all applications in the EU that year. With respectively 177,134 and 162,451 
asylum applications in 2015, Hungary and Sweden were the EU’s number 
two and three host countries. In 2017, Germany remained the number one 
host country, while Hungary and Sweden became less attractive than Italy 
and France, among others (Eurostat, 2018).
Rising numbers of refugees in Europe have spurred diverging political 
responses from national governments, as member states are affected in dif-
ferent ways and the EU remains unable to come up with a coherent migration 
policy. Some countries have been openly welcoming of refugees, including 
Germany and the Nordic countries, especially Sweden. The political attitude 
toward refugees in these countries is mostly characterized by concerns for 
solidarity and responsibility and can be summarized by German chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s words: “Wir schaffen das!” (We can do this!). Despite taking 
in and retaining relatively few refugees, Portugal might be described as even 
more liberal, as its government has actively tried to attract more refugees. 
This political attitude is in strong contrast with that of the Italian, Hungarian, 
Austrian, and Greek governments, for instance, who have attempted to cut 
down the numbers of asylum seekers flocking to their countries through 
measures such as the creation of hundreds of kilometers of fences on the EU’s 
external frontiers, between Greece and Turkey or Hungary and Serbia, making 
it more difficult for asylum seekers to reach a safe haven and strengthening the 
notion of a ‘Fortress Europe’. Walls have also gone up between EU member 
states, however, between Slovenia and Croatia, for instance, and even within 
the Schengen area, between Austria and Slovenia.
The rise of border fences and the temporary reinstatement of border 
controls within the Schengen area show that the refugee crisis has strongly 
divided the European member states, leading to a political crisis. As a majority 
of refugees enter the European Union through Italy (central Mediterranean 
route) and Greece (eastern Mediterranean route), these countries have felt the 
strongest migratory pressures under the Dublin Convention, which allocates 
responsibility for an asylum seeker to the country of entry, so that all other 
member states would be legally justified in sending most asylum seekers 
back to Italy and Greece. The Convention thus creates a huge imbalance 
in responsibilities between Northern and Southern European States. In 
order to reduce this migratory pressure on the latter, plans have been made 
by the European institutions to relocate refugees across the EU. This has 
been thwarted by Eastern EU member states—mostly Hungary, Slovakia, 
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and Poland—which added an East-West divide within the EU. In practice, 
the number of refugees who have been relocated has remained small owing 
to disagreements on quotas as well. Nevertheless, the number of resettled 
persons increased from 6,550 in 2014 to 24,155 in 2017 (Eurostat, 2018).
As the crisis deepened, support for accepting refugees declined everywhere 
in Europe, including in initially very welcoming countries such as Germany 
and Sweden. This is related to the election victories of nationalist and populist 
parties, who used the refugee crisis to their advantage. In Germany, for 
instance, the far-right AFD (Alternative für Deutschland) grew rapidly on 
the strength of its anti-refugee rhetoric, and so did the Sweden Democrats 
in Sweden, forcing governments to alter their liberal course and move to 
the right, which in practice mostly meant limiting the numbers of refugees 
being admitted. At the European level this move to the right is illustrated 
by the agreement negotiated with Turkey, according to which the latter 
agreed to take in refugees who refuse to apply for asylum in Greece or are 
ineligible for asylum within the EU. The overall aim of this agreement was 
to curb the influx of refugees and undocumented migrants. The same goes 
for the Migration Partnership Framework, which aims to handle asylum 
applications outside Europe, fight human trafficking, and avoid dangerous 
sea crossings, in which thousands of migrants have died over the previous 
years (Castillejo, 2017; UNHCR, 2018). However, all these measures also 
show that Europe is increasingly shifting responsibility to third countries, 
many of which—Turkey included—are already shouldering a heavier load 
than EU countries.
The refugee crisis is in many ways related to the European integration 
process itself. The will to foster peace, liberty, and economic prosperity 
has driven European nations closer to one another since the Second World 
War. As a result of intensive political cooperation, the creation of a common 
market and a free-travel zone, Europe has turned into one of the best places 
in the world to live in terms of GDP per capita and perceived quality of life. 
Thanks to the dominance of liberal democracy, economic growth and stability, 
universal health care and social welfare provisions, it has increasingly become 
an attractive destination for migrants. While the world has not become 
more migratory over the last half a century—the share of people who live in 
a country where they were not born has remained close to 3 percent of the 
global population—Europe has absorbed an ever-larger share of the world’s 
international migrants (Czaika & De Haas, 2014). While this creates plenty of 
opportunities for further economic growth, it has also caused fears as national 
governments have partially lost control of those who enter their territory 
owing to the opening of borders within the Schengen area. This problem was 
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acknowledged long before the refugee crisis. The Schengen Treaty provides for 
a uniform visa system, and steps were taken to strengthen the EU’s external 
borders. Later, Frontex was established to monitor and control the latter. The 
refugee crisis has shown, however, that these borders are permeable, which 
fuels xenophobia and racism and bolsters Eurosceptic parties.
The immigration threat is fivefold. First of all, there is a fear that Europe 
will be overrun by political refugees and economic migrants from developing 
countries, notably Africa and the Middle East. This ‘invasion’ notion, which 
has even taken hold in some academic circles (e.g., Collier, 2014; Betts & 
Collier, 2018), is reinforced by images of boats overflowing with refugees and 
economic migrants desperate to reach European shores, as well as reports on 
the number of migrants and refugees entering Europe that fail to contextualize 
the situation (cf. Lucassen & De Haas, 2017). Second, some national citizens 
fear that the arrival of large groups of refugees will be too costly. Refugees 
receive shelter, clothing, education, medical treatment, etc., while draining 
social welfare funds due to their low level of labor market participation. This 
fear is especially present in North-Western European states with a strong 
welfare system—rich countries which many migrants want to reach once they 
set foot in Italy or Greece. Third, there is anxiety that terrorists might hide 
among the refugees. This security threat has to be viewed in the context of 
9/11, the rise of the Islamic State, and the recent terrorist attacks in European 
cities—Madrid (2004), London (2005/2017), Paris (2015/2016), Brussels 
(2016), Nice (2016), Barcelona (2017), Berlin (2016), and Stockholm (2017), 
the last two being committed by (rejected) asylum seekers. Fourth, there is 
a fear that European values might crumble: many newcomers are Muslims, 
and Islam is often viewed as incompatible with Western values (separation 
of church and state, gender equality, etc.). The mass assaults on women that 
took place in Cologne, Hamburg, and other German cities on New Year’s 
Eve 2016 had a profound impact in this respect. The fifth and final fear is that 
refugees will turn out to be ‘unassimilable elements’ in European societies 
in the long run (Lucassen, 2005).
European countries must deal with highly conflicting forces. On the one 
hand globalization, free markets, and international treaties—e.g., the 1951 
Refugee Convention, the Schengen Agreement and the European Convention 
on Human Rights—push for open borders and the welcoming of newcomers 
for work, study, family reunification, and asylum purposes. On the other 
hand, there is a desire to control and curb migration and close borders, as the 
unrestrained influx of immigrants weighs on welfare systems, poses security 
threats (there may be criminals and terrorists among them), and might create 
a divide between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Favell & Hansen, 2002). The latter 
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is especially true for non-Western immigrants who score consistently worse 
on integration scores compared to Western immigrants. Previously, these 
problems were mostly handled through visa policies—making it difficult or 
even impossible for economic migrants from developing countries to enter 
European territory, while keeping the Union’s external borders tightly shut. 
This system has proved unsustainable in recent years under much increased 
migratory pressures, so that many member states started to act on a more 
individual basis. This led to divergent approaches, and a combination of 
short-term, mainly ad hoc measures intended to deal with immediate problems 
rather than develop a long-term solution. The Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration, a document negotiated and prepared by the 
United Nations, constitutes, by contrast, a long-term vision on migration 
policies on an international scale. The compact lists 23 objectives and com-
mitments related to migration, highlighting migrant rights and the need for 
evidence-based migration policies (International Organization for Migration, 
2018). Although nonbinding under international law, the compact was widely 
debated in several countries as many politicians feared its endorsement would 
stimulate migration, and criticized the compact for its lack of distinction 
between documented and undocumented migration. In Belgium, tensions 
related to the country’s approval of the compact caused a collapse of the 
federal government in December 2018. Nonetheless, Belgium (and Sweden) 
endorsed this compact mere days later at the UN General Assembly, along 
with 150 other countries (Segers & Kerckaert, 2018).
In this chapter we will describe and compare the current immigration and 
integration policies of two Schengen member states: Belgium and Sweden, 
with a focus on economic migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees. Also, 
we will describe how these countries have dealt with the recent refugee 
crises. Subsequently, we will make a systematic comparison of migration 
and integration in Belgium and Sweden today, using key policy areas from 
the Migrant Integration Policy Index. Finally, we will make an inventory 
of key similarities and differences, and draw some general conclusions. The 
comparison between Belgium and Sweden is interesting as the latter has 
often been perceived as the ultimate immigration-friendly nation, with top 
integration scores, while Belgium scores considerably worse and the Belgian 
government has used a much more negative discourse on immigration, and 
has even launched social media campaigns to discourage potential asylum 
seekers from coming to Belgium.
Unless otherwise stated, we define asylum seekers as migrants who have 
applied for asylum and who are awaiting a decision; refugees as migrants 
whose asylum application has been approved; and economic migrants as 
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people who were in no particular danger in their country of origin and whose 
main motivation was to improve their socio-economic position. These are 
ideal types, in the Weberian sense, as economic and political motives are 
often mixed up in practice. Asylum seekers from Syria or Iraq who arrive in 
Greece or Italy, but continue their journey to North-western Europe, have 
in fact political and economic motives.
The Belgian case
Belgium has responded to the refugee crisis in an ambivalent way. Theo 
Francken, the Secretary of State for Asylum, Migration, and Administrative 
Simplification at the time of the refugee crisis up until the governmental 
collapse in December 2018, has described Belgium’s policy toward asylum 
seekers ‘as strict, but fair, [and] not too gentle’. This presupposes that the 
Belgian government has gone to great lengths to curb the influx of asylum 
seekers and economic migrants, and to return those who have no right to live 
in Belgium to their country of origin or a responsible third country. Francken 
has used tough public discourse. Concerning undocumented immigrants 
Francken used wording such as ‘chasing them’ or ‘cleaning up’, for instance. 
Furthermore, he wants to fight human traffickers and supports both the 
creation of asylum centers and the relocation of application procedures 
outside Europe as a way to end undocumented immigration. Francken has 
also criticized what he calls ‘Europe’s open border policy’ as it might—in his 
eyes—imply the end of the Union. Moreover, he has launched campaigns 
on social media directed toward Iraqis to discourage them from coming to 
Belgium. There have been several incidents in which Francken’s policy was 
criticized as too harsh or lacking humanity, such as the case of Sudanese 
refugees who refused to apply for asylum and were repatriated, after which 
some of them were allegedly tortured once back in Sudan. This sparked 
a political crisis in Belgium. Francken maintained his position, however. 
Public protests also arose against Francken and Belgium’s interior minister 
Jan Jambon (also N-VA) when a Kurdish-Iraqi toddler was killed by a police 
bullet in the spring of 2018. The girl and her family had been removed from 
the United Kingdom and were chased by the Belgian police as they tried to 
return to the UK in a van with other transit migrants (Austin & Rankin, 2018).
The way Francken is portrayed in news media and the type of discourse 
he maintains seem to suggest that Belgium’s immigration and integration 
policy is in essence a one-man show, and it suggests that a breach in Belgium’s 
immigration and integration policy has appeared in recent years; one from 
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a very liberal to a very restrictive policy. However, there seems to be a large 
discrepancy between Belgium’s actual migration and asylum policy and the 
way Francken and his administration frame and report on it, the latter being 
largely tailored for the electorate of the N-VA, a nationalist party (of which 
Francken is a member) which favors a strict policy on immigration. This 
discrepancy has been noted both by the left and the far-right (cf. Buxant, 
2017). While the policy is presented as extremely strict, statistics from the 
Belgian Immigration Office and Fedasil, as well as reports by Myria, suggest 
the opposite: Belgium has become in fact more liberal toward refugees than 
under Francken’s (liberal) predecessor, Maggie De Block. Statistics show 
that the refugee crisis led to an increase in first-time asylum applications in 
Belgium from about 1,000 in January 2014 to 6,360 in September 2016, after 
which a decline set in. From March 2016 on, the number of first-time asylum 
applications was back to its January 2014 level.
In the 2014-2016 period, most asylum applications were made by Syrians 
(15,540), Iraqis (10,950), and Afghans (10,760). In 2016, 63 percent of all asylum 
seekers were male and 37 percent female, with a clear over-representation of 
men in the 18-34 age category. However, distributions by ethnicity show that 
the over-representation of (young) males is mainly caused by some refugee 
groups, first of which are the Afghans (86 percent male). For the Syrians 
there was only a slight over-representation of men (52 percent male) among 
the asylum seekers, from which one may assume that many Syrians arrived 
with their families (Myria, 2017: 90).
The increase in asylum applications in 2014 and 2015 was considerable 
and required action. It was met by an increase in the number of reception 
centers. The figures show that the Belgian authorities made sufficient efforts 
to give shelter to all applicants. On January 1, 2014, reception centers had 
the capacity to receive 20,182 individuals, with a 73 percent occupancy rate. 
This number rose to 33,659 on January 1, 2016 when 96 percent of the actual 
capacity was in use. Subsequently a decline set in, and by January 2018 the 
number of openings had decreased to 23,283, of which 76 percent were in 
use (Fedasil, 2018). Also interesting is the evolution of the acceptance rate of 
asylum applications, which has increased strongly and is very high in the case 
of Syrians. Next, it seems that with regard to the humanitarian visa, priority 
was given to Christian Syrians and other religious minorities over Muslims 
(Myria, 2017). Moreover, there were some rescue actions, e.g., in Aleppo in 
2015, which specifically targeted Christians (Decreus, 2015).
A special challenge in Belgium is caused by transit migrants who want 
to reach the United Kingdom. Many transit migrants used to settle in a 
self-constructed camp in Calais, Northern France, at a stone’s throw from 
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the Belgian border. However, after this so-called ‘Jungle of Calais’ had been 
dismantled, security measures were taken to prevent refugees from trying 
to reach the UK through the port or the Eurotunnel. As a result, migration 
routes have shifted and Brussels’ North station—from where buses depart to 
Great Britain—has become a new hub to embark on a dangerous trip across 
the English Channel. Consequently, many refugees cluster in the nearby 
Maximilian park and live in very poor conditions. This has led to controversy 
because this is happening only a few kilometers from the European institu-
tions. While the Belgian authorities want the transit migrants to apply for 
asylum, the targeted group of refugees refuses as they aim to continue their 
journey—often facilitated by human traffickers—to the United Kingdom, 
while they lack legal status in Belgium. In order to solve these problems, 
Belgium and the UK aim to cooperate more intensively (Torfs, 2018).
In late 2018, the United Nations unveiled the Global Compact for Safe, 
Orderly and Regular Migration which lists 23 objectives and commitments 
related to migration, highlighting migrant rights and the need for evidence-
based migration policies (International Organization for Migration, 2018). 
The Belgian federal government was involved in its development, and initially 
agreed to endorse the compact at the UN General Assembly in Decem-
ber 2018. However, in the weeks leading up to this endorsement, majority 
parties clashed over the contents of the compact, as they did in several other 
countries. N-VA, citing issues with the compact’s content and fearing a new 
wave of migrants, no longer wanted to endorse the compact and requested 
that Belgium would abstain from the vote in the General Assembly. Other 
majority parties disagreed with this stance, and wanted to go ahead with the 
earlier agreed-upon endorsement. This tension eventually led to the collapse 
of the Belgian federal government in December 2018. Despite this, Belgium 
endorsed the compact at the UN General Assembly some weeks later (Segers 
& Kerckaert, 2018).
The Swedish case
Sweden was one of Europe’s main receivers of asylum seekers during the 
recent refugee crisis. In 2015, Sweden reached a historical high in the num-
ber of asylum seekers: almost 163,000 applications were made in that year 
(Krzyżanowski, 2018; Swedish Migration Agency, 2019). Afterwards the 
government took action in order to limit the influx of asylum seekers and to 
minimize potential negative impacts of the refugee crisis on Swedish society. 
Among the measures taken were the temporary reinstallation of border 
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checks, restrictions on the attainment of residence permits, and attempts 
to facilitate the repatriation of rejected asylum seekers to their countries of 
origin. Notwithstanding these restrictive measures, Sweden agreed in 2017 
on the relocation of 2,800 refugees who applied for asylum in Italy or Greece. 
This underlines the willingness of the Swedish government to cooperate with 
other European administrations regarding migration and integration issues 
(Swedish Ministry of Justice, 2018).
Notwithstanding the restrictive measures taken from the end of 2015 on, 
the highest number of granted asylum applications was reached in 2016—due 
to the time-lag caused by the asylum procedure itself—when, according to 
the Swedish Migration Agency, 30,863 persons obtained asylum over the 
months of October, November, and December. In 2017, the number of granted 
applications started to drop and in 2018 it reached numbers (somewhat more 
than 10,000 for the whole year), which were actually lower than before the 
refugee crisis (Swedish Migration Agency, 2019).
The population composition of the asylum-seekers and refugees in Sweden 
resembles that of Belgium to a very large degree. The greatest numbers of 
refugees in Sweden are of Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi origin. For 2016, the 
numbers of asylum applications for individuals of those origin countries 
were respectively 5,459, 2,969, and 2,758. Overall, about 60 percent of the 
applicants were male and some 40 percent were female. The majority of 
asylum seekers are young: more than half of them were below the age of 25 
(Swedish Migration Agency, 2019).
Traditionally, the Nordic countries have the reputation of having generous 
welcoming policies toward all groups of migrants, including refugees. Accord-
ing to Tanner (2016) this attitude has changed to become more hostile since 
the rise of populist parties. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats were founded 
in 1988 but were paid little attention to in the political debate for almost two 
decades. In the election of 2010, the party gained enough votes to become 
represented in the parliament with 20 of the 349 seats. Since then the party has 
grown in popularity and the anti-multicultural and anti-integration arguments 
have remained high on the party ś agenda. In the elections of 2014 and 2018, 
the party has consistently gained more votes, the latest outcome being that it 
holds 62 seats. In the most recent election, the two main parliamentary blocs 
gained an even number of seats, resulting in ‘deadlock’ for months. After four 
months of negotiations between parties it was clear that a new government 
could be approved and installed in January 2019.
Even in the years prior to the ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, the increasing numbers 
of refugees from Syria and Iraq led to frictions in Swedish society. In August of 
2014, the Swedish Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, addressed the importance 
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of showing tolerance in his summer speech, a few weeks before the election: “I 
know this will cause friction. I therefore call on the Swedish people to show patience 
and open their hearts” (quoted in The Local, August 16, 2014). A year later, at 
the beginning of September, the new Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven, called for 
the same at a rally for refugees. For the election in 2018, opinion polls showed 
that immigration and integration were the main issues of concern for voters.
Since turning from being a poor country with a major emigration to North 
America in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to a rich country in 
the second half of the twentieth century, Sweden has welcomed immigrants 
and refugees in record numbers. Labor immigration was crucial for the 
country to develop and become the welfare state it has been recognized as. 
Back then, an ageing population was not an issue, but now it is one of the 
top societal challenges for Sweden and many other countries worldwide. The 
changing demography, due to immigration, has been highlighted as one way 
to meet this challenge. Integration is seen as one of the key factors in this 
discussion (cf. Bengtsson & Scott, 2011).
Comparing Belgium and Sweden
While the previous sections drew a more general picture of how the Belgian 
and Swedish governments have dealt with the refugee crisis, a more systemic 
comparison of the countries’ immigration and integration policies will be 
discussed in this section. We will focus on key policy areas from the Migrant 
Integration Policy Index (MIPEX): family reunification, permanent residence, 
labor market mobility, anti-discrimination, education, political participation, 
health, and access to nationality. This index is a tool specifically designed to 
compare the integration policies of all 28 EU member states, along with those 
of 10 other countries (Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New 
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA). Through 167 policy 
indicators, this index attempts to create a multi-layered picture of migrants’ 
opportunities to participate in their new environment. Sweden, with an 
overall score of 78 percent at the time of the most recent measurement in 
2015, is the highest-scoring country in the index. Belgium ranks 7th with a 
score of 67 percent (see also Table 1.2).
When breaking down the overall integration policy score by policy area, we 
note that Sweden scores very high on labor market mobility, while Belgium’s 
score is much lower. Key aspects in this regard are the fact that in Sweden 
migrants can look for employment from the day they arrive as there are no 
distinctions made between Swedish and non-Swedish citizens in labor market 
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regulations. In Belgium, migrants have to obtain citizenship to gain equal rights 
to public sector jobs, and other regulations also restrict access to the private 
job market for noncitizens. Access to general support is high in both countries, 
but it is in terms of targeted support for newcomers that Sweden distinguishes 
itself from Belgium. In particular the 2009 Labor Market Introduction Act 
in Sweden laid out a framework which made it easier for newcomers to learn 
Swedish and find jobs that match their skills (MIPEX, 2015).
In terms of family reunion, we find that Sweden and Belgium have similar 
policies, as newcomers with (at least) one-year permits can be reunited with 
their partners. In Belgium, members of low-income groups (with an income 
<120 percent of minimum ‘social integration’ income level) are not allowed 
to reunite with their partners. Such an income restriction on family reunion 
is present in only seven other EU countries. In Sweden, a basic fee per family 
member is required, with lower fees in effect for refugees and permanent 
residents. The procedure through which reunion is decided is usually short 
in both countries, and family members can mount a legal challenge in case 
of rejection. In Sweden, spouses and adult children admitted under family 
reunification provisions enjoy near-equal social rights to the Sweden-based 
families, while in Belgium labor market integration for reunited family 
members is delayed (MIPEX, 2015).
Sweden has the best policy on education for newcomers, particularly in 
terms of targeting the needs of immigrant pupils and making sure schools 
facilitate these as much as possible. Schools also receive compensation for 
extra costs related to bilingual pupils. Furthermore, the Swedish government 
encourages schools to seize new opportunities in terms of skills that these 
migrant pupils bring to their education. For pupils it is sometimes possible to 
choose courses in their mother tongue. Belgium lags somewhat behind in this 
policy area, as economically disadvantaged pupils often receive insufficient 
support, and there are no systematic solutions to socio-economic concen-
tration or related problems of high turnover of teachers in disadvantaged 
schools. A lack of evidence-based policy in this area is also notable in Belgium 
(MIPEX, 2015).
Neither Belgium nor Sweden scores particularly highly on health policy 
for newcomers. Both countries make efforts to ensure that all newcomers are 
entitled to the same health benefits as citizens, and access policies are in place 
to ensure migrants know about these entitlements and other health benefits. 
In Belgium, it appears problematic that reporting undocumented migrants 
is not explicitly prohibited in professional codes of conduct. Health services 
are only partially responsive to the needs of migrants in both Belgium and 
Sweden—and many other countries in the EU (MIPEX, 2015).
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When considering political participation, we find a large divide between 
the two countries. Sweden ranks 7th in this area, and has slightly favorable 
opportunities for political participation. We note this regarding voting rights 
(some of the most inclusive in Europe), the strong position of NGOs, and cities’ 
constant experimenting with new methods of democratic and participatory 
methods for migrants. Voting rights in Belgium are more restricted, having 
become open to foreigners only since the 2006 local elections. It also appears 
that in regional elections in Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia, non-EU citizens 
do not have voting rights. The consultative bodies (that represent migrants) 
from Belgium are some of the weakest in Europe. Political liberties are the 
same in both countries, as non-EU citizens are guaranteed the right to join 
or form associations or political parties (MIPEX, 2015).
The policy area of permanent residence for newcomers is the only one in 
which Belgium ranks higher than Sweden, even topping all other countries. 
Here, EU and non-EU citizens are treated equally in their path to permanent 
residence, simply requiring that they have a basic income. The procedure to 
obtain permanent residence is often short and clear, but in Sweden there is 
some cause for concern as this procedure is less discretionary than in most 
EU countries. In both Belgium and Sweden, any permanent resident may 
work, study, and live in the country, enjoying the same rights as other citizens. 
Associated with permanent residency is access to nationality. Here, we 
find that both countries tolerate dual citizenship for both immigrants and 
emigrants. The eligibility standards are fairly similar, as migrants need to 
be long-term residents first (e.g., having lived in the country for at least five 
years, attained permanent residency). Following this, they must also pass 
‘good character’ requirements and pay a basic fee. In Belgium, an additional 
employment requirement—one of the most demanding in Europe—is also 
in effect, making the path to obtaining nationality harder (MIPEX, 2015).
The final policy area under consideration in MIPEX is that of anti-
discrimination. The definition of discrimination in both countries is fairly 
comprehensive, ensuring that actors cannot discriminate based on ethnicity, 
religion, nationality, etc. The procedures to enforce these regulations are 
robust, with legal aid, NGO support, etc. The Interfederal Centre for Equal 
Opportunities (Belgium) and the Equality Ombudsman (Sweden) are strong 
institutions which support victims of discrimination. In Sweden, more effort 
is undertaken to inform the public about discrimination, and to include anti-
discrimination clauses in public contracts than in Belgium (MIPEX, 2015).
In any event, the MIPEX evaluates written policy. If the multicultural 
project does not run deeper than words in official documents, there is a much 
greater likelihood of failure (see also Michael Adams, 2017).
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Similarities and differences
In the course of the twentieth century both Belgium and Sweden transformed 
from emigration into immigration countries. Both countries faced strong 
immigration in the post-war era owing to the economic boom they were 
experiencing. However, after some period of strong labor influx, the govern-
ments of both countries felt the urge to curb immigration; in Sweden from the 
mid-1960s on, and in Belgium in the early 1970s following the oil crisis (Borevi, 
2012; Lesthaeghe, 2000). They were successful in reducing immigration in 
the short run—for some time immigration fell even below emigration—but 
failed in the long run. Immigration barriers turned temporary migrants into 
permanent migrants, and as a result of family reunification, family forma-
tion, and the influx of refugees, immigration soon started to rise again, and 
reached figures during the last two decades which have never been registered 
before (Grönberg, 2013). The recent refugee crises have added to this, but an 
important structural component is formed by intra-European immigration, 
which has gone up ever since the Schengen Zone was established and the EU 
was systemically extended.
Belgium and Sweden have made efforts to receive and integrate newcomers, 
and both countries strive for a multicultural society, which means that they 
prefer a salad bowl over a melting pot model (Martens & Caestecker, 2001; 
Tawat, 2014). This implies that in the imagined ideal society, newcomers 
enjoy equal opportunities, while they are able to maintain their heritage 
culture, religion, and identity. In both countries this ideal is only partially put 
into practice, and it turns out to be a far greater challenge for non-Western 
immigrants when compared to Western immigrants—but our systematic 
analysis of the MIPEX scores showed that Sweden out-performs Belgium in 
all domains of migrant integration, except for the field of obtaining permanent 
residency. Sweden scores especially well in terms of labor market integration.
The different performances in terms of migrant integration can be partly 
ascribed to the fact that Sweden developed a comprehensive integration 
policy much earlier on in the twentieth century, while Belgium kept viewing 
post-war immigrants as ‘temporary elements’ in Belgian society until the late 
1970s. It was only during the 1990s that a real integration policy was being 
formulated, when in practice huge disparities between natives and immigrants 
had already come into being (Martens & Caestecker, 2001). This means 
that Belgium has been overtaken by events and policies developed since the 
1990s aimed largely at healing old wounds, while integration policy should 
be forethoughtful. The late reaction of the Belgian government is a missed 
opportunity, but it has above all given incentives to frame immigration in a 
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negative way and to curb it as much as possible, although with no success. 
During the previous government’s tenure, immigration and acceptance 
rates for asylum seekers have increased further, notwithstanding the strong 
anti-immigration discourse maintained by the Secretary of State for Asylum, 
Migration, and Administrative Simplification.
In general, Sweden is a more immigrant-friendly nation than Belgium, and 
it offers newcomers the same superb social welfare provisions as native-born 
Swedes. This reveals that Sweden is very generous and regards immigrants 
as highly valuable. This might be partially related to the fact that Sweden is 
a relatively large country with a small population, while Belgium is a small 
country with a relatively large population, but it also signifies cultural differ-
ences (Sweden aims to be a leading nation in terms of humanitarian aid and 
social equality), and a failure of Belgium’s government to identify and use 
immigrants’ human capital in an efficient way. More generally, immigration 
is framed in Sweden in terms of opportunities, while the Belgian govern-
ment has presented immigration more as a challenge or even a burden. In 
fact, immigration can be both—an opportunity and a burden—and much 
depends on the willingness of immigrants to adapt to the host society, and 
the willingness of the receiving society—both the government and the native 
population—to assist them in this difficult process. This is rewarding, also 
economically. The better immigrants perform, for instance, in the labor 
market, the less they drain from social welfare provisions, and the more they 
contribute to the maintenance of the social system itself.
No matter what attempts from right-wing parties will be launched to 
curb immigration, and no matter what kind of sophisticated policy on the 
European level will be developed, immigration into European member states 
will continue as long as Europe remains safe and prosperous. It is therefore 
better and wiser to put the greatest efforts into the integration of immigrants 
and to develop policies which counteract segregation and discrimination in all 
domains of society. This requires a positive, open attitude toward newcomers 
from the receiving society, no matter what reason migrants may have had to 
move to the receiving country. Governments set an example for society at large 
by the type of policies they develop and apply, but maybe even more so by the 
language which politicians use in public. In this respect, Sweden cannot serve 
only as an example for Belgium, but for the majority of European societies. 
Government policy should not be guided by fear, but by thoughtfulness, 
intelligence, foresight, and courage.
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The Refugee Situation as Portrayed in 
News Media : A Content Analysis of 
Belgian and Swedish Newspapers – 
2015-2017
Rozane De Cock, Ebba Sundin, and Valériane Mistiaen
Introduction
In the fall of 2015, one of the most common images carried by the European 
news media was that of refugees walking along train tracks in the hope of 
reaching various destinations in Europe. Their faces showed tiredness, worry, 
but also relief. For many of them the long journey by foot was par for the 
course after the dangerous crossing of the Mediterranean Sea.
The media expounded on many themes—the journey itself, the political 
reactions in the various European countries, the European Union’s ponderous 
scramble for solutions likely to help these people seeking the safety of the 
EU borders, and civil society’s response to what has been referred to as the 
refugee crisis.
In this chapter we compare the portrayal of the refugee crisis in Swedish 
and Belgian newspapers from 2015 to 2017: news reporting, features, debates, 
columns, and letters to the editors. The portrayal touches on many facets of 
the European situation in the three years in question: from compassion and 
humanitarian concerns to racism and xenophobia.
News reporting on refugees
Studies that pertain to refugees and immigration can be found within the 
‘agenda setting’ research field. Many have their starting-point in specific 
cultural areas and countries. In Belgium and Sweden the issue has attracted 
many researchers over a long period of time, since both nations have a history 
of immigration.
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In a recent report Strömbäck, Andersson, and Nedlund (2017) conclude 
that Swedish studies focus on various aspects of the refugees and immigration 
issue, such as historical overviews, stereotyping, and racism, adding that few 
studies look at the way the news media are portraying this issue—especially 
from 2010 on. What they found in their literature overview was that the news 
media are problem-orientated and that they tend to focus on the point of view 
of the authorities (see also Chapter 5). In their study of newspaper reporting 
between 2010 and 2015, they conclude that negative portrayals of refugees 
are more common than positive ones. This is in line with older research by 
Van Gorp (2005) indicating that in Belgian newspapers refugees were most 
often portrayed as victims or intruders and the existence of a negativity 
bias in Flemish television news (Jacobs, Meeusen, & d’Haenens, 2016). De 
Cleen et al. (2017) stress the discursive continuity of negative discourse on 
migration-related topics in Flanders and thus also in the latest ‘refugee crisis’. 
This discourse is, according to them, only adapted to the current situation and 
is therefore still portraying refugees as a cultural, economic, or security threat.
Furthermore, Strömbäck et al. (2017) mention a UNHCR report that focuses 
on news reporting on the refugee situation (Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 
2016). This report highlights differences in coverage of the refugees/migrants 
issue in five EU countries, and concludes that the most positive reporting is that 
of Swedish newspapers as compared to coverage in Spain, Italy, Germany, and 
the UK. Compared to Strömbäck et al. (2017), this shows that while negative 
portrayal of refugees dominated in the Swedish newspapers, it was still more 
positive than that to be found in the press of other European countries.
The UNHCR report devotes one chapter to the Swedish press coverage. 
Written by Askanius and Linné (2016), this chapter is based on a sample 
of circa 300 articles from a nine-month period in 2014-2015. Immigration 
figures, mortality statistics, mafia/trafficking, and political response/policy 
are among the themes that score high for all three Swedish newspapers. 
Both Strömbäck et al. (2017) and Berry et al. (2016) provide descriptions of 
the media representation of the refugee situation up to 2015—that is almost 
our study’s starting point. Furthermore a number of studies review previous 
research on the portrayal of refugees/migrants in European and Scandinavian 
countries. For example, Camauër (2011) lists some of the early works of the 
2000s and concludes as follows:
Generally, the reviews suggest that a majority of the studies have concluded 
that ethnic minority groups, refugees and migrants often appear in the 
reporting as unadjusted, marginalized, crime perpetrators and/or ‘threats’, 
and are stereotypically represented. (Camauër, 2011: 38)
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Horsti, Hultén, and Titley (2014) contribute to the field with their work on 
national public service media (PSM) as well as a comparison between some 
European countries, including Belgium and Sweden (Flemish Public Broad-
casting and Swedish Public Service media and their policies and programs on 
cultural diversity). The study targets the policy question among the national 
PSM companies. The Belgian perspective has its own complexity owing to the 
country’s multilingual structure. Nevertheless, Dhoest (2014: 119) concludes 
that “the presence of ethnic minorities in Flemish public broadcasting is 
problematic but not hopeless”. As for the Swedish study, it highlights a lack 
of focus on diversity issues in the policy documents (Hultén, 2014).
Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) conducted a content analysis of 1,200 
articles selected in the newspapers of countries that lay on the migratory 
routes used during the 2015 refugee crisis: Greece, Serbia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, and Germany. It is worth mentioning that politicians’ voices 
dominate the press coverage at the expense of citizens and refugees, which 
“reconstitutes and re-legitimizes their exclusion” (p. 629). According to 
Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) this is done by silencing them as well as 
through decontextualization and collectivization, e.g., including refugees 
into collective referents such as nationality. Moreover the authors argue 
that using humanitarian and security-oriented terminology and portraying 
refugees as victims or threats contributes to the ‘refugee misrecognition’. 
The work of Sumuvuori et al. (2016) comparing Finnish, British, and Belgian 
newspapers (the quality papers Le Soir and De Morgen) on their reporting on 
refugees during early 2016 also concludes that politicians and experts are given 
a forum in the press, whereas refugees remain voiceless (see also Chapter 5).
The last two arguments are put forward by the Council of Europe report 
Media Coverage of the ‘Refugee Crisis’: A Cross-European Perspective, by 
Georgiou and Zaborowski (2017), who content-analyzed the quality press 
of eight European countries (Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Serbia, and UK) from July to November 2015 to pinpoint 
any evolution in the news coverage. They labeled a first period as ‘careful 
tolerance’ in connection with the mass drownings in the Mediterranean 
Sea (July). A second period was titled ‘ecstatic humanitarianism’ as Europe 
appeared for once as “a place of (relative) solidarity to the plight of asylum 
seekers” (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 2017: 8) after Alan Kurdi’s death. The 
last month of the study (November) coincided with an increase of ‘fear and 
securitization’ in the wake of the Paris terrorist attacks. Although briefly 
discussed, this study also stressed that differences in coverage depend on 
various factors such as historical, socioeconomic, and political context, press 
culture, media regulation, ideology, and freedom (Georgiou & Zaborowski, 
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2017: 11-14). In this respect, it is important to set up multicultural comparative 
studies such as the IM2MEDIATE project. Not only are totally opposing 
media cultures worth an in-depth analysis; countries belonging to the same 
type of media system can also show intriguing differences and similarities. 
Within the widely used taxonomy of media systems by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004), Belgium and Sweden, along with the other Nordic countries, are part 
of the democratic corporatist section. Nevertheless, of all these countries, 
Belgium is the closest to the polarized pluralist model (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004, p. 169), which turns the comparison between the two countries’ news 
reporting on refugees into an interesting case study.
Methodology
This chapter is based on the findings of a quantitative content analysis of 
Belgian and Swedish newspapers’ representations of the refugees and im-
migration issue in the years 2015-2017. The study was divided into 11 periods 
spanning between March 21, 2015 and July 4, 2017. Period 1 runs from March 21 
to April 4, 2015. The idea here was to look at a period predating the summer 
of 2015, generally seen as the start of the so-called refugee crisis. Period 2 
runs from August 24 to September 20, 2015 and corresponds to the start 
of the ‘crisis’ period, which encompasses the appearance of refugee camps 
in Brussels’ Maximilian Park, the drowning of Alan Kurdi, and German 
chancellor Angela Merkel’s “Wir schaffen das”. The third period is the week of 
September 21-27, 2015. This was when European leaders reached an agreement 
on the settlement of refugees in the various EU member states as proposed by 
François Hollande and Angela Merkel. Only Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and 
the Czech Republic voted against the agreement. Period 4 runs from October 7 
to November 6, 2015 (the start of the resettlement in other EU member states 
of refugees having entered the EU through Greece and Italy). The fifth period 
revolves around the Cologne incident (January 1-7, 2016), in which many 
women were sexually assaulted during the German city’s New Year’s Eve 
celebrations. In the news this incident was linked by officials to refugees 
and migrants, sparking a heated debate on crime, refugees, cultural threats, 
and racism. It was in period 6 (March 17-23, 2016) that a highly controversial 
agreement was struck between the EU and Turkey, under which Turkey would 
prevent refugees from entering the EU in exchange for the cash needed to 
shelter them in Turkish camps as well as relaxed visa rules for Turkish people. 
The seventh period is that of the Olympic Games (August 5-22, 2016), which 
saw teams of refugee athletes enter the competition. Period 8 includes the 
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key moment of the Hungarian referendum (October 2 to 9, 2016), which 
asked the following question: “Do you want the European Union to be entitled 
to prescribe the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary 
without the consent of Parliament?” A clear signal was sent to the EU when 
98 percent of the voters answered in the negative, even though quorum 
requirements (participation of at least 50 percent of registered voters) were 
not met. The ninth period (October 17-30, 2016) is that of the ‘dismantlement 
of the Calais Jungle’—the forcible evacuation of a long-established refugee 
camp in Calais, a French town close to the Belgian border and the gateway 
to the UK. Adoption by the Hungarian Parliament of a law making it pos-
sible to detain asylum seekers upon arrival corresponds to our tenth period 
(March 7-13, 2017). Finally, period 11 runs from June 28 to July 4, 2017, a time 
when Italy considered closing its ports to NGO ships.
For the purposes of this study a total of 1,832 articles on refugees published 
by four Belgian newspapers (two Dutch-language and two French-language 
titles) and two Swedish newspapers were content-analyzed. Data collection 
was done using the GOPress, Europresse, and Factiva archives as well as 
online news media subscriptions (Belgium), and Media Archive Retriever 
(Sweden). For each media landscape, the main national quality newspaper 
and the largest popular newspaper were content-analyzed. All articles were at 
least 300 words long and contained the word refugee and/or the local language 
variants and synonyms.
The two Swedish newspapers are Dagens Nyheter and Aftonbladet. Dagens 
Nyheter can be described as an independent liberal daily newspaper (seven 
issues a week), founded in 1862. It is the quality paper with the highest 
circulation rates among national newspapers (over 600,000 copies—TS, 
2016). Aftonbladet is a popular daily (seven issues a week), founded in 1830 
and described as independent and social democratic. It ranks among Sweden’s 
major national popular papers, with a circulation of circa 550,000 copies (TS, 
2016). In total, 977 Swedish items were content-analyzed. The distribution 
between the two papers was: Dagens Nyheter (606) and Aftonbladet (371).
The Belgian Dutch-language newspapers include De Standaard and Het 
Laatste Nieuws. De Standaard was founded in 1918 as part of a Catholic-con-
servative tradition. In 2014-2015, according to the Belgian Information Center 
on Media (CIM), it was Flanders’ most read quality newspaper (16.9 percent 
of total coverage) while Het Laatste Nieuws reached 36.4 percent of the overall 
newspaper readership (CIM, 2018). Created in 1888 to support the Liberal 
Belgian Party, this paper is part of the Persgroep publishing company and 
is the most popular daily in Flanders. Le Soir is the most read broadsheet in 
French-language Belgium. In 2014-2015, it reached 18.7 percent of the total 
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newspaper readership. Le Soir was founded in 1887 by Emile Rossel as a 
politically independent paper within a liberal tradition. It is now part of the 
powerful Rossel group. The last newspaper in our study is the French-language 
L’Avenir, whose audience reach is 15.6 percent (CIM 2018). It is a Catholic daily 
first published in 1918. Today, L’Avenir is also the name of a Wallonia-oriented 
media group of nine newspapers—a major name in Belgium. In total, 855 
articles were studied for Belgium: 298 articles from De Standaard, 267 from 
Het Laatste Nieuws, 81 from Le Soir, and 209 from L’Avenir. Different article 
genres such as news reports, interviews, in-depth documentaries, editorials, 
columns, and letters to the editors are included in the sample as the selection of 
all these genres is part of the inclusion versus exclusion decisions taken by news 
professionals in a newsroom resulting in a final news product: the newspaper.
The research team developed a coding instrument (inspired by Berry, 
Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2016) that went through multiple rounds of adjust-
ments before pre-testing. The quantitative analysis was based on 51 variables. 
Some of the variables and variable values are the same as those of the UNHCR 
report, which will contribute to more comparable analyses. Twenty-two 
different themes were identified (number 23 was labeled “other” and mainly 
included articles about culture or art). The themes ranged from immigration 
figures to (human) rights to journey-related matters (search and rescue, 
mafia/traffic, mortality figures, aid supplies, humanitarian issues, rejection 
rate, etc.), to the immigration issue itself (civil and political response, racism), 
to all aspects pertaining to arrival and settlement (reception, post-arrival 
integration, economic threat, threat to national security, cultural threat, health 
risk for the country of destination, crime against/by refugees, success stories, 
etc.). Intercoder reliability was measured on a sample of Swedish (n = 30) and 
Belgian news articles (n = 30). Cohen’s kappa showed perfect reliability for 
some variables such as mentioning immigration figures and mentioning success 
stories. Other variables had a reliability score higher than .90 (for example, 
gender), or higher than .80 (among others, post-arrival integration, educational 
and occupational background). The religion, racism, mentioning humanitarian 
dimensions, and degree of collective portrayal variables scored above .70, with 
only a few variables scoring between .60 and .70 (such as family background).
In each news story the first three refugees mentioned were coded by gender 
in order of appearance. The total number of refugee and non-refugee actors 
quoted or paraphrased was also calculated. We recorded all mentions of 
religion—e.g., Christian, Muslim. The degree of collective portrayal was 
coded on a scale from 1 (highly collective portrayal) to 5 (highly individual 
portrayal) based on plural nouns, personal pronouns, statistics, and figures 
or metaphoric language used (e.g., floods, wave).
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Research question and hypotheses
For comparison purposes between the Swedish and Belgian newspapers, we 
formulated the following research question and hypotheses as guidelines for 
the comparative content analysis, based on the literature as presented above.
RQ: What were the most important thematic topics pertaining to refugees in the 
Swedish and Belgian newspapers in 2015-2017?
H1: Swedish newspapers pay more attention (expressed as prominence in the news, 
number and length of articles) to refugees than the Belgian press does.
H2: As time goes by, newspapers will devote less attention (expressed as a decrease 
in newsworthiness based on number and length of articles) to refugees.
H3: ‘News domestication’ results in the newspapers referring to the home country as 
the most important location of the news story—this for Sweden as well as Belgium.
H4: The ‘most important country of origin’ ranking does not match that of the 
asylum seekers registered in the two countries under study.
H5a: In news articles refugees are mostly presented as a collective rather than as 
individuals.
H5b: The Swedish press is less likely to portray refugees in a collective way than 
the Belgian press.
Results
First of all, we compared Swedish and Belgian newspapers with respect to 
the major thematic topics applied to refugees. When comparing the whole 
sample, we clearly see resemblances and differences between the two countries 
(Table 3.1). In both countries the papers primarily focus on political responses 
to the refugee situation and they both do so in nearly a quarter of all articles. 
Where they diverge is with the second most important theme: while the 
Belgian dailies zoom in on the aid supplies, the Swedish newspapers point 
at civil society’s response. Post-arrival integration is the third most common 
theme in the Belgian press, while in the Swedish press this place is taken by 
pieces on the refugees’ ordeal on land and at sea. Remarkably, the ‘journey’ 
theme is four times less frequent in the Belgian press. Welfare related events 
are reported on twice as often in Swedish newspapers, which also mention 
human rights more often. The ‘threat to national security’ theme is mentioned 
six times more often in Belgium as compared to Sweden. This might be 
explained by the March 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels’ subway and airport. 
A refugee as an economic threat, however, is not a commoner theme in Belgian 
newspapers. Crimes committed by refugees, mortality figures, and mafia/
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traffic are more present in the Belgian than in the Swedish press. Crimes 
and racist acts against refugees are more readily condemned by Swedish 
journalists than by their Belgian counterparts.
Table 3.1: Most important themes in news articles on refugees in per cent (N = 1832)
Theme Belgium Sweden
1. Immigration figures 3.2 2.0
2. Welfare 1.9 5.2
3. Aid supplies 18.9 5.3
4. Human rights 1.6 4.2
5. Refugee success stories 1.2 2.0
6. Civil society response 4.1 12.6
7. Political response/policy 25.3 26.1
8. Receiving refugees 5.3 3.2
9. Post-arrival integration 8.5 6.4
10. Humanitarian 3.7 2.5
11. Economic threat 1.5 2.5
12. Threat to national security 1.9 0.3
13. Cultural threat 0.8 0.5
14. Health risk for country of destination 0.2 0.1
15. Crime by refugees 2.3 0.9
16. Mortality figures 2.8 0.5
17. Search and rescue 1.1 0.7
18. Mafia/traffic 2.3 0.6
19. Journey 2.7 10.6
20. Rejecting 4.3 3.6
21. Crime on refugees 1.5 2.3
22. Racism 2.1 5.3
23. Other 2.7 2.5
Note: X2 (22) = 249, p < .001
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Newspaper attention, region, and evolution throughout time
Looking at the number of articles written on the refugee issue in the three 
years under study, we see that overall the two Swedish newspapers devote more 
attention to refugees (53.3 percent, n = 977) than all four Belgian newspapers 
combined (47.6 percent, n = 855), expressed both in percentages and absolute 
numbers. Concerning Belgium, taking regional differences into account 
the Dutch-language press devotes twice as many articles to refugees (30.8 
per cent, n = 565) as its French-language counterpart (15.8 percent, n = 290).
Another indicator of prominence in the news is word count. To compare 
word count in our three language regions (Sweden as well as Dutch- and 
French-language Belgium) an ANOVA test was performed, combined with a 
post-hoc Gabriel test for unequal group sizes (F(2,1828) = 29.9, p < .001). This 
showed that Swedish newspapers not only outweigh their Belgian counterparts 
in sheer number of published pieces pertaining to refugees, but also that 
Swedish articles are on average much longer (M = 813) than Dutch-language 
(M = 663) and French-language articles (M = 516). The Dutch-language articles 
are also significantly longer than the French-language ones.
Prominence in the news can also be shown by studying the layout of news-
papers in terms of item priority. An ANOVA test shows that, on average, news 
stories on refugees appear on page 10 of Belgium’s French-language papers, 
on page 12 in Swedish newspapers and even further back in Dutch-language 
newspapers (M = page 17); F(2,1828) = 59.6, p < .001. In other words our three 
regions are quite different with respect to the location of the relevant articles. 
Our data thus confirm Hypothesis 1, which states that Swedish newspapers 
pay more attention to refugees than the Belgian press does, except for article 
position, with French-language newspapers tending to be more upfront with 
their stories on refugees.
News cycle attention research predicts a decrease in newsworthiness as a 
topic gradually loses urgency. In other words our second hypothesis is that as 
time goes by newspapers will pay less attention to the refugee issue. This will 
be indicated by a decrease in news prominence—fewer articles published in a 
specific time period and smaller word count. Table 3.2 shows that in the spring 
of 2015 refugees bound for Europe already faced untold dangers—without 
the press feeling the need to report on this. Based on the total number of 
days content-analyzed as part of our study (10.1 percent), period 1 is clearly 
underreported (only 1.7 percent of the total number of published articles). 
However, reality indicators (see literature review) show that large numbers of 
refugees were already coming to Sweden and Belgium—a reality newspapers 
failed to reflect at the time. Seen from this perspective, period 7 (12.2 percent 
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versus 5.8 percent coverage) is underreported as well. Looking at period 3 
through 6, and 8 through 11, we notice that news coverage is in line with 
the expected, proportional attention expressed in number of days. Period 2 
encompasses no less than 35.8 percent of all articles in the sample, while time 
period length would lead us to expect a more proportionate amount of news 
attention—about 19 percent.
Indeed, news attention suddenly peaks when the events of the summer of 
2015 place the refugee issue squarely in the spotlight, with almost 36 percent 
of all articles published between 2015 and 2017. When plotting all articles on 
a graph (figure 3.1), what emerges is the typical pattern of a news wave as 
described by Wien and Elmelund-Præstekær (2009) and Vasterman (2005): 
the news cycle attention peaks in period 2, 4, and 9, reaching its highest level 
at first in period 2. This is followed by a calmer period 3, then by a second but 
lower peak in period 4. News attention ebbs before rising for the third time 
in period 9—a curve far less steep—before fading away throughout periods 
10 and 11. Since our data collection stops at the beginning of July 2017 and 
reporting follows the typical pattern of a structural news wave (Vasterman, 
2005), a new theme within the general refugee issue might generate another 
Table 3.2: Published articles on refugees (in n and %) per time period (2015-2017) in 
Swedish and Belgian newspapers compared to percentage of days in data collection 
period.




Percentage of published 
articles
1 10.1 32 1.7
2 19.0 656 35.8
3 4.7 115 6.3
4 20.3 398 21.7
5 4.7 80 4.4
6 4.7 88 4.8
7 12.2 106 5.8
8 4.7 69 3.8
9 9.5 161 8.8
10 5.4 70 3.8
11 4.7 57 3.1
Total 100.0 1832 100.0
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news cycle, although the starting peak is unlikely to reach the intensity of 
the one generated in the summer of 2015 (period 2).
As already mentioned, an article’s word count is another indicator of a 
topic’s prominence. Throughout our eleven periods there is only one signifi-
cant increase in word count (F(10,1820) = 3.34, p < .001), namely in our fifth 
period (see Figure 3.2). In this period negative news stories focused on the 
New Year’s Eve mass sexual assaults that took place in Cologne and other 
German cities, with links to crimes committed by migrants and refugees, 
often drawing on information given by officials. The length of these negative 
stories increases to an average of 1,022 words, to be contrasted with the word 
count of stories published in the summer of 2015 (the first news peak). These 
were no more than 653 words long on average, which is more in line with the 
overall average word count of the news articles (M = 720, SD = 621). Period 8 
Figure 3.1: Evolution in news attention expressed as number of published articles on 
refugees per studied time period (2015-2017) in Swedish and Belgian newspapers.
50 ROzanE dE cOck, Ebba sundIn, and vaLéRIanE MIstIaEn
generated the second largest word count average (M = 871) but the post hoc 
test does not show a significant difference from the other time periods. The 
stories in period 8 focus on the popular rejection of the mandatory settlement 
by the EU of “non-Hungarians” (i.e., refugees) in Hungary. Period 11 has the 
shortest articles (M = 637), but our hypothesis that news articles on refugees 
may become shorter in time is refuted.
Focus of news location
As per Hypothesis 3, the newspapers under study primarily focused on events 
that took place in their own country. In the case of Belgian newspapers 
nearly 60 percent of all stories on refugees are resolutely Belgian-centric. 
In Swedish newspapers Belgium is mentioned in only about 1 percent of 
all articles. Sweden is the first and most-often-mentioned location of news 
stories on refugees throughout the whole Swedish sample (circa 65 percent), 
while Sweden is only mentioned as most important location in less than 
1 percent of the Belgian pieces. This is a significant difference between the 
two countries (X2(18) = 1190, p < .001), in line with the ‘news domestication’ 
Figure 3.2: Evolution of average article word length during the studied periods in 
Swedish and Belgian newspapers
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hypothesis, which states that a newspaper’s home country is the main location 
mentioned in its articles. The EU in general is the second most mentioned 
location in both Belgian and Swedish newspapers (circa 10 percent). The 
balance is equally made up by neighboring countries. No peak in percentages 
occurs in mentions of Italy, Greece, and Turkey, even though most refugees 
entered the EU through these countries’ borders. The same can also be said 
for Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq: less than 2 percent of the articles have these 
countries as main location.
Hypothesis 4 states that the ‘most important country of origin’ ranking 
does not match the country of origin ranking of asylum seekers registered 
in the two countries under study. To test this hypothesis, in addition to each 
country’s ranking of the countries of origin, we also determined specific 
shares in the total number of asylum applications filed in Belgium and in 
Sweden (Eurostat, 2016b; 2017; 2018c). Generally speaking, with respect to 
actual shares of asylum seekers from the main countries of origins (for both 
Belgium and Sweden), the ranking follows the top 3 throughout 2015-2017, 
as shown in Table 3.3.
While this ranking is mostly respected in the newspaper articles, the 
prominence attributed to the share of nationalities of refugees in reality 
Table 3.3: Real world percentage of asylum seeker applications by country of origin 
(top3) compared to newspaper world share of attention for asylum seekers by country 
of origin for Belgium and Sweden in 2015 – 2017.
Year Country of 
origin








2015 Syria 29 26 29.0 33 29.3
Afghanistan 14 20 3.6 26 3.1
Iraq 10 24 5.2 13 2.6
2016 Syria 28 16 20.4 21 17.3
Afghanistan 15 16 6.3 10 3.9
Iraq 11 5 4.1 9 1.4
2017 Syria 16 19 23.6 24 6.9
Afghanistan 7 7 3.6 < 7 5.6
Iraq 7 < 6 10.9 7 2.8
Note: 2015: X2(7) = 386; p < .001; 2016: X2(6) = 73; p < .001; 2017: X2(6) = 16; p < .001 (Source for 
EU-28 and percentage share for Belgium and Sweden: Eurostat 2016b, 2017 and 2018c)
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does not correspond to their visibility in newspaper articles. The main focus 
of both Belgian and Swedish articles is on Syrian refugees. They do remain 
the largest share of refugees throughout the years under study, but this 
intense focus on Syrians in newspaper reporting is at the expense of other 
nationalities such as Afghanis and Iraqis. In 2015 almost one third of the 
news articles concentrated on Syrian refugees in Belgium and Sweden. This 
makes sense as the actual share of Syrian refugees is more or less the same 
in the two countries. Afghan and Iraqi refugees can be considered to have 
been overlooked as they are underrepresented in the newspaper world: with 
a share of only about 3 percent in Belgian and Swedish newspapers in 2015, 
Afghanis are heavily underrepresented compared to their share of a quarter 
to a fifth of the total number of asylum seekers in Belgium and Sweden. The 
same holds true for Iraqis, with an actual share of 24 percent in Belgium and 
13 percent in Sweden, while their newspaper share is only a few percent. This 
phenomenon recurs in 2016 and 2017, with the Belgian press over-representing 
the Syrian refugees as compared with the official Eurostat statistics. Such 
is not the case for Sweden: Syrians are underrepresented in the newspaper 
share, as seen in Table 3.3.
Individual or collective portrayal?
Representing refugees as a faceless throng fleeing a foreign land while facing 
death tends to deny them any individuality. Based on previous studies of 
‘refugee reporting’, we expect the news articles to portray refugees more as 
a massive group rather than individuals. For the whole sample in general 
the slant of the articles is indeed moderately to highly collective (M = 1.51, 
SD = 1.07). Three quarters (76.5 percent) of all Belgian and Swedish articles 
represent refugees as a massive, undifferentiated group—an unending stream. 
On the other end of the continuum, less than 4 percent of all articles portray 
refugees in an individual fashion. Finally, about 20 percent of the articles mix 
collective and individual portrayals.
We expected the Swedish press to portray refugees in a less monolithic 
manner. For these statistical results we looked at the Swedish versus the 
Belgian articles (t-test) and then separately at the Dutch-language articles, the 
French-language articles, and the Swedish articles (ANOVA-test). Both tests 
showed that our hypothesis was not supported. We measured ‘collectivity’ 
on a scale from 1= very collective to 5= very individual. The Swedish press 
portrays the refugees in a significantly more collective manner (M = 1.35) as 
compared with the Belgian press (M = 1.69) (t(1505,1830) = 6.74, p < .001). Of 
the three regions under study Sweden (M = 1.35) remains the one whose press 
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has the most collective outlook on refugees, with Belgium’s French-language 
(M = 1.8) and Dutch-language (M = 1.63) papers tending to favor individual 
points of view more (F(2, 1829)=26.5, p < .001).
Conclusion
This study’s overall research question was an attempt to define the most impor-
tant themes to be found in Swedish and Belgian newspapers in the years 2015-2017 
regarding the refugee crisis. To answer this question we content-analyzed 1,832 
news articles published in six newspapers over 11 periods based on major events.
As indicated by our results there were many different themes accompanying 
both the coverage of the crisis and the debates it provoked. In both countries 
political responses—both negative and positive—focused on domestic points 
of view. Our first four hypotheses were confirmed. Swedish newspapers pub-
lished more numerous and longer articles on the topic. We identified three 
peak attention periods (period 2, period 4, and to a smaller extent period 9) but 
the summer of 2015 (period 2) remains the most important period in terms of 
news production. This period corresponds to what Georgiou and Zaborowski 
(2017) labeled “ecstatic humanitarianism”. Our fourth hypothesis shed light on 
the fact that the actual ranking of the countries of origin of registered asylum 
seekers did not reflect the press’s attempts at classification. The main focus in 
both Belgian and Swedish newspapers is on Syrian refugees. This is a problem 
inasmuch it could lead to public misperception of the “real” and “good” refugees 
(Szcepanik, 2016) coming from Syria as they embody the “dreamed archetype 
of the refugee” (Akoka, 2011) and deserve media attention, as opposed to “the 
others” coming from other countries and being underexposed.
The results also showed differences between Belgian and Swedish news 
coverage, however. Our last hypothesis was not confirmed as our findings 
did not point to a more individualized portrayal of refugees in the Swedish 
press as compared to Belgium. Future research can look at new trends of news 
attention with respect to refugees, as well as possible links with recurring 
news waves. An interesting, extra time period would be the one defined by 
the Aquarius controversy (a humanitarian ship whose attempts to bring 
refugees ashore were repeatedly thwarted by the Italian government) as 
well as the welcoming attitude of the Spanish government (June 2018). In 
the first seven months of 2018 Spain was the country through which the most 
refugees entered the EU, with the support of a European Commission intent 
on managing the growing migratory flows across the Mediterranean and the 
shift from Italian to Spanish harbors (Reuters, 01/08/2018).
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Chapter 4 
Depiction of Immigration in Television 
News : Public and Commercial 
Broadcasters – a Comparison
Valériane Mistiaen
Introduction
The media play an important role in mental representations as they constitute 
the main source of knowledge about many issues, contributing to the “com-
mon sense” understanding of the world (e.g., d’Haenens & Mattelart, 2011: 
237). They affect the way in which the local population will act and react. As is 
demonstrated in this book, this is even truer for reporting about immigration, 
as most people will never meet refugees in person but will instead refer to 
real-life experiences communicated to them by the media. In this sense Tétu 
(2004) argues that even if there is a break in the timing of the broadcast and 
discordance between the original context and the reception context, the 
‘direct’ aspect of the news automatically turns the viewer into a witness.
Regarding immigration news, many content and discursive analyses focus 
on European newspapers (Baker et al., 2008; Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017). 
These studies either concentrate on how minority groups are represented in 
the news (Van Dijk, 1991), on the framing used to depict the immigration 
processes (Van Gorp, 2005; De Cleen et al., 2017), or on the linguistic pat-
terns (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008; Holmes & Castañeda, 2016; Calabrese & 
Mistiaen, 2018).
Given the difficulties associated with gathering TV news items, fewer 
studies focus on TV channels. Only a few concentrate on the framing of 
the language of TV news items pertaining to immigration and its impact 
on opinions (see for instance Lecheler, Bos & Vliegenthart, 2015). In the 
Dutch-speaking part of Belgium, recent studies have looked at the way 
public and commercial broadcasters deal with immigration topics (Jacobs, 
Meeusen & d’Haenens, 2016; Meeusen & Jacobs, 2017), but, as far as we 
know, no comparable study was executed in the French-speaking part. This 
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chapter contributes to these efforts by studying Belgian French-language 
immigration TV news.
We believe that different processes are used by each media platform to 
report an external situation to the news audience, and that these different 
processes will trigger different reactions. Based on images and language 
interfaces, different media will also organize their own rhetoric according 
to what they think their audience expects (Tétu, 2004: 9-10).
In this chapter, we intend to investigate, through a lexical analysis, whether 
and, if so, how public and commercial Belgian French-language TV newscasts 
diverge in their coverage of the refugee crisis. We hypothesize that the distinct 
logic of both types of broadcasters (public and commercial) will be reflected 
in news items on immigration.
We shall first describe the Belgian media context and our hypotheses, 
corpus partition, and methodology, before moving to findings and discussion.
Public service and commercial broadcasting in Belgium
“Media systems are embedded in their social environment which is also 
culturally—and nationally—shaped” (Thomass & Kleinsteuber, 2011: 25). This 
is why it is necessary to acquire a deeper insight into both French-language 
Belgian TV channels under study within their own specific environment.
Established in 1977, the RTBF (Radio Télévision belge de la Fédération 
Wallonie-Bruxelles—Belgian radio and television of the French-language 
community-Brussels) in July 1997 became by decree an autonomous state 
enterprise with a cultural remit. This decree “emphasizes the importance of 
producing programs of its own, reflecting the cultural heritage and identity of 
the French-speaking community in Belgium” (De Bens, 2004: 23). The RTBF 
offers six radio stations and five TV channels: La Une (main channel), La 
Deux (events, discovery programs; targets minority groups), La Trois (cultural 
programs for a youth audience), OUFtivi (for young people), PureVision 
(thematic channel available on cable) and ARTE Belgium as well as an audio 
and video content-on-demand digital platform, Auvio. The public service is 
funded up to 75 percent by the Belgian French-language Community. Other 
revenue is derived from sponsorship and advertising.
On its website the public service broadcaster states that its goal is to be 
a “leader for expression and fulfillment for everyone, by everyone and eve-
rywhere”. Its mission statement is: “[to meet] the needs and expectations of 
Belgian French-language citizens as well as to inform, entertain and educate. 
Its first mission is to confirm and verify information before explaining it and 
dEPIc tIOn Of IMMIgRatIOn In tELEvIsIOn nEWs 59
putting it into perspective”. Since 2016 the RTBF has organized activities and 
training sessions in order to foster cultural diversity amongst its programs 
and employees (RTBF, 2017: 71).
RTL-TVI (Radio Télévision Luxembourg – Télévision Indépendante—Lux-
embourgish Independent Radio and TV), the commercial French-language 
counterpart owned by the RTL Group, was established in 1987. RTL Belgium 
operates four radio stations and three TV channels: RTL-TVI (main channel), 
Club RTL (for young people) and Plug RTL (for teenagers). It focuses on 
innovation, production, and distribution of “the best audio-visual content”. 
Nonetheless, its Internet website specifies that RTL Belgium’s goal is to be a 
“link within community life, through the production of news and proximity 
programs”. As far as we know, nothing comparable to the diversity focus of 
the RTBF exists for RTL-TVI.
As shown by Figure 4.1, in 2017, RTL-TVI and La Une were the two most 
watched Belgian TV channels by Belgium’s French-language audiences.
We should emphasize that Belgium’s French-language TV operators face 
stiff competition from France’s TV channels (mostly TF1, France 2, & France 3) 
and have been struggling to retain/increase their viewership (Raeymaeck-
ers & Heinderyckx, 2018: 15). On a national level, “La Une (…) is in direct 
competition with RTL-TVI during prime time. The RTBF offers more and 
Figure 4.1: TV audiences in French-speaking Belgium in 2017 (in %)
Source: CIM TV – Sud, 1/1 – 31/12/2017, 02-26h, 4+, Live+7+Invités – GfK Belgium NV.
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longer newscasts than does RTL-TVI” (De Bens, 2004: 24). In June 2018 the 
RTL-TVI evening newscast was more watched (15.8 percent of the audience) 
than the RTBF evening newscast (13.6 percent) (CIM, 2018).
The main differences between public service and commercial broadcasters 
is that the former do not depend on advertising revenue and are thus expected 
to play at democracy-building through “a ‘public logic’, characterized by 
universal service, public value, quality and diversity as key values, whereas 
the commercial news production process is dominated by a market-oriented 
logic and is characterized by audience maximization” (Jacobs et al., 2016: 
643). Owing to market competition, commercial broadcasters are more likely 
to dwell on soft news and sensationalist stories to boost ratings (McManus, 
1994; Bird, 2000).
As seen in the RTBF mission statement, La Une has a public commitment 
to put issues into perspective, provide more background information (i.e., 
more experts, interviews of direct protagonists), and depict minorities in a 
more positive light (Van den Bulck & Broos, 2011). Moreover, commercial 
broadcasters are expected to be of lower quality as they tend to use “more 
sensational features in their news compared to public service broadcasters” 
(Kleemans & Hendriks Vettehen, 2009: 236). Commercial newscasters are also 
expected to feature less “hard news” (e.g., politics, economics) and more “soft 
news” (e.g., sleaze, scandal, sensation, and entertainment) (Esser, 1999: 293). 
Popular media cultivate viewer empathy by interviewing eyewitnesses with 
whom they can easily identify in order to trigger a more emotional reaction 
(Hendriks Vettehen, Nuyten & Peeters, 2008: 320). Research by Tink (1998: 
102) showed that “the RTBF and France 2 select some topics according to 
educational rather than commercial criteria and … address news topic in a 
more diverse way than private channels”.
More differences among newspapers than among 
TV stations
The third chapter of this book deals with the portrayal of migrants by Belgian 
and Swedish newspapers. It concludes that Belgian French-language news-
papers show a clear tendency to represent the refugees as a nondescript mob, 
giving them very few opportunities to express themselves—and when given a 
voice, most of the refugees presented are male adults. In our previous studies 
(Joris et al., 2018; Mistiaen, 2017) focusing on the Belgian French-language 
press, we conclude that politicians are overrepresented and are invited to 
express their views very often. The education or family background of the 
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refugees is barely mentioned. And the most frequent origins of the refugees, 
when indicated, are Syrian and Iraqi, while the main theme covered refers to 
political solutions to the refugee crisis.
These findings concur with Georgiou and Zaborowski’s cross-country 
study (2017: 3) of European media coverage of the refugee crisis, and confirm 
the general lack of voice given to (female) refugees, although it would help to 
adopt a broader perspective. A study by Chouliaraki and Zaborowski (2017) 
states that politicians are present in 66 percent of the sample, compared to 
only 16.6 percent of migrants and refugees (p.620), which ties in with the 
newspaper coverage findings presented in this book’s Chapter 3.
The preliminary results of our quantitative analyses of French-language 
television news items in Belgium follow the same patterns, with the exception 
that refugees are somehow interviewed more frequently on TV than quoted 
in newspapers (Mistiaen, 2018).
From these quantitative analyses we conclude that overall differences 
between French-language tabloids and broadsheets are greater than between 
public and commercial French-language TV channels. Previous studies con-
firm that similarities between the two TV channels stand out. A combination 
of quantitative and qualitative analysis carried out during seven months in 
2007 shows no difference between the public and the commercial broadcasters 
in French-language Belgium (Daclette, 2007). For Flanders, after analyzing 
140 newscasts from 2003 through 2007, Van den Bulck and Broos (2011) 
concluded that there was barely any difference in the way minority groups were 
stereotyped by Flemish commercial (VTM) and public (VRT) broadcasters, 
notwithstanding the fact that the latter had developed a diversity charter.
Given that so few differences are found between public and commercial 
broadcast news reports on immigration issues, all journalists may share 
similar personal values, beliefs, and social capital when it comes to minority 
representation (Van den Bulck & Broos, 2011: 212). As a result differences might 
not be dictated by market logic but by the personal beliefs and experiences 
of the journalists processing immigration news.
Our exploratory study of the corpus analyzed in this chapter (Mistiaen, 
2018) shows similar patterns. Firstly, politicians are overrepresented and 
there is a general lack of voice given to refugees, with the exception that 
refugees are somehow interviewed more frequently on TV than quoted in 
newspapers. Secondly, the exploratory research also concludes that overall 
differences between French-language regional newspapers and broadsheets are 
greater than between public and commercial French-language TV channels. 
Thirdly, even though our preliminary analysis did not highlight any statisti-
cal significance, we noticed that the public broadcaster (La Une) mentions 
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the origin of the refugee more often, and more often presents a solution 
angle to the crisis. However, this channel seems to neglect the families and 
occupational background of refugees. Moreover, commercial broadcaster 
RTL-TVI seems to give more importance to individuals and shows many 
more children (8 percent for 2 percent on La Une).
This chapter goes deeper than the former analyses, offering a quantita-
tive and qualitative analysis of the differences found between both Belgian 
French-language TV channels with respect to immigration topics.
Hypotheses
To investigate the divergences between public and commercial Belgian 
French-language TV newscasts pertaining to the immigration issue, we 
formulated the following hypotheses:
H1: The public broadcaster presents more news related to immigration, and the 
sequences are longer compared to the commercial broadcaster.
H1a: La Une explains the causes of immigration and some concepts linked to 
it. For a better understanding, the refugee crisis is more often put into perspec-
tive using figures, graphs, and tables than on RTL-TVI, which focuses more on 
sensationalistic aspects.
H2: The public broadcaster makes fewer references to cultural, economic, security, 
or health threats as compared to the commercial broadcaster.
H2a: As a consequence, more references to welfare, cultural enrichment, and a 
general positive tone will be found on La Une.
Corpus and Methodology
What follows is a short quantitative analysis giving a global picture of the 
corpus and an in-depth qualitative analysis of 300 segments of the Belgian 
evening newscasts of the public and commercial TV channels, respectively La 
Une (50,928 words) and RTL-TVI (50,923 words). The period of analysis spans 
from March to September 2015. We first browsed databases of both channels 
to extract news items dealing with migrants or refugees in the context of the 
refugee crisis. Then, we watched each item twice and coded the sequences in a 
SPSS file before transcribing all segments, with special attention to interviews 
and mention (or omission) of sources with respect to figures, charts, or graphs. 
The process was impeded by the fact that queries in the search engine are 
limited to descriptors provided by RTBF or RTL archivists, not the whole 
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Table 4.1: Corpus description
Events Number 








– Bart De Wever’s (Mayor of Antwerp and the leader 
of Nieuwe-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA), a nationalist 
Belgian Dutch-speaking political party) declaration 
on integration (24/03/15)
– Visa not allowed for five Yezidi women who were 







– Bart De Wever’s declaration on the revision of the 
refugee status (26/08/15)
– Discovery of 71 deaths in a lorry in Austria 
(27/08/15)
– Tensions in Eastern Europe (Hungary, Croatia, 
Serbia, Macedonia)
– Emergency measures taken in Belgium
– Citizens initiatives
– Various shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea
– Eurostar traffic interruption (02/09/15)
– Alan Kurdi’s death (02/09/15)
– Queue in front of the Belgian Foreign Office
– Maximilian park (Brussels)
– Calais jungle
– Liesbeth Homans’s (N-VA politician, Vice-minister 
and Flemish Minister of Home Affairs, Housing, 
Administrative Affairs, Integration, Social Economy, 
Equality and Poverty) declaration on social housing 
for refugees
– Various European summits and meetings on 
refugee distribution and quotas (05,09,14/09/15)
– More than 17,000 migrants arrived in Germany 
(05-06/09/15)
– Petra Laszlo’s incident in Hungary (08/09/15)






– The N-VA declares that they want to reduce family 
allowances for refugees (21/09/15)
– Hungary allows police to open fire on refugees who 
illegally cross the border (21/09/15)
– Bart De Wever (N-VA) states that “Schengen is 
clinically dead” (22/09/15)
– European extraordinary meeting (23/09/15)





contents of the newscasts. As a result, some segments may have been omitted. 
Furthermore, we completed a first exploratory reading to detect the main 
patterns, and highlighted the main events marking our corpus.
Then, our analysis consists of a lexical analysis complemented by Corpus 
Linguistics (CL) tools. Adopting a CL methodology “allows for a higher 
degree of objectivity—that is, it enables the researcher to approach the texts 
(relatively) free from any preconceived notions regarding their linguistic or 
semantic/pragmatic content” (Gabrielatos & Baker, 2008: 7).
After cleaning our corpus of all unnecessary information (Née, 2017), 
we processed it using a concordance software (AntConc), determined the 
relevance (i.e., keyness) of the corpus (which determines the keywords, e.g., 
the most frequent lemmas), and used the concordance tool. The concordance 
tool facilitates the study of every occurrence of a term in its immediate lexical 
context—its co-text—based on various rankings (alphabetical order of the 
right or left context, chronological order of the corpus).
Results
Number and length of the news items
Before looking at the way the story is told, we asked ourselves whether 
the crisis was dealt with in Belgian French-language TV newscasts. To 
do so, we looked at the frequency of immigration news items on both TV 
channels and the length of each segment. On a strictly numerical level, 
RTL-TVI presents more news dealing with immigration than La Une 
for the period under study. But surprisingly, a close look at the division 
by period (see Table 4.1) did not single out any news item for the first 
period on RTL-TVI (but three on La Une), while for the last period, La Une 
broadcast five more segments than RTL-TVI. This is significant as the span 
was a one-week period, thus making it a noticeable difference. Moreover, 
RTL-TVI produced 41 more news items during the second period, which 
has been identified as the peak in the mediatization of the refugee crisis 
(Berry et al., 2016).
At this point of the analysis, we must mention some differences regarding 
the selection of broadcast segments. Although La Une presents a lower number 
of news items on immigration for the period under study, there is only one 
theme it did not address (see Appendix 4.1) when RTL-TVI did: the French 
artists’ mobilization after Alan Kurdi’s dramatic death (September 6, 2015). 
Likewise, we found eleven themes that were not touched upon by RTL-TVI 
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but were covered by La Une (e.g., Yezidi women at the European Parliament 
(March 27, 2015), the “golden song” (August 25, 2015), possible health threat 
(September 4, 2015 and September 24, 2015), possible presence of terrorists 
in the crowds of refugees (September 10, 2015)).
To understand the extent to which La Une gives viewers more ‘keys’ to 
understanding the situation, we counted all the segments entirely dedicated 
to immigration figures or contextualization and the complex legal tools 
regarding immigration.
We noted seven instances aimed at helping citizens to understand the 
refugee crisis on La Une compared to two on RTL-TVI. Hence, we argue 
that La Une produces more documentary work than RTL-TVI. As to the 
sequence duration, each news item lasts an average of one minute and 24 
seconds on RTL-TVI and two minutes and one second on La Une. During 
the first period under study news items dealing with refugees were mainly 
broadcast after the tenth news item. In contrast, during the second and third 
periods news items regarding refugees were at the beginning of the news 
broadcast (among the first five topics). This clearly shows that immigration 
topics were given prominent media coverage at the end of the summer of 
2015, and especially at the end of August and the beginning of September. 
This was a period when many upsetting images could be seen on European 
media (Berry et al., 2016). Nonetheless, we did not notice any particularity 
or common denominator that might justify the broadcasting of news item 
in the second part of the newscast (see Appendix 4.1), so it is probably due to 
the reporting of other newsworthy events that occurred in that period (start 
of the school year, VW scandal, closing of the Caterpillar plant).
Table 4.2: All immigration news entirely dedicated to immigration figures, 
contextualization and legal context
La Une RTL-TVI
– 25/08/15: Immigration figures and 
graphs
– 01/09/15: Immigration figures
– 04/09/15: Germany’s immigration 
figures and graphs
– 14/09/15: Schengen space
– 15/09/15: European financial support
– 23/09/15: Geneva convention
– 24/09/15: Toughening of residence 
conditions (limitation of residence 
permit and family reunification)
– 03/09/15: Myria report
– 24/09/15: Toughening of residence 
conditions (limitation of residence 
permit and family reunification)
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Our first hypothesis is thus only partially validated as we noticed that La 
Une presented fewer news items related to immigration during our period of 
analysis but addressed a wider variety of topics than RTL-TVI. La Une’s news 
items are longer than those of the commercial broadcaster and the segments 
appear more often at the beginning of the newscast than on RTL-TVI.
Mention of threats
To examine our second hypothesis, i.e., whether the public broadcaster makes 
fewer references to threats (cultural, economics, security, or health threats), 
we examined the language used in the newscast. To identify the segments 
using terminology linked to threats, we studied the lexical fields surrounding 
three terms: conflict, security, and terrorism, using both thesaurus dictionaries 
and our own experience. As required by the concordance program, the lists 
were lemmatized.
For both broadcasters, the most prominent lexical field was security (435 
occurrences in La Une corpus; 384 occurrences in RTL-TVI corpus), followed 
by conflict (respectively 259 and 278 occurrences) and terrorism (respectively 
227 and 195 occurrences). From these three related lexical fields, we grouped 
the most frequent terms and analyzed them in concordance in Table 4.3.
From a strictly numerical point of view, we could claim that La Une focused 
more on security, conflict, and terrorism, but our reading of the corpus invited 
us to look further into these news items. To understand how these terms 
were used in context, we undertook a deeper analysis of all the occurrences 
previously mentioned.
From the first lexical field, the terms fight,* conflict,* and war* mainly focus 
on the Syrian war and the “brave” refugees who flee conflicts and fight for 
their lives. On La Une, we also found two occurrences of fighters, which were 
used to refute the idea that ISIS fighters infiltrate refugee migration flows. 
Fewer references to the Syrian war appear in the RTL-TVI corpus and the 
broadcaster does not address the idea that Islamic fighters might arrive in 
Europe within refugee migration flows. It actually focuses on what ISIS 
fighters do to civilians and on funds raised by the European Union to stop 
the war.
We discovered that the only RTL-TVI news item in which the term attacks 
was mentioned told the story of an Iraqi couple and their baby who decided 
to leave Iraq after being victims of an attack. Here RTL-TVI focused on the 
human side, choosing to end the sequence with sentences such as: Their 
lives were in danger. They saved their baby’s life. A hope for another life starts 
(September 9, 2015). Within the eight items mentioning the term attack in 
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the La Une corpus, two referred to suicide attacks in Afghanistan and four 
to the Paris, Brussels, and Thalys attacks. These items explained that the 
authors of these attacks were not newcomers but people who had been living 
in Europe for a long time.
Regarding the term weapon* (or arms), half of the sequences of La Une 
and one third of RTL-TVI sequences dealt with the Hungarian law that 
Table 4.3: Frequencies of terms belonging to the lexical fields of conflict, terrorism, 
and security (Translation in Appendix 4.2)
Number of occurrences in a 
security context
(La Une corpus)









21 (2 emergency measure – 1 safety 
measure – 3 retaliatory measure)
(…) a security measure immediately 
criticized by humanitarian organiza-
tions. (31/08/15)
24 (3 emergency measure – 3 restric-
tive measures – 2 drastic measures)
(…) Belgians are in favor of more 
border controls (…). (27/08/15)
Polic* (police) 49
(…) Belgians are in favor of more 
border controls (…). (14/09/15)
57





The problem is that they number 
around 1,000 and there is only space 
for 260 people in the waiting room. 
(31/08/15)
23
This raises an issue, police inform us 





(…) refugee status is then a protec-
tion which is difficult to obtain. 
(23/09/15)
3
This grants refugees social security 
which is similar to that of national 






Must the city of Brussels manage the 
influx of asylum seekers, with all the 
issues linked to security, health and 
administration? (11/09/15)
18
Because of the lack of security, police 





It is here that Croatia set up an 
emergency registry and transit center. 
(19/09/15)
18
All the British, German and French 




Number of occurrences in a 
security context
(La Une corpus)










(…) a coastguard takes out his gun 
and opens fire in the sky. (12/09/15)
19
And we stay in Greece where many 





Indeed, numerous suicide attacks 
threaten citizens every day. 
(24/08/15)
2
They left Baghdad because they were 
victims of an attack (…). (09/09/15)
Combat* (fight) 10
A child who, with his family, is 
continually fleeing conflicts in Syria. 
(03/09/15)
8
She recounts her detention in the 
company of five other captives in a 





(…) people who flee conflicts ask for 
asylum (…). (23/09/15)
10
The European Union prefers to invest 





Thus, to recall, they are protected 
people welcomed because their lives 
were in danger in their country. 
(23/09/15)
11
(…) an often very dangerous journey to 
get to Europe (…). (08/09/15)
Dram* (drama) 18
(…) open Europe’s eyes on the human 
tragedy that takes place at its doors. 
(03/09/15)
15
Once again in the Mediterranean Sea, 
another similar tragedy. (28/08/15)
Guerre* (war) 42 (mostly references to wars in 
Middle Eastern countries)
(…) these migrants who flee wars and 
conflicts.
(30/08/15)
41 (mostly references to wars in 
Middle Eastern countries)
In this humanitarian crisis unprec-
edented since WWII. (30/08/15)
Mort* (dead) 24
IOM estimates that the death toll 
could exceed 4,000 deaths in 2015. 
(01/09/15) 
22
According to the International 
Organization for Migrations, since 
the beginning of the year, more 
than 2,500 refugees have died in the 
Mediterranean Sea. (13/09/15)
Total 141 128
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allows the shooting of migrants who illegally enter the territory. From our 
reading, La Une tended to focus more than RTL-TVI on the justifications 
and consequences of this law, while adopting a more critical point of view 
(The debate is more urgent than ever (September 14, 2015); The following images 
attest that some migrants flee bombs (September 22, 2015); Many in Europe 
are still shocked after Hungarý s announcement to allow its army [to shoot] … 
(September 22, 2015).
In both corpuses, danger* mostly refers to the risks of staying in a country 
at war and the difficulties refugees come across on their journey to Europe. 
Drama* also echoes the tragic way in which some journeys end. Interest-
ingly, usage of the terms drama and dead peaks at the very beginning of 
September 2015 with Alan Kurdi’s death and the discovery of 71 dead migrants 
in a lorry in Austria.
An important term mentioned in the second lexical field (security) is police. 
La Une mainly uses it in connection with Eastern European police forces 
Number of occurrences in a 
security context
(La Une corpus)











So, are there any jihads among the 
asylum seekers? (10/09/15)
6
They are trapped: between the 
government and jihads who both 
persecute them. (14/09/15)
Islam* (Islam) 33 (among which 25 Islamic State)
(…) Islamophobia files are the ones 
that achieve the greatest increase. 
(29/08/15)
20 (among which 16 Islamic State)
Islamist humanitarian organizations, 
close to the Gulf States and Qatar, to 
name one, would / could encourage 
refugees to join Europe. (03/09/15)
Menac* (threat) 15
It is a provisional measure which is 
authorized when a serious threat to 
public order and national security is 
suspected. (14/09/15)
8
The Prime Minister ends his speech on 




8 (among which 2 ISIS – Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant – ter-
rorist organizations/groups)
(…) the dismantling of the 
Verviers terrorist group would have 
contributed to the diffusion of racist 
comments. (29/08/15)
13 (among which 8 ISIS terrorist 
organizations/groups)
(…) kidnapped and imprisoned by 




threatening refugees (complete with tear gas, truncheons, handcuffs…) or 
attempting to secure borders. RTL-TVI refers only twice to police abuses. 
Police are mainly depicted as usefully maintaining calm and order and 
investigating and jailing smugglers.
With respect to the third lexical field under study, terrorism, it almost 
always refers directly or indirectly to the Islamic terrorist group ISIS and its 
threats. Only once does RTL-TVI mention that Hungarian policemen are 
seen as a threat to refugees, while La Une addresses the question of whether 
jihadists might hide within migration flows. We should add that La Une is 
the only channel which discusses the refugees’ arrival as a possible threat for 
Europe while clarifying that these are always the words of far-right politicians 
(Others, on the extreme right-wing, think that migrants are simply a threat for 
Europe. September 9, 2015).
Regarding the term problem, half of the occurrences on La Une refer to 
the problems generated by the arrival of refugees. On three occasions it 
is linked with medical issues newcomers are facing, and twice with infra-
structure problems. On RTL-TVI, surprisingly, the emphasis is placed on 
the problems generated by the wave of solidarity seen in Belgium. In these 
news items we found an unusual sentence punctuating vox pop interviews: 
The problem and the truth being that many Belgian citizens are afraid to see so 
many foreigners arriving in our country (September 3, 2015). As with most vox 
pops, it is regrettable that an editorial team should make such a generality 
with no other basis than chance encounters with three random passers-by in 
this case. This example also echoes two other instances previously quoted: 
… Belgians are in favor of more border controls … (August 27, 2015) and … 
Islamist humanitarian organizations, close to the Gulf States and Qatar, to name 
one, would / could encourage refugees to move to Europe (September 3, 2015). 
These examples found in RTL-TVI corpus attracted our attention because 
they generalize opinions or state unverified information without any caution.
The term measure is always used in the political sense of establishing new 
means to tackle the refugee crisis: The emergency of crisis is underlined 
by the widespread use of the terms emergency measure, emergency places, 
emergency aid, summoned in emergency (La Une); emergency shelters, opened 
in emergency (RTL-TVI). Concerning La Une all occurrences of protection, 
except one related to border protection, refer to the Geneva refugee status. 
On the contrary RTL-TVI does not broach the subject of refugee protection, 
which is surprising in a corpus of news items dealing with refugees.
Generally speaking the term security refers to European security on La Une 
and to Belgian security on RTL-TVI. Social security was mentioned a few times 
after Bart De Wever stated that he wanted refugees to be deprived of social 
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security for refugees (September 22, 2015), and in a few cases in connection 
with refugees “being safe now” that they had entered Europe.
To be comprehensive, we studied separately the terms identity, culture, 
economics, and health when meaning ‘threat’ (Table 4.4).
As we can see in Table 4.4, very few references to identity, cultural, 
economic, or health threats are made explicitly with words directly related 
to the topic. Nevertheless, we looked further into our corpus and read each 
sequence carefully. We did not find any other references regarding identity, 
cultural, or economic threats. With respect to health threats we found two 
more references in La Une’s corpus (September 4, 2015: scabies cases and 
September 24, 2015: refugee children vaccination) but none on RTL-TVI. 
Neither did we find references to welfare or cultural enrichment on RTL-TVI 
and very few on La Une: two segments related to economic benefits due to 
the arrival of refugees (In Germany, the Head of the Federation of German 
Industries explained that this wave of migration was an economic opportunity. 
Table 4.4: References to cultural, economic, and health threats (translation in 
Appendix 4.3)
Number of occurrences in a 
security context
(La Une corpus)









(…) Muslims in their majority 
constitute a threat to the Christian 
identity of Europe. (03/09/2015)
Culture* 1
This may provoke racism among 
citizens. This creates a culture of 
mistrust. (24/03/2015)
1
Main topics of concern for the 
evening: security and difficulties due 





He considers that this blockage 
of the border is detrimental to the 
Serbian economy and has therefore 
taken retaliatory measures against 
Croatia. (24/09/2015)
2
(…) it is true that there are also 
many migrants who come only for 





The sanitary conditions on site are 
deplorable. (04/09/2015)
2
A very complicated situation which 




September 5, 2015) and one referring to cultural enrichment (in a segment 
aired on September 3, 2015, Amir, a former Bosnian refugee in Belgium, states 
that cultural diversity enriches all).
From these results, we learn that the media coverage does not differ much 
from one channel to the other. While La Une makes more mentions of terms 
such as ‘security’, ‘conflict’, ‘terrorism’, and ‘health threat’, it does so in a 
more critical (we recall it; opens Europe’s eyes) and balanced way, presenting 
divergent opinions, causes, and consequences. On the other hand, La Une 
makes three references to cultural or economic benefits while RTL-TVI shuns 
these aspects. La Une seems to adopt a more European perspective while 
RTL-TVI focuses on Belgium and the human/humanitarian aspect of the 
news. We conclude that our second hypothesis is partly rejected although 
it should be attenuated as La Une has more news items on security, conflict, 
and terrorism but fewer items regarding cultural and economic threats, while 
making more references to cultural and economic benefits. These results 
also illustrate how the same terms can have different meanings depending 
on their usage, fostering different conceptions of the refugee crisis. This is 
why it is helpful to undertake a qualitative analysis.
Conclusion
In this chapter we aimed to study the quantity and quality of the news items 
on immigration—with the emphasis on refugees—broadcast by Belgium’s 
most popular French-language TV channels, RTL-TVI and La Une. As we 
supposed that market logic may guide both news selection and the way the 
public and commercial broadcasters produce the news, we focused on whether 
each channel’s distinct logic was reflected in news on immigration. To test 
our hypothesis, we conducted a lexical analysis complemented by corpus 
linguistics tools on a corpus of 300 news items (101,851 words) spanning from 
March to September 2015.
At first sight divergences between the French-language public service and 
commercial broadcasters are negligible and match Van den Bulck and Broos’s 
(2011: 2016) conclusion on the ways in which minority groups are stereotyped 
by Flemish commercial (VTM) and public (VRT) broadcasters alike. An 
in-depth qualitative analysis only partially confirmed our hypotheses.
Regarding the first hypothesis, although it is true that La Une offers longer 
newscasts, news items on immigration were less numerous than on RTL-TVI. 
This result contradicts De Bens’s 2004 study which found that in general 
the RTBF broadcasts more news items than its commercial counterpart. 
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Nonetheless, even if the number of immigration segments is less significant 
on La Une for the period under study, the channel actually deals with a wider 
range of different topics and offers a wider view of the situation, including 
a greater number of different actors, while RTL-TVI mainly focuses on 
emotional events. Moreover, sequences documenting immigration contexts 
and legal tools are much more numerous on La Une than on RTL-TVI. In 
light of these results, we were not able to confirm H1 or H1a.
Our second hypothesis (H2 and H2a) was partially confirmed as La Une 
actually makes more references to threats, in an effort to achieve a wider 
variety of topics and to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the 
situation. While RTL-TVI never mentioned or referred to economic benefit 
or cultural enrichment, we found very few such instances in the corpus of 
La Une.
Although none of our hypotheses were fully confirmed, our qualitative 
analysis has shown the extent to which interpretation of specific terms may 
strongly vary depending on their usage.
Since the differences between the two channels are not significant, and 
knowing that the journalists’ personal beliefs and experience inevitably 
color their approach to immigration topics (Van den Bulck & Broos, 2011), 
it is worth investigating whether any divergence should simply be ascribed 
to journalists’ personal choices and/or beliefs, to their sensitivity as well as 
knowledge of the subject and/or whether her/his work was an assignment 
from an editor.
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– News item dealing with racism
– Citizen initiatives
– Germany will welcome 800,000 
refugees
– Meetings with asylum seekers 






– Tribute to the lorry’s death 
people and statements of the 
police
– Bart De Wever’s declaration on a 
special status for refugees







– Tensions in Eastern Europe
– Shipwrings
– Migrants’ uses of smartphones
– Political ping-pong between 
Yvan Mayeur (Mayor of Brussels 
at that time, Socialist Parti) and 
Bart De Wever
– Police controls at the Belgian 
borders
– Hungary allows to open fire on 
refugees who pass illegally the 
border
– The N-VA will to reduce family 
allowance for refugees
– Visit of a Red-Cross center in 
Belgium
7/09/2015 – Quotas repartition
– 500 emergency beds set up in the 
center of Brussels
– Fire in an asylum center in 
Germany
– French president (François Hol-
lande) declaration on a possible 
military intervention in Syria
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RTBF RTL-TVI
10/09/2015 - Theo Francken’s tweet and its 
consequences
– Belgian parliamentary decision 
on a possible military interven-
tion in Syria
– UNIZO (De Unie van Zelfstan-
dige Ondernemers – Union for 
self-employed and businessman)
– SB Overseas, non-profit organi-
zation that offers psychologist 
support to migrants
– Macedonia welcomes migrants 
with blows
– Denmark suspends train connec-
tions with Germany
– Merkel is welcomed in an asylum 
centre in Germany
16/09/2015 - Difficult situation in the Maximil-
ian park
– Croatia opens its borders
– Marine Le Pen talk at the 
Dutch-speaking Parliament
18/09/2015 – Belgrade (Belgium) welcome 400 
asylum seekers
– Documentary on a Syrian family 
settled in Estinnes (Belgium)
– Integration journey
– Croatia closes its borders
19/09/2015 – Calais manifestation
– Rescue operation in the Mediter-
ranean Sea
– Tensions in Eastern Europe
– Munich beer party
23-
26/09/2015




– King Philippe of Belgium visits 
asylum seekers
– Changes in the attribution of the 
refugee status in Belgium
– Death of a minor refugee in 
Calais
– Pope declaration




Number of occurrences in 
a security context (La Une 
corpus)
Number of occurrences in a 







21 (2 emergency measure – 1 
safety measure – 3 retaliatory 
measure)
(…), une mesure sécuritaire 
immédiatement critique par les 
organisations humanitaires. 
(31/08/15)
24 (3 emergency measure – 3 restric-
tive measures – 2 drastic measures)
(…) les belges plébiscitent une mesure: 





(…) la police allemande a reçu 
l’ordre d’ intensifier entre autres les 
fouilles. (14/09/15)
57







Le problème c’est qu’ ils sont 
aujourd’hui environ 1000 et qu’ il 
n’y a place que pour 260 personnes 
dans la salle d’attente. (31/08/15)
23
Cela pose d’ailleurs un problème, la 
police vient de nous signaler qu’ il y a 





(…) le statut de réfugié est donc 
une protection qui n’est pas facile 
à obtenir. (23/09/15)
3
Celle-ci accorde aux réfugiés une 
protection sociale identique à celle 







La ville de Bruxelles doit-elle gérer 
l’afflux des demandeurs d’asile, 
avec toutes les questions liées 
à la sécurité, l’hygiène et le suivi 
social ? (11/09/15)
18
Les policiers sont venus en renfort au 





C’est ici que la Croatie a installé 
en urgence un de ces centres 
d’enregistrement et de transit. 
(19/09/15)
18
Tous les leaders britanniques, français, 
allemands, affirment l’urgence 
d’ intervenir. (03/09/15)
Total 168 143
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Number of occurrences in 
a security context (La Une 
corpus)
Number of occurrences in a 









(…), un garde côte sort son arme 
et tire plusieurs fois en l’air. 
(12/09/15)
19
Et on reste en Grèce ou de nombreux 





De nombreux attentats suicides 
menacent en effet les citoyens tous 
les jours. (24/08/15)
2
Ils ont fui Bagdad parce qu’ ils avaient 





Un enfant qui, avec sa famille, n’a 
cessé de fuir les combats en Syrie. 
(03/09/15)
8
(…) elle raconte sa captivité aux côtés 
de cinq autres prisonnières dans une 





(…) les personnes qui fuient les 
conflits demandent l’asile (…) 
(23/09/15)
10
(…) l’Union européenne préfère miser 
sur l’accompagnement dans les pays 




Ce sont donc, on le rappelle, des 
personnes protégées, accueillies 
parce que leur vie est en danger 
dans leur pays. (23/09/15)
11
(…) un périple souvent très dangereux 




(…) ouvrir les yeux de l’Europe sur 
le drame humain qui se joue à ses 
portes. (03/09/15)
15
Un autre drame similaire une nouvelle 
fois en mer Méditerranée. (28/08/15)
Guerre* 
(war)
42 (mostly references to wars in 
Middle Eastern countries)
(…) ces migrants qui fuient guerres 
et conflits. (30/08/15)
41 (mostly references to wars in 
Middle Eastern countries)
Dans cette crise humanitaire sans 





L’OIM estime qu’on pourrait 
dépasser les 4000 morts en 2015. 
(01/09/15) 
22
D’après l’Organisation Internationale 
pour les Migrations, depuis le début 
de l’année, plus de 2700 réfugies sont 
morts en Méditerranée. (13/09/15)
Total 141 128
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Number of occurrences in 
a security context (La Une 
corpus)
Number of occurrences in a 









Alors, y a-t-il des djihadistes 
parmi les demandeurs d’asile ? 
(10/09/15)
6
Ils sont coincés entre deux feux: entre 




33 (among which 25 Islamic 
State)
(…), ce sont les dossiers à caractère 
islamophobe qui connaissent la 
plus forte hausse. (29/08/15)
20 (among which 16 Islamic State)
(…) des organisations humanitaires 
islamistes, proches d’états du Golf, 
du Qatar, pour le citer, pousseraient 





C’est une mesure provisoire qui est 
autorisée en cas de menace grave 
pour l’ordre publique ou la sécurité 
intérieure de l’État. (14/09/15)
8
Le premier ministre a terminé son 
discours en évoquant la question de 





8 (among which 3 ISIS terrorist 
organizations/groups)
(…) le démantèlement de la cellule 
terroriste de Verviers auraient 
contribué à la diffusion de propos 
racistes. (29/08/15)
13 (among which 8 ISIS terrorist 
organizations/groups)
(…) enlevée et séquestrée en Irak 
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Appendix 4.3
Number of occurrences in a 
security context
(La Une corpus)









(…) musulmans dans leur majorité 
constitue une menace pour l’ identité 
chrétienne de l’Europe. (03/09/2015)
Culture* 1
Cela peut provoquer chez les 
citoyens du racisme. Cela crée 
une culture de la méfiance. 
(24/03/2015)
1
Principaux sujets d’ inquiétude de 
la soirée: la sécurité et les difficultés 





Il estime que ce blocage de la 
frontière nuit à l’économie 
serbe et a donc pris des mesures 
de rétorsion contre la Croatie. 
(24/09/2015)
2
(…) c’est vrai qu’ il y a aussi beaucoup 
de migrants qui viennent pour des 






Les conditions sanitaires sur places 
sont déplorables. (04/09/2015)
2
Une situation très compliquée évide-





Agency and Power in the Dutch-Language 
News Coverage of the Summer 2015 
Refugee Situation in Europe: A Transitivity 
Analysis of Semantic Roles
Lutgard Lams
Introduction
Migration, as a global phenomenon, has a cyclical nature with ebbs and flows, 
depending on socioeconomic and political conditions in the migrants’ home 
countries. Yet, over the last few decades the number of migrants has been 
rising steadily. Since summer 2015 Europe has witnessed an unprecedented 
growth of asylum seekers due to the Syrian war and the rise of terrorist 
activities in Afghanistan, Iraq and the wider Middle-East, and sub-Saharan 
Africa. Figures made available by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR, 2015) indicate a rise of 4.7 million people fleeing their 
home countries from late 2011, reaching 15.1 million in total by the end of 2015. 
Compared with the second quarter of 2015, the number of Syrian and Iraqi 
asylum seekers more than tripled between July and September 2015 (Eurostat, 
2016). Since that period, the theme has featured at the top of the political 
agendas, and has been widely reported in most European media outlets.
Given the impact of media on shaping public opinion (McCombs & 
Shaw, 1972; Jacobs & Hooghe, 2015; Lecheler, Bos, & Vliegenthart, 2015), 
migration coverage in the media has attracted much scholarly attention. Our 
study inscribes itself in this vast literature on human mobility and presents 
a discourse-analytical perspective with an examination of the discursive 
positioning of the protagonist actors in the migration debate. While several 
cross-cultural studies have been conducted about immigration press coverage, 
most examine framing practices or conduct quantitative content analysis, 
probing variables such as mentioning of nationality and gender, or the extent 
to which refugees are treated as individuals and receive a voice. Others have fo-
cused on semiotic investigations of visual media data or used corpus-linguistic 
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methods to analyze lexical choices and the type and connotation of words 
that keep company or collocate with the key term ‘refugee(s).’ Fewer studies 
examine the verbal processes associated with the refugees and hardly any 
project has analyzed the media portrayal of non-refugee actors, who receive 
considerably more media mileage than the refugees themselves. Hence, this 
chapter focuses on the representation practices of refugees and the most 
prominent participants (the EU, Germany, Hungary, and their leaders) in 
the migration debate in terms of agency and semantics of verbal processes.
The selected objects of investigation are accounts about the European 
refugee situation of late summer 2015 at the height of what was perceived as a 
crisis, in the Dutch-language progressive quality press De Volkskrant [VK] for 
the Netherlands and its equivalent in Belgium, De Morgen [DM]. The choice 
for the progressive press accounts facilitates comparison with an earlier study 
of the more conservative elite press of a number of countries, including the 
Netherlands and Belgium (Lams, 2018).2 Findings in that study demonstrate 
that the refugee actor received hardly any agency. This begs the question 
whether the progressive press has been using similar representation patterns.
The Netherlands and Belgium are comparable, since both countries 
registered similar figures for asylum applications per 100,000 local citizens 
(266 and 397 respectively) in 2015 (BBC, 2016). The number of first-time 
asylum applicants in the third quarter of 2015 had jumped by 136 percent 
in the Netherlands and 191 percent in neighboring Belgium up from the 
preceding quarter (Eurostat, 2015). It concerned primarily refugees from Syria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq, seeking international protection. Both the Netherlands 
and Belgium are also comparable in terms of real-world indicators, such as 
the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), with Belgium indexing a 
slightly higher score on integration policy (67) than the Netherlands (60) 
and Germany (61).
2 This article is part of a larger project which analyses cultural and ideological convergences 
and divergences in a selection of British, French, Dutch, and Belgian media narratives about 
immigration. In a first phase, a cross-cultural discourse analysis examined the refugee coverage 
in what has been called the more conservative press, like the Times (UK), Le Figaro (France), La 
Libre Belgique (French-language part of Belgium), and De Telegraaf (the Netherlands) (Lams, 
2018). The second, ongoing instalment compares the narratives of the more progressive press in 
the same countries (The Guardian, Le Monde, Le Soir, De Morgen, De Volkskrant) to eventually 
draw a comprehensive picture of the coverage across the ideological spectrum.
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Dutch-language news coverage of refugees
We limit discussion of the extensive literature in the field to the research 
conducted on the Dutch-language press narratives, given our particular 
focus on the Netherlands and Flanders for this chapter. Yet, we first highlight 
recurrent scholarly conclusions about international (mainly Western) media 
coverage which deserve closer attention of media practitioners and politicians. 
The main findings relate to the high level of collectivization of the refugee actor 
(e.g., KhosraviNik, 2010; ThorbjØrnsrud & Figenschou, 2016; Chouliaraki & 
Zaborowski, 2017), who is also deprived of a direct voice, since most forum 
space is given to the political elites, shifting the plight of the refugees and their 
personal histories to a focus on how the arrival of refugees creates a ‘European 
crisis’ (e.g., Philo, Briant, & Donald, 2013; Kaleda, 2014; Benson & Wood, 2015; 
ThorbjØrnsrud & Figenschou, 2016; Sumuvuori et al, 2016; Chouliaraki & 
Zaborowski, 2017; De Cock et al., 2018; Lams, 2018). An additional highlight 
concerns the context-dependent fluctuations between themes of securitization 
(“narratives of security”) and humanitarian themes (‘narratives of care’) 
(Benson, 2013; Caviedes, 2015) or between the ‘intruder’ and ‘victim’ frames 
for the refugees (Van Gorp, 2005; ThorbjØrnsrud & Figenschou, 2016).
Studies about the power of language in public discursive representations of 
minorities were already being conducted in Flanders and the Netherlands in 
the early 1980s. In his analysis of national and regional Dutch newspapers of 
October 1981, Van Dijk (1983) concluded that news coverage reflects viewpoints 
of the political elites and government institutions, the police and the justice 
department, depriving minority groups of a voice. Most news coverage about 
the latter put the spotlight on sensational incidents, thus constructing a 
negative image of these minorities. Initiating research into elite discourses 
about immigration in Belgium, Blommaert and Verschueren (1998) drew 
attention to the discourse of (in)tolerance and hidden racism. d’Haenens 
and De Lange (2001) analyzed representation of asylum seekers and refugees 
in the Dutch national newspapers De Telegraaf and De Volkskrant as well as 
regional dailies in the early 1990s. The overall image of asylum seekers and 
refugees reportedly was largely negative, prompting d’Haenens and De Lange 
to conclude that there were erroneous generalizations, careless use of figures 
and other factual material, and suggestions of threat in the lexical choice of 
terms like ‘flood’ and ‘stream’ (2001: 849).
In the same decade, further research was conducted by Van Gorp (2005) 
and Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007), looking into the Belgian and Dutch 
media coverage respectively. Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007) discovered 
five frames in the Dutch media over a 10-year period from 1995 to 2004 with an 
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overall dominance of the intruder frame (above all “Islam as threat”), except 
for the years 1998-2000, where the multicultural frame temporarily ranked first. 
Van Gorp (2005) analyzed migration coverage in eight Belgian newspapers 
from 2000 to 2003, concluding that while 50 per cent of the articles included 
both victim and intruder frames, in the articles with only one frame generally 
the intruder frame prevailed (26 percent) over the victim frame (21 percent), 
except in Christmas periods. Refugees were more often cast as intruders in 
the Flemish press, compared with the Francophone press. The popular press 
comprised more articles with a dominant intruder frame than the elite press, 
yet without any statistical significance. As for ideological differences between 
progressive and conservative papers, while the left-wing De Morgen used 
the victim frame slightly more often than the other Flemish newspapers, no 
statistical significance of this divergence was found (Van Gorp, 2005).
More recently, Masini and Van Aelst (2017) conducted a content analysis to 
examine the relation between actor diversity and viewpoint diversity on the one 
hand and ideological orientation on the other hand, in a sample of six Flemish 
newspapers, covering immigration between January 1, 2013 and April 30, 2014. 
Based on the person-positivity hypothesis (the presence or absence of key actors 
is significantly related to the positive/negative direction of the viewpoints), they 
concluded that the closure of the gates to the immigrants’ voices resulted in a 
negative news representation in the Flemish press (Masini and Van Aelst, 2017).
Another analysis of the Dutch media coverage of immigration concerns the 
study by Krouwel (2008) about the ideological differences between the left- and 
right-wing newspapers. It was concluded that the left-of-center De Volkskrant 
and NRC Handelsblad, which had gradually changed its formerly liberal stance 
to a more leftist orientation (De Fijter, 2006), shared similar positions in the 
migration debate. De Telegraaf was said to harbor a clear right-wing ideology.
This brings us to the ideological orientation of the newspapers investigated in 
the present study. Both the Flemish De Morgen and the Dutch De Volkskrant are 
ideologically on the left of the political spectrum. The Flemish daily is generally 
considered to be a progressive paper, owned by a liberal press company, De 
Persgroep (De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010). With the circulation of its print and 
digital versions in 2015 standing at approximately 54,882 (CIM, 2018), it is the 
second most popular national quality paper in Flanders. Its older counterpart 
in the Netherlands, De Volkskrant, was established in 1919 and is currently the 
third largest newspaper in the Netherlands (Bakker, 2016). It originally catered 
to the Catholic labor movement. Since the 1960s it has profiled itself more as a 
progressive newspaper for the young generation. The newspaper is generally 
believed to hold a left ideological orientation (Van Zanten, 2006; Bakker & 
Vasteman, 2007; van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2015).
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Theory, method, and research questions
When engaging in cross-national media comparison, the analyst needs to 
consider journalistic systems and cultures. As for systems, both Belgium and 
the Netherlands belong to the same “democratic corporatist model” (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004), in that the history of strong party newspapers coexisted with 
the commercial press throughout much of the twentieth century. Although 
opinion-oriented journalism has diminished in importance and journalists 
increasingly embrace neutral and information-oriented roles, opinionated 
reporting has not entirely disappeared. Since the early theories of Halllin and 
Mancini, new visions of the constituent parts of journalistic professionalism 
have emerged (Hanitzsch, 2007). Rather than thinking in terms of models, 
the Worlds of Journalism Project (WJP) advances the more flexible notion 
of ‘journalistic culture,’ which has been defined as “a particular set of ideas 
and practices by which journalists legitimate their role in society and render 
their work meaningful” (Hanitzsch, 2007: 369). The WJP country reports for 
Belgium and the Netherlands in the 2012-2016 period are comparable, although 
they show a slightly greater eagerness of journalists to promote tolerance 
and cultural diversity in Flanders (3.31/5) than in the Netherlands (2.77/5).3
The units of investigation were selected by singling out all articles published 
during the peak period of the asylum seekers’ arrival in Belgium, starting from 
August 24, 2015 when long waiting queues for registration and a refugee camp 
in downtown Brussels attracted intense media attention up to September 20.4 
Search criteria were set at a minimum of 300 words for each article that featured 
refugees in Europe as the main theme. The key term for the LexisNexis and 
GoPress databanks search was ‘refugees,’ since the plural form yielded more 
articles than its singular equivalent. This key word was selected because the 
3 The Worlds of Journalism Study’s figure for Belgium, combining the perceptions of Flemish 
and French-language journalists, is 3.59. Separate scores for the latter are slightly higher for 
promoting tolerance and cultural diversity (3.93) than their Flemish counterparts (3.31) (See 
www.worldsofjournalism.org/country-reports).
4 Since 2015, similar scenarios have been playing out in the summers 2017 and 2018 at the same 
place in Brussels. Concerns by the spokesperson for the Federal Centre for Asylum Applications, 
Theo Francken, that this place might become a second [jungle of ] ‘Calais’, if the mayor of Brussels 
who is in charge of security for that particular area, does not take decisive action, have been met 
with fierce opposition from this socialist and French-speaking mayor. The debate is one more 
element in the intricate political power games between conservative and progressive parties, 
aggravated by unclear divisions of competencies between the federal and the local levels and 
the long festering Belgian communitarian problems between the Dutch- and French-speaking 
political elites. All of this naturally fuels media attention and the refugees are caught up in the 
middle of this political polarization.
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target actors were the people who, at that time, arrived in Europe in need of 
protection. The reference term ‘refugee’ used in this article does not adopt the 
judicial definition in terms of acquisition of legal ‘refugee’ status, but follows 
the dictionary definition of transient people seeking refuge, which appears to be 
the general reference for this actor in the Dutch-language media, often used 
interchangeably with the term ‘(im)migrant’ or ‘asylum seeker.’
The corpus selection yielded 137 articles for De Morgen and 146 for De 
Volkskrant. First, a content-analytical study was conducted on the full corpora 
to examine variables, such as the level of collectivization of the refugees, the 
voice allocated to them, the themes and the framing processes. In a second 
phase, both samples were halved for the in-depth discourse analysis of all 
predications about and descriptions of the main actors (the refugees, the 
EU as an institution, the German government with its Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, the Hungarian government and its Premier Victor Orban, the Dutch 
government with its Prime Minister Rutten, the Dutch Center for Asylum 
Applications (COA), the Belgian government and the Premier Charles 
Michel, the Belgian Federal Center for Asylum Applications (Fedasil) and 
its spokesperson Theo Francken. These were the most frequently mentioned 
actors in all the corpora. The present chapter discusses the actors common 
to both newspapers, i.e., the refugees, the EU institution, the German and 
Hungarian governments and their leaders.
Underpinning the epistemological premise in this study is the theoretical 
perspective in Critical Discourse Studies (e.g., Fairclough, 1989) that discourse 
is a powerful social practice in constructing meaning. This view goes hand 
in hand with the insights of Social Representations Theory (e.g., Moscovici, 
2000), Social Identity Theory (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and Framing 
Theory (e.g., Scheufele & Tewskbury, 2007), which are all concerned with 
ideological power involved in representations that shape social relations 
and identities or maintain the social status quo. In addition, Hallidayan 
Systemic-Functional Linguistics (Halliday & Matthiessen, 2014) supplied 
us with tools for transitivity analysis, which probes into the ways syntax and 
semantics jointly construct agency and power. These linguistic analytical 
instruments can help to lay bare power relations underlying media narratives. 
Research questions about this aspect of agency and power are as follows: 
How are the protagonists in the immigration issue positioned syntactically in the 
sentences (as active agents or passive agents/beneficiaries)? With what type of 
verbal processes are these actors associated and what are the connotational values 
of these processes, leading to negative/positive/neutral semantic roles allocated 
to the actors involved?
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To determine the type of verbal processes and the semantic roles for all 
actors, a coding book was developed. Given the labor-intensive work of 
manually coding every single sentence component, the corpus was halved 
and one out of every other article was selected, yielding 73 articles for De 
Volkskrant and 69 for De Morgen. While it is hardly possible to taxonomize the 
kind of activities and predications ascribed to the refugee actor, categorization 
of the type of verbal processes that the actor was associated with was a more 
realistic venture. These include material/behavioral, relational, verbal, mental, 
affective and perception processes and a variety of modal auxiliary verbs. For 
the refugee actor, the most dominant processes were the material ones, which 
is the reason the current chapter focuses on this type. All processes, except for 
the relational descriptions, were first coded for the type of role bestowed on 
the person/group in terms of active or passive agency. This involved syntactical 
analysis of sentential composition (e.g., subject, (prepositional) object, passive 
or active mode, nominalization). Secondly, the semantics of the roles were 
coded by marking the connotation of the processes with positive/negative/
neutral values. While coding the verbal processes, the co-text, essential in 
meaning generation, needs due consideration. This can include, for example, 
negations and any implicit meanings created by figurative language, like 
metaphors or irony. Figurative meaning took precedence over literal meaning 
at all times. This necessitated a manual coding process with training sessions 
and mutual consultations. Intercoder reliability was measured on a sample 
of the corpora and rendered a figure for Krippendorff’s Alpha’s, varying from 
.611 to 1 (full agreement) for 24 variables. It is some of these variables that 
will be discussed in the empirical section of this chapter.
Patient or agentive roles were determined on the basis of dominance 
per article, excluding any ex aequos. Dominance was established upon the 
majority principle. All ‘winning’ codes per text were then aggregated over the 
entire corpus, delivering a total picture of the absolute and relative number of 
articles featuring the actors in a majority (positive/negative) active or (posi-
tive/negative) passive role. Portraying the refugee as primarily undergoing 
negative processes contributes to a victim frame. By contrast, a depiction of 
the refugees engaging in negative actions could generate the moral panic or 
intruder frame. Here are some examples of the semantic roles for the refugee:
– neutral agentive role:
“Hij laat een foto zien op zijn smartphone” [He is showing a picture on his 
smartphone], De Volkskrant, 19 September 2015
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– positive agentive role:
“Deze vluchtelingen zijn dan misschien de eersten die in hun thuisland 
aan de wederopbouw zullen bijdragen” [These refugees will perhaps be 
the first ones to contribute to the reconstruction of their homeland], De 
Volkskrant, 17 September 2015
– negative agentive role:
“Het station was gisteren urenlang gesloten, nadat de asielzoekers voor 
chaos op perrons en bomvolle treinen zorgden” [the station was closed for 
hours yesterday, after the asylum seekers created chaos on the platforms 
and caused trains to be crowded], De Morgen, 2 Sept 2015
– positive patient role:
“Bezorgde burgers bieden de vluchtelingen hulp, maar niemand lijkt goed 
te weten wat er waar precies nodig is” [concerned citizens offer help to the 
refugees, but nobody seems to know what exactly is necessary and where], 
De Morgen, 3 Sept 2015
– negative patient role:
“Het cabinet bouwt een hek om Europa en keert vluchtelingen de rug toe” 
[The cabinet is building a fence around Europe and turning its back on the 
refugees], De Volkskrant, 9 Sept 2015
Results of the empirical analysis: De Volkskrant and 
De Morgen
The bulk of the study contained the transitivity analysis of semantic roles 
and verbal processes associated with the main actors. Only the findings of 
the material action processes are discussed since they represented the largest 
category. Although the study also yielded interesting results about the media’s 
position toward the local Dutch/Belgian political elites, for practical reasons 
of space we zoom in on only the refugees and the most prominent common 
actors to both corpora (EU, Germany, Hungary). Germany and Hungary 
are the two countries that registered the highest numbers of new asylum 
applications in 2015, over 47,000 and 177,130 applications respectively (BBC, 
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2016).5 This can explain why their leaders’ voices ranked among the top five 
prominent actors in the media coverage of that period.
Agency and power: semantic roles of the refugee actor
As is clear from Table 5.1, in the Flemish corpus of De Morgen the refugee is 
depicted unambiguously in a passive position, since the majority of articles 
reveal a dominant patient role (75.4 percent or 52 out of 69 articles). Only 
31.9 percent (22/69) of the articles give the actor a leading agentive role. As 
for semantics of agency, most articles with a dominantly agentive role adopt 
a neutral stance (86.4 percent or 19/22). The percentage difference between 
4.5 percent and 9.1 percent for the refugee’s positive and negative actions is 
negligible since this concerns only one and two articles respectively. Most 
articles with dominantly patient processes have a positive tenor (53.8 percent 
or 28/52 articles), followed by 21.2 percent (11/52) negative and 15.4 percent 
(8/52) neutral connotation.
As in De Morgen, more articles in De Volkskrant position the refugee in a 
dominant patient role as receiver of an action (54.8 percent or 40/73) than as 
an agent (42.5 percent or 31/73).6 Yet, the distance between active and passive 
roles is smaller than in De Morgen. Concerning semantics, the results are very 
similar to the findings in De Morgen. The majority of the dominant active 
processes have a neutral tenor (87.1 percent or 27 out of the 31 articles with a 
dominant agent role), with only 3.2 percent (1/31) and 0 percent reserved for 
a positive and negative orientation respectively.7 As for the passive processes 
associated with this actor, 60 percent (or 10/40) are positive, 25 percent (or 
10/40) are negative and 10 percent (or 4/40) are neutral, leading to a beneficiary 
frame and, to a lesser extent, a victim frame.
Clearly, in both newspapers the refugee is cast as a beneficiary of help, 
to a lesser extent as a victim of negative processes, but not as an agent of 
doom. Hence, no intruder or moral panic frame can be found in the data. 
The high level of neutrality in the active material processes indicates how the 
journalists and the editors strive for objectivity in this hotly debated migration 
issue. On the other hand, rarely does one find discussions about the positive 
contributions refugees can actively make to the local host communities.
5 While the EU average of asylum applications per 100,000 of a country’s local population was 
260, nearly 1800 refugees per 100,000 of Hungary’s local population claimed asylum in 2015. The 
figure for Germany stood at 587 (BBC, 2016).
6 Further research is necessary to determine statistical significance of these relative differences.
7 The aggregate percentages do not always amount to 100, since the few ex aequos are not taken 
up in the calculation.
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Agency and power: semantic roles of the EU, Germany, and 
Hungary
The most salient gap between the Dutch and the Flemish papers lies in the 
semantic role allocated to Europe as an institution. As can be seen in table 5.2, 
the EU agency role dominates in both newspapers (67.1 percent or 29/43 
[DM] and 65.4 percent or 17/26 [VK]). However, while the neutral tone of 
the agentive processes takes the lead in both papers (34.5 percent (or 10/29) 
for DM and 52.9 percent (or 9/17) for the VK), the second position is taken 
up by negative EU actions in the Flemish paper (24 percent or 7/29) and by 
positive EU actions in the Dutch paper (29.4 percent or 5/17). The Belgian daily 
with its headquarters in Brussels, the heart of the EU, is clearly more critical 
of EU actions than the Dutch paper. Yet, the Belgian paper also allocates 
positive agency to the EU with 17.2 percent (or 5/29) of the articles, but these 
rank only third after the negative and neutral accounts. Within the minority 
category of passive processes, a negative tenor prevails in both papers, with 
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a higher percentage (83.3 percent or 5/6) in DM than in the VK (40 percent 
or 2/5). The EU is thus presented in both papers as being affected negatively 
by the sudden rise of immigration, with a stronger focus on this crisis for the 
EU in the Belgian than in the Dutch newspaper.
The German government, in the spotlight because of its Chancellor’s widely 
reported phrase “Wir schaffen das” at the end of August, is credited with an 
overall active role in both papers, as table 5.3 demonstrates (72 percent or 
18/25 for DM and 63.2 percent or 12/19 for the VK). In De Morgen, we note an 
equal number of articles with a leading neutral and positive tone to the action 
verbs (38.9 percent or 7/18), whilst the neutral actions dominate in the VK 
(41.7 percent or 5/12), followed by the positive processes (16.7 percent with only 
2 out of 12 articles associating Germany with positive active processes), in a 
distant second position. It seems that the Dutch accounts are somewhat less 
enthusiastic about Germany’s actions than the Flemish narratives. The articles 
with predominantly negative actions for Germany account for 5.6 percent 
(or 1/18) and 8.3 percent (or 1/12) in DM and the VK respectively. When 
examining the roles for Chancellor Angela Merkel, a similar pattern emerges. 
DM allocates more positive agency to her (57 percent or four out of the seven 
articles with a dominant agency role), while the Chancellor receives only 
16.7 percent (or 1/6) of the articles with a dominant positive agency in the VK.
Table 5.3: Semantic roles of the German government, including its leader Angela 























































































As for the Hungarian government with the conservative Premier Victor 
Orban, articulating the ideologically opposite stance of Angela Merkel’s 
welcoming position, the agentive roles are also dominant in both papers 
(85.7 percent or 18/21 for DM and 75 percent or 9/12 for the VK), as is obvi-
ous in table 5.4. The VK gives this actor negative agency with a prevalence 
of negatively connotated verbal processes (55.6 percent or 5/9), followed 
by 33.3 percent (3/9) of the articles with a neutral tenor. For De Morgen, 
the ranking order is just the opposite with the neutral articles coming first 
(44.4 percent or 8/18) and the negative ones next (27.8 percent or 5/18), thus 
demonstrating a higher level of neutrality toward Hungary than the Dutch 
newspaper. Not a single article featuring dominant positive actions by the 
Hungarian government appears in both newspapers. When zooming in on the 
roles for Premier Orban, the same pattern becomes apparent with dominance 
of agentive roles at 60 percent (3/5) for De Volkskrant and 57.2 percent (4/7) 
for De Morgen, and negative agency ranking on top at 66.7 percent (2/3) for 
De Volkskrant, while it comes only second with 25 percent (1/4) after neutral 
agency for 75 percent or three out of four articles with dominant agency 
position in De Morgen.
Table 5.4: Semantic roles of Hungarian government, including its Premier Victor 
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Discussion
In both newspapers, the EU, Germany, Hungary, and local political institutions 
and elites receive impressive media attention and are predominantly presented 
as active participants in the debate. They can thus advance their immigration 
views, which increasingly become central on their electoral platforms. This 
way, the refugees’ plight gets politicized and also domesticated, which is also 
evident in the prevalence of local elites’ political response and policy themes in 
both newspapers. Evidence of this is the renewed heated debate in summer 2018 
among Belgian political elites concerning the situation with the newly arrived 
refugees in Brussels and the protracted Belgian federal government impasse in 
December 2018 about signing up to the UN global pact, the first ever international 
deal on the migration situation, approved by delegates from 164 countries in 
Marrakesh. Similar to the findings by Parker, Naper, and Goodman (2018) and 
Sumuvuori et al. (2016), the discourse in both newspapers centers on Europe 
as the focus of the crisis, thus shifting attention away from the crisis for the 
refugees, escaping the dismal circumstances in their home countries and having 
to face critical and life-threatening conditions on their journey to safer havens.
When it comes to semantics of the processes which these political players 
are associated with, we note subtle differences in attitude between the Dutch 
and the Belgian/Flemish corpora under investigation, which can by no means 
be generalized without further research into larger corpora. The EU receives a 
more positive coverage in De Volkskrant than in De Morgen. Several articles in 
De Morgen criticize the EU for its internal divisions, resulting in a Hamlet-like 
hesitation to efficiently handle the situation. As for the semantic positioning 
of the German government and its Chancellor Merkel, the Flemish paper 
appears to give them more credit than is the case in its Dutch counterpart. 
It also prints more articles with Hungarian neutral active processes than De 
Volkskrant. Yet, both papers are aligned in not publishing any positive articles 
about the Hungarian government and its leader’s actions.
In contrast to the active roles bestowed on the EU’s political institutions 
and leaders, refugees are presented by both papers in primarily nonagentive 
roles, and are deprived of power by being muted in not getting access to the 
public forum to tell their own stories as political and social subjects, situated 
against a troubled historical background in their home countries. However, in 
the Dutch newspaper the difference between active and passive roles for the 
refugee is smaller than in the Flemish daily, where the articles with a leading 
passive role far outnumber those which offer the refugee some agency. In 
other words, De Volkskrant offers the refugee a more active function than De 
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Morgen, although this agency is still overshadowed by the larger percentage 
of processes the refugees undergo.
The lack of voice and agency for the refugees is generated not only in the 
absence of direct or indirect quotation, but also in the syntactic and semantic 
positioning of the refugees in passive roles without agentive power. As for 
semantics, whenever agency is allocated to the refugees, it is associated with 
neutral material action verbs, thus giving an overall impression of a neutral 
tenor and objective reporting. A brief digression on methodological approach 
is in order here. This result underscores the importance of adjudging not only 
positive and negative, but also neutral evaluation to all processes examined. 
It is essential to factor in all material processes, including the neutral action 
verbs, instead of merely focusing on the minority of colored lexical items in 
the texts, which often blinds the eye of the researcher examining framing 
processes. This rigorous approach complicates the research and is, above all, a 
time-consuming exercise if it is to be carried out manually. But judging from 
the many cases where the figurative meaning prevailed over the literal one, 
we argue that, so far, computer-aided linguistic analysis cannot replace the 
human interpretative capacities to distinguish connotation, even denotation, 
of certain verbs for categorization into the various verbal processes.
It says a lot for the journalists and authors of these particular corpora that 
in the majority of the verbal processes associated with refugees a neutral 
stance was adopted, and a high level of editorial objectivity was reached, at 
least as far as material action verbs are concerned. This echoes earlier findings 
published in the Finnish report about the migration coverage in a selection of 
European media outlets, including De Morgen, six months later (Sumuvuori 
et al., 2016). Yet, this dominant neutrality does not preclude an additional 
examination of the ratio between positive and negative actions allocated to 
the refugees. As for the material action verbs, negative actions appear twice 
as much as positive action processes, but their numbers are still negligible in 
comparison with the neutral action verbs and the passive processes in general. 
Therefore, just like the findings about the center-right newspapers’ coverage 
of the refugee situation in that same crisis period (Lams, 2018), no moral 
panic or threat frames underlie the narratives of these center-left newspapers.
On the basis of this semantic role analysis, it can be concluded that, unlike 
earlier findings by Van Gorp (2005) and Roggeband and Vliegenthart (2007) 
about the contribution of the negative frames for the migrants and refugees 
to a dominant securitization sphere in the previous decade, the current 
corpora do not cast the refugee in such a dominant position of intruder. The 
ascription of maliciousness, as discussed in Chouliaraki and Zaborowski 
(2017), which “narrows down the refugee’s agency to the capacity to harm” 
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(2017: 268) is largely absent in this emotional period of a crisis atmosphere 
in which the sufferer is portrayed as in dire need of help. If maliciousness 
surfaces at all, it often originates through quotations from frame sponsors, 
like right-wing political leaders. Moreover, when it comes to the passive role 
of the refugees, the negative victim position is only secondary to the more 
dominant positive image of refugees as beneficiaries. This representational 
shift from intruder to victim and beneficiary demonstrates the importance 
of political context and the transient nature of events for discursive change 
and frame dominance (Benson, 2013). More negative images can easily 
return after single incidents involving refugees, and confirms the need for 
periodical revisits of previous research, as called for by Caviedes (2015). 
As for the active role of the refugees, articles about the positive impact the 
newcomers could have on the local communities unfortunately remain largely 
absent. Yet again, this can, to some extent, be attributed to the historical 
and situational context of that time period, with all focus on the European 
authorities, unprepared to welcome a sudden surge of newcomers in dire 
need of humanitarian assistance.
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Tolerance and Cultural Diversity through 
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Cultural values, migrant integration policy, and journalistic 
role perceptions: Collusion or Collision?
For several years now, immigration has steered the policy debate in Europe 
and it continues to do so as new urgent matters keep on setting the agenda. 
Integration of immigrants and immigration as a whole is a major political 
issue, not only in the realm of policy, but also in those of public opinion 
and journalism, (e.g., Watson & Riffe, 2013). A country’s cultural values can 
also stimulate or reject immigration (Leong & Ward, 2006). This chapter 
explores the interrelationships between data on policy, public opinion, 
cultural values, and journalistic cultures in an effort to integrate databases 
that were hitherto only studied separately, and we do so with an emphasis 
on journalistic cultures. The databases used are the Migrant Integration 
Policy Index (MIPEX), the World Values Survey (WVS), and the Worlds of 
Journalism Study (WJS).
The MIPEX classification is in fact a normative evaluation of countries 
whereby experts attribute scores of between 0 and 100 to the list of countries, 
assuming at least implicitly that ‘less’ developed policy contexts should be 
adjusted based on the better-developed migration policies of the ‘more’ 
developed countries. ‘Policy’ does not operate in a cultural vacuum, so it 
comes as no surprise that researchers have sought and found (Callens, 2015; 
Hooghe & De Vroome, 2015; Schroyens, Meuleman, & Galle, 2015) links 
between the public opinion of nation states on the one hand and the lat-
ter’s migration and integration policies on the other. The aforementioned 
researchers have weighed the importance of two conflicting hypotheses. The 
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first hypothesis states that liberal immigration policies foster competition, 
and hence public attitudes that oppose increased immigration. The second 
hypothesis that was already vindicated in research prior to ours stresses a 
positive correlation between a more welcoming public opinion and policies 
in migrant-friendly countries.
Welzel (2013)—a key specialist of the World Values Survey—developed 
a theory of human development according to which social-economic devel-
opment, emancipative cultural change, and democratization constitute a 
coherent entity of social progress. The author classifies countries according to 
their cultural values and the extent to which opportunities for emancipative 
values are on offer.
Communication scientists (see e.g., Vliegenthart, 2015) have stressed 
the importance of a third sphere alongside cultural attitudes and policy 
orientations, where political issues get constructed: the media sphere. There 
are important agenda interactions between political actors, the general 
public, and the media. McCombs (2011: 1) argued that: “The power of the 
news media to set a nation’s agenda, to focus public attention on a few key 
public issues, is an immense and well-documented influence.” Nevertheless, 
the impact of the media on the public is currently assessed as important, 
but not as unilaterally and predominantly as has been suggested by early 
communication scholars.
When it comes to the influence of the media on politics, most of the 
relevant literature confirms the existence of media effects on the political 
agenda (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2016), although contingency—depend-
ing on specific circumstances—has also been observed. What works for 
agendas might also work for values. The emancipative values in national 
public opinion cultures and political cultures may very well go together with 
similar journalistic values. Investigating the extent to which this holds true 
is the goal of our study.
We studied the relationship between the media and other spheres based 
on data from the Worlds of Journalism international research study. These 
data contain information about the way journalists in 67 countries view 
their professional roles. The empirical goal of this chapter is to compare the 
degree to which emancipative values in the Worlds Value Survey coexist 
with MIPEX policies (as reflected in prior research results) as well with 
journalistic role perceptions (a less explored domain so far). Our analysis 
will focus on countries for which data on three research dimensions are 
available: the MIPEX policy index, the international World Values survey 
and the Worlds of Journalism international journalists’ study, that is a set 
of 24 countries.
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The three databases
MIPEX shows an integrated score on eight policy areas in 40 western countries. 
The eight domains are labor market mobility, family reunion, education (since 
2010), political participation, long-term residence, health, access to nationality, and 
anti-discrimination. An integrated score is calculated based on assessments of 
experts involved in a peer-review process. Although theoretically each domain 
has independent index scores (from 1 to 100), we refer to the integrated score, 
leading to an overall score out of 100. The experts who score the different 
dimensions are independent legal scholars and practitioners within the domain 
of migration law (Niessen, 2009: 7). The consulted experts rely on in-depth 
knowledge of the national legal and regulatory provisions on legal policy 
within their own country, and are also able to assess the regulatory frameworks 
of other countries from a comparative perspective. In order to achieve optimal 
objectivity in scoring, a second opinion of an extra expert is always requested 
to peer-review the scores of the individual expert assessments.
The MIPEX database is the only database used in this study that is derived 
from judgments by experts. The other two databases are based on survey 
research input. Current World Values Survey data (WVS, 6th wave, 2010-2014) 
gathered in 60 countries made it possible to put together a number of different 
scales (http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). The WVS targets a representative 
adult population sample (at least 1,200 respondents per country) in different 
countries with the same survey questionnaire, aimed at providing essential 
insights into political and social-cultural change.
Especially relevant for research on immigration opinions is the Emancipa-
tive Values Index. Emancipative values emphasize freedom for everyone. Based 
on these values a scale is constituted ranging from 0 to 1. The Emancipative 
Values Index is based on four sub-indices: autonomy, equality, choice, and 
voice. The institutional spheres from which these four indices are derived 
are widely different. Autonomy mainly points to the autonomy of children 
in the family context. Equality refers to gender equality, whereas choice is an 
indicator of ethical matters such as homosexuality, abortion, and divorce. The 
last index, voice, refers to political participation. Previous research has shown 
that these core values (Welzer, 2013) are related to important concepts such 
as well-being, democracy, and environmental sustainability. Our study thus 
wants to advance the scientific knowledge of the interrelational connections 
between values in policy (MIPEX), public opinion (WVS), and journalism 
(Worlds of Journalism Study).
The third used database is on journalism. Journalism (Deuze, 2005) is 
among other professions known to have an ideology of its own; this ideology 
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has been interpreted in many different ways across the globe. The Worlds 
of Journalism study brought together researchers from 67 countries. In 
an unprecedented collaborative effort, more than 27,500 journalists were 
interviewed between 2012 and 2016, based on a common methodological 
framework (http://www.worldsofjournalism.org). The Worlds of Journalism 
questionnaire deals with many dimensions of the occupational ideology. 
One of the questions raised was the degree to which journalists see it as 
their professional role to promote tolerance and cultural diversity in the 
countries where they work, although this conception conflicts somewhat 
with the universal ideal of ‘objectivity’ (e.g., Broersma, 2015), which implies 
that journalists should not take sides in public debates, even when ideals such 
as cultural diversity are at stake. Since immigration issues policy and public 
opinion are interrelated (Callens, 2015), we will study whether journalistic 
culture has been following this trend.
The question about journalistic roles relates to a wider set of questions 
regarding journalists’ perceptions of professional roles. The items in question 
can be grouped under four headings: the monitoring role, the interventionist 
role, the collaborative role, and, finally, the accommodating role of journalism. 
The monitoring role implies that journalists want to provide political informa-
tion, monitor and scrutinize political and business actors, and motivate 
people to participate in politics. The interventionist role refers to journalists’ 
advocating for social change, influencing public opinion, setting the political 
agenda, and supporting national development. The collaborative role of 
journalism concentrates on supporting government policy and conveying 
a positive image of political leadership. Finally, the accommodating role of 
journalism refers to the provision of entertainment, news that attracts the 
largest audience possible, and offers advice for daily life. In our study, we will 
investigate how the role promoting tolerance and cultural diversity relates 
to the other perceived roles.
Obviously, this analysis cannot answer questions on causality. It is most 
likely that journalism, cultural values, and policy will influence each other in 
a constant intermingling of causes and effects. Each one of these databases 
has had a large influence on research, so that it is interesting to see whether 
their items correlate, although the databases are based on different theo-
retical frameworks. A large-scale multi-country study of values, policy, and 
journalism measured with a unified theoretical background is lacking, and 
is practically unfeasible. Therefore, it is most necessary to compare these 
existing databases with different backgrounds to get a grasp of how culture, 
policy, and journalism are intertwined.
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After having provided a general overview of the databases and pointed 
at the interaction between them, we specifically focus on the similarities 
and differences between Belgium (both French- and Dutch-speaking) and 
Sweden, as this is a central dimension of the IM²MEDIATE project on which 
this book reports.
Although an integration of the databases mentioned here (MIPEX, World 
Values Survey, and Worlds of Journalism) was not undertaken in previous 
research, it has to be noted that in their classic work on comparing media 
systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) have made an international comparison 
including Sweden and Belgium and classified both Belgium and Sweden as 
democratic corporatist media systems. The democratic corporatist model 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004: 298) is characterized by a strong emphasis on 
the role of organized social groups in society, but simultaneously a strong 
adherence to the ‘common good’. The free flow of information is deemed 
important, but the state has a positive obligation to sustain that free flow.
Despite this similar background in both Sweden and Belgium, there are 
some peculiarities that need to be pointed out. Van Aelst and Aalberg (2011) 
compared the degree of formality of relations between politicians and journal-
ists in three countries, i.e., Sweden, Norway, and Belgium. The study found 
that the relations between members of both professions were most formal in 
Sweden and least formal in Belgium, with Norway occupying an in-between 
position. This higher degree of formality might go together with a strong 
emphasis on the monitoring role of journalism in Sweden, when compared to 
Belgium. Indeed, Swedish journalism has been said to be influenced strongly 
by the ‘Granskningsidealet’ (i.e., the Watchdog Ideal) of journalism (Wiik, 
2007). This watchdog ideal might also imply that the collaborative role of 
journalists (such as journalists supporting government policy) might be more 
outspokenly sustained in Belgium when compared with Sweden.
The supposed detachment of Swedish journalism is however ambiguous. 
Another dimension of Swedish journalism is its preoccupation with diversity. 
Comparing Swedish journalism with German journalism, Graf and Jönhill 
(2011: 10) remark that Sweden has a long history of being occupied with 
diversity in journalism and making plans sustaining diversity in journalism. 
Journalists might not only be critical toward authorities, but also engaged to 
change society according to the ideals of multiculturalism. This orientation 
might imply that Swedish journalists more often see it as their role to promote 
tolerance and cultural diversity in society, when compared with Belgian 
journalists. This might go together with other more interventionist role 
perceptions in Sweden when compared to Belgium.
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Strömbäck, Nord, and Shehata (2012) remark that journalism in Sweden 
is nowadays caught between professionalization and commercialization. 
Commercialization might imply that increasingly role perceptions are oriented 
toward pleasing the audience, rather than controlling politics. Also in Belgium 
(Raeymaekers, Paulussen, & De Keyser, 2012: 152) journalists worry that the 
impact of sensationalism is increasing. Although both Swedish and Belgian 
journalism are probably influenced by the evolution toward commercialism, 
we might suspect that as a corroboration of the more pronounced watchdog 
role of journalism in Sweden the accommodative role of journalism is less 
developed compared to Belgium as well.
It must furthermore be noted that a comparison between Belgian and 
Swedish journalism also has to take into account that journalism in Belgium 
is far from homogenous. Belgian journalism includes both French-language 
and Dutch-language journalism. French-speaking journalism (Bonin et al., 
2017) is more influenced by what Hallin and Mancini (2004) call the polar-
ized pluralist model. This Mediterranean oriented cluster of media systems 
historically has a greater degree of political parallelism than the democratic 
corporatist model. This might result in a higher degree of monitoring jour-
nalism, interventionism, and collaborative journalism in French-speaking 
Belgian journalism. Promoting tolerance and cultural diversity by journalists 
might be a more prominent role in French-speaking Belgium as well, because 
historically (Billiet, Maddens, & Beerten, 2003) this region is associated with a 
greater openness toward migration and multiculturalism than Flanders. As the 
degree of market orientation is also lower in polarized pluralist media systems, 
we might also expect to have a lower accommodative role of journalism in 
French-speaking journalism.
Hypotheses and research questions
The links between MIPEX and public opinion (as expressed in the WVS) 
have been explored in earlier research. The links with journalism culture have 
not yet been extensively investigated. Nevertheless, it is logically consistent 
to assume that the degree to which journalists see it as their professional role 
to promote tolerance and cultural diversity is connected with integration-
friendly options in policy and public opinion. This leads us to the following 
hypotheses:
H1: In countries with high MIPEX values, journalists will view promoting tolerance 
and cultural diversity as an important professional role.
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H2: In countries with high emancipative values, journalists will view promoting 
tolerance and cultural diversity as an important professional role.
Furthermore, logical assumptions on the resonance between policy, public 
opinion dimensions, and other dimensions of journalism culture are less 
derivable from earlier research. Therefore, we formulated open research 
questions here rather than hypotheses.
RQ1: Is there a correlation between MIPEX and the role perception on promoting 
tolerance and cultural diversity and the four other journalistic role perceptions 
(i.e., monitoring, interventionist, collaborative, accommodating roles)?
RQ2: Is there a correlation between emancipative values and the role perception 
on promoting tolerance and cultural diversity and the four other journalistic role 
perceptions?
To test these research questions, a database of countries was compiled that 
consisted of all the 24 countries that were included in all three central data-
bases. The countries for which data are available are all Western countries, 
except for South Korea, the only non-Western country that met the criteria 
for inclusion in this study.
Table 6.1: Countries under study
Australia Estonia Ireland Spain
Austria Finland Latvia Sweden
Belgium Germany The Netherlands Switzerland
Bulgaria Greece Portugal Turkey
Canada Hungary Romania UK
Czech Republic Iceland South Korea USA
In addition to the study of the interrelations, we aimed to examine whether 
these countries group together on the dimensions specified in these three 
databases. Focusing specifically on the role perception that journalists would 
like to promote tolerance and cultural diversity, we ran analyses of the cluster-
ing of countries on three dimensions, combining each dimension with this 
particular role perception. These three dimensions are the MIPEX data, the 
World Values Survey, and the four other role perceptions borrowed from the 
Worlds of Journalism Study.
RQ 3: How do Western countries cluster together when it comes to the role percep-
tion that journalists should promote tolerance and cultural diversity in correlation 
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with data on integration policy, emancipative values, and other journalistic role 
perceptions?
Finally, we test hypotheses comparing Belgian with Swedish journalism 
cultures and Francophone Belgian journalism with Dutch-speaking Belgian 
journalism.
H3: Journalistic role perceptions will be different in Belgium and Sweden.
H3a: The role perception that journalism needs to promote tolerance and cultural 
diversity is more important for Swedish journalism when compared to Belgian 
journalism.
H3b: The monitoring role of journalism is more important for Swedish journalists 
when compared to Belgian journalists.
H3c: The collaborative role of journalism is more important for Belgian journalists 
when compared to Swedish journalists.
H3d: The interventionist role of journalism is more important for Swedish journal-
ists when compared to Belgian journalists.
H3e: The accommodative role of journalism is more important for Belgian journal-
ists when compared to Swedish journalists.
H4: Journalistic role perceptions will be different in French-speaking and Dutch-
speaking Belgian journalism.
H4a: The role perception that journalism needs to promote tolerance and cultural 
diversity is more important for French-speaking journalism when compared to 
Dutch-speaking Belgian journalism.
H4b: The monitoring role of journalism is more important for French-speaking 
Belgian journalists when compared to Dutch-speaking Belgian journalists.
H4c: The collaborative role of journalism is more important for French-speaking 
Belgian journalists when compared to Dutch-speaking Belgian journalists.
H4d: The interventionist role of journalism is more important for French-speaking 
Belgian journalists when compared to Dutch-speaking Belgian journalists.
H4e: The accommodative role of journalism is more important for Dutch-speaking 
Belgian journalists when compared to French-speaking Belgian journalists.
Methods and analysis techniques
Technique 1: Correlation analysis
We used a data set of 24 countries that met the abovementioned inclusion 
criteria. Each country was entered as a case, and each dimension from the 
chosen databases was entered as a variable. These scores have a value of 
between 0 and 100 for each country on each dimension. These values are 
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percentage scores in the case of the W VS and the Worlds of Journalism 
Study, and Evaluation by Experts scores in the case of MIPEX. This dataset 
is available upon request from the authors of this study. Pearson’s correla-
tions were calculated. Tables are presented with the dimensions from the 
four databases used on the horizontal and the vertical axis, indicating their 
interrelations. The cells of the tables are Pearson’s correlation coefficients, 
representing the degree to which the different dimensions are intertwined. 
We calculated significance at the .01, .05, and .10 levels. The higher (.10) level 
of significance is included because we are dealing with a statistically small 
sample of European countries (N = 24).8
Technique 2: Cluster analysis
We ran a cluster analysis with four clusters to identify countries with similar 
or dissimilar profiles, while focusing on the role of journalism to promote 
tolerance and cultural diversity and combining each of the four databases 
with this role perception. We went through several exercises in dividing the 
map of Europe (plus some non-European countries) to come up with “four 
clusters of the press” when it comes to promoting tolerance and diversity, 
paraphrasing the seminal work of Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956) 
on media models across the globe.
This allowed us to didactically evaluate the impact of each database on 
the specific role perception we focused on. The clustering method used is 
the furthest neighbor method, which tends to produce compact clusters of 
similar size. This method allows us to explain differences and similarities 
between groups of countries more didactically, compared to other methods 
that create a large center cluster and a few smaller clusters containing a few 
countries or containing only one. Graphically the clusters are presented 
using dendrograms, i.e., tree-like structures to visually present how countries 
group together.
Technique 3: t-tests
The questions about role perceptions of journalism in the Worlds of Journalism 
Study used a five-point Likert scale. These ordinal data are used quantitatively 
with a comparison of means using t-tests. The t-tests allow two by two com-
parisons between Belgian journalists and Swedish journalists and between 
Dutch-speaking Belgian journalists and French-speaking Belgian journalists.
8 This results in a slightly different reporting of significance levels in this chapter of the book.
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Results
Correlation analysis
Emphasis (see Table 6.2) on the importance of promoting tolerance does not 
significantly correlate with the MIPEX scores (r = -0.133, p = .534), nor does 
this role perception significantly correlate with emancipative values (r = -0.331, 
p = .114). In other words, the hypotheses on MIPEX (H1) and emancipative 
values (H2) are not confirmed.
Table 6.2: Correlations between journalistic role perceptions and MIPEX and 







Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01
Additional research questions (RQ 1 and 2) deal with the link between 
MIPEX and emancipative values on the one hand, and other role perceptions 
of journalists on the other hand.
The journalistic role perceptions that correlate most strongly with the 
other databases are interventionism and collaboration. Both these journal-
istic role perceptions tend to be associated with lower MIPEX values and 
lower emancipative values. The correlations are more blatant in the case 
of interventionism (i.e., MIPEX: r = -0.479, p = .018; emancipative values, 
r = -0.714, p = .000). The correlations with collaboration, while somewhat 
lower, follow the same trend (i.e., MIPEX: r = -0.402, p = .052; emancipative 
values, r = -0.590, p = .002).
The perception that journalists should promote tolerance and cultural 
diversity throughout their work co-occurs with the perception that they should 
monitor society (r = 0.538, p = .007) as well as with interventionism (r = 0.691, 
p = .000) (see Table 6.3). Interventionism itself is tied up with collaboration 
in a high correlation (r = 0.752, p = .000). A last significant correlation to 
be noted in table 3 indicates that monitoring and accommodating forms 
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of journalism clearly do not go together, as indicated by a strong negative 
correlation (r = -0.532, p = .007).
Table 6.3: Intercorrelations among journalistic role perceptions 
Monitoring Interventionism Collaboration Accommodation 
Tolerance 0.538*** 0.691*** 0.305 -0.009
Monitoring 0.367* 0.260 -0.532***
Interventionism 0.752*** 0.073
Collaboration 0.161
Note: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, ***= p < .01
Cluster Analysis
Only two countries have both a strong integration policy (high MIPEX) and 
a strong emphasis on tolerance among journalists These two countries are 
Portugal and Sweden. Another small cluster consists of Latvia and Turkey: 
both on the outside of Europe, these two countries exhibit a strong emphasis 
on tolerance among journalists, but also a weak integration policy, based on 
the MIPEX score.
Next to these two small clusters, we identified two larger clusters, which 
are clearly different regions. The first one consists of Western European 
countries. These countries have highly developed integration policies, but 
their journalists do not seem too concerned with promoting tolerance and 
cultural diversity. Next to the Western European countries, English-speaking 
Western countries outside Europe join this cluster: Australia, Canada, and 
the United States.
The second large cluster includes only one English-speaking country: 
Ireland. Iceland is also included in this cluster. In addition to Iceland and 
Ireland, a large group of Central and Eastern European countries are part of 
the cluster as well. South Korea also joins this cluster.
The second clustering exercise is a further attempt to classify the data with 
four clusters using other variables. It resulted in four clusters of the press 
based on emancipative values measured in the World Values Survey and 
the journalists’ perception of their role as promoting tolerance and cultural 
diversity (Figure 6.2). This cluster solution also includes two small clusters and 
two large clusters. Two countries that already stood out in the first clustering 
exercise once again confirm their uniqueness. Sweden, high on MIPEX, is 
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also scoring very high on the emancipative values. On the other hand, Turkey 
is scoring low on emancipative values as well as on MIPEX. Although the 
clustering method we used does not tend to form small clusters the uniqueness 
of Sweden and Turkey makes them one-country clusters anyhow.
Figure 6.1: Four clusters of the press based on MIPEX and the role perception that 
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Figure 6.2: Four clusters of the press based on emancipative values and journalists’ 
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The two other countries—Portugal and Latvia—that belong to the first 
cluster’s small groups join another, larger cluster. This cluster includes the bulk 
of countries that were grouped together in the ‘low MIPEX-low tolerance’ 
cluster. There is once again similarity between the large group of countries 
in the ‘high emancipative values and low tolerance’ cluster and the ‘high 
MIPEX-low tolerance’ cluster.
Finally, we produced clusters using interventionism and the journalistic 
focus on tolerance as input. Iceland, a country appearing together with very 
different countries in the earlier cluster analyses, has its very own place in 
this cluster analysis, characterized by low interventionism and a low focus 
on promoting tolerance among journalists.
The combination of high interventionism with a high focus on tolerance 
among journalists has a clear regional Southern identity in this cluster analy-
sis. Journalism in the Baltic countries has the features found in Southern 
countries, making these countries also a part of this cluster.
In this cluster analysis the countries that are in the ‘high-high’ and ‘low-low’ 
clusters are easily identified from a geographic point of view. In the ‘high-low’ 
and ‘low-high’ groups, however, we find all the Germanic language-speaking 
countries, as well as Finland and the Czech Republic, two countries that 
are geographically close to these Germanic countries. It is however difficult 
to make a clear distinction between the two groups since the countries 
mentioned are scattered throughout these two clusters.
Figure 6.3: Four clusters of the press based on interventionism and journalists’ 
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Comparing Belgium and Sweden
The results comparing Belgium and Sweden confirm most hypotheses on 
differences between Belgium and Sweden very clearly. All tested role percep-
tions differ statistically significantly from each other in the two countries, 
although not always in the predicted direction.
Indeed, as hypothesized, Swedish journalists pay more attention to 
promoting tolerance and cultural diversity (4.06 versus 3.59 on a five-point 
scale, 4.06 versus 3.59, t = -7.234, p < .001). The Swedish journalists also score 
higher on the four role perceptions associated with the monitoring role, i.e., 
to provide analysis of current affairs (4.06 versus 3.59, t = -7.234, p < .001), to 
monitor and scrutinize political leaders (4.35 versus 3.38, t = -4.732, p < .001), 
to monitor and scrutinize business (4.20 versus 3.25, t = -14.446, p < .001), 
and to motivate people to participate in political activity (2.92 versus 2.52, 
t = -5.482, p < .01).
The role of promoting tolerance and the monitoring roles generally score 
higher on the five-point scale compared with the interventionist and col-
laborative role perceptions, both in Sweden and Belgium. Nevertheless the 
results from Belgium and Sweden are different. In four of the five cases this 
confirms our hypotheses. Indeed, as to interventionism, Swedish journalists 
are more motivated to influence public opinion (2.62 versus 2.48, t = -2.048, 
p < .05), to advocate for social change (2.98 versus 2.58, t = -5.559, p < .001), 
and to support national development (2.38 versus 2.10, t = 3.896, p < .001). 
The only interventionist role perception that is more prominent in Belgium 
is the urge to set the political agenda (2.50 versus 2.76, t = 3.840, p < .001). 
Belgian journalists also score higher on the will to support government policy 
(1.03 versus 1.49, t = 13.913, p < .001) and the need to convey a positive image 
of political leadership (1.37 versus 1.50, t = 3.082, p < .001), but the higher 
preference for these last-mentioned two roles confirm our hypothesis, as we 
hypothesized a more outspoken collaborative role in Belgium.
The final three role perceptions documented in the table deal with the 
accommodating role of journalism. The two role perceptions that link most 
clearly to entertainment are most supported in Belgium, i.e., to provide 
entertainment and relaxation (2.54 versus 2.78, t = 3.758, p < .001) and to 
provide the kind of news that attracts the largest audience (2.0 versus 2.90, 
t = 14.197, p < 001). The more ambiguous role perception related to the accom-
modating role, because it could also be interpreted as leaning a bit toward 
the monitoring role is more prominently supported in Sweden and not so 
much in Belgium, i.e., the will to provide advice, orientation, and direction 
for everyday life (3.23 versus 2.96, t = -4.446, p < .05). It needs nevertheless 
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to be added that whatever the differences between Sweden and Belgium may 
be on the accommodating role perceptions, these role perceptions are always 
deemed less important than the monitoring role perceptions and the need 
to promote tolerance and cultural diversity.
Differences on role perceptions within Belgium
The role perception that journalism should promote tolerance and cultural 
diversity is more popular for French-speaking Belgian as compared to Dutch-
speaking Belgian journalists. This confirms our hypothesis (3.31 versus 3.93, 
t = -6.554, p < .001). This is an important difference, but on the monitoring, 
interventionist, collaborating, and accommodating roles we perceive that 
often the differences between Flemish and Francophone journalists are 
statistically insignificant, confirming a great similarity in journalism in both 
Belgian language communities.
Table 6.4: Role perceptions of journalists in Belgium and Sweden 
Role Sweden Belgium t-value p-value
Promote tolerance and cultural diversity 4.06 3.59 -7.234 .000***
Provide analysis of current affairs 4.05 3.85 -3.676 .000***
Monitor and scrutinize political leaders 4.35 3.38 -14.732 .000***
Monitor and scrutinize business 4.20 3.25 -14.446 .000***
Motivate people to participate in political activity 2.92 2.52 -5.482 .050*
Influence public opinion 2.62 2.48 -2.048 .041*
Advocate for social change 2.98 2.58 -5.559 .000***
Set the political agenda 2.50 2.76 3.840 .000***
Support national development 2.38 2.10 3.896 .000***
Support government policy 1.03 1.49 13.913 .000***
Convey a positive image of political leadership 1.37 1.50 3.082 .000***
Provide entertainment and relaxation 2.54 2.78 3.758 .000***
Provide the kind of news that attracts the largest 
audience
2.00 2.90 14.197 .000***
Provide advice, orientation, and direction for daily 
life
3.23 2.96 -4.446 .040*
Note: *= p < .01, **= p < .05, ***= p < .001
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Nevertheless, some hypothesis confirming differences between the two 
Belgian regions exist. Francophone journalists urge their audience more to 
participate in political activity (2.09 versus 3.01, t = -9.436, p < .001), confirming 
a stronger monitorial role in French-speaking Belgium. The Francophone 
journalists also want to set the political agenda more explicitly (2.46 versus 
3.12, t = -6.888, p < .001). A role perception that contradicts the hypothetical 
difference between Flemish and Francophone journalism is the stronger will 
to influence public opinion in Flanders (2.61 versus 2.33, t = 3.138, p < .05). This 
role perception pertains to the interventionist role, but as it is also an audience-
oriented role perception it might be seen as leaning toward the accommodating 
role. A difference between Flanders and French-speaking Belgium also exists 
in the more clearly accommodating role perception to provide the kind of 
news that attracts the largest audience (3.05 versus 2.72, t = 3.299, p < .001). A 





Promote tolerance and cultural diversity 3.31 3.93 -6.554 .000***
Provide analysis of current affairs 3.80 3.90 -1.377 .169
Monitor and scrutinize political leaders 3.31 3.46 -1.355 .176
Monitor and scrutinize business 3.19 3.33 -1.393 .164
Motivate people to participate in political 
activity
2.09 3.01 -9.436 .000***
Influence public opinion 2.61 2.33 3.138 .002**
Advocate for social change 2.55 2.63 -0.799 .425
Set the political agenda 2.46 3.12 -6.888 .000***
Support national development 2.31 2.46 -1.473 .146
Support government policy 1.47 1.50 -0.367 .714
Convey a positive image of political 
leadership
1.68 1.29 6.559 .000***
Provide entertainment and relaxation 2.90 2.66 2.480 .051
Provide the kind of news that attracts the 
largest audience
3.05 2.72 3.299 .000***
Provide advice, orientation, and direction 
for daily life
2.94 2.99 -0.549 .583
Note: *= p < 0.1, **= p < .05, ***= p < .01
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final hypothesis confirming difference between the two parts of the country 
lies in the higher will to convey a positive image of political leadership in 
Flanders (1.68 versus 1.29, t = 6.559, p < .001), confirming the hypothesis on a 
more outspoken collaborative role taking in Flemish journalism.
Conclusion
Our main conclusion is that, contrary to what we expected, countries with a 
higher focus on promoting tolerance in journalism cultures have less eman-
cipative values and migrant-friendly policies (hence falsifying hypothesis 1 
and 2). Promoting tolerance is a value in countries where journalistic culture 
is interventionist, and hence opposed to the values in policy (as measured 
by MIPEX, cfr. Research question 1) and society (as measured by the WVS, 
cfr. Research question 2). Our results indicate that journalism professionals 
in countries without a clear migrant integration policy seem to consider it 
as their explicit task to counterbalance the main policy line set out in their 
home country when it comes to immigration and openness.
Interventionism—often seen through its political dimension—can also be 
viewed as a will to actively promote some civic values among public opinion. 
This refers to the ‘opinion guide’ role that journalists take on when political 
or social issues are being strongly debated. During the 2015 migration crisis 
certain media outlets adopted a welcoming tone toward refugees and tried 
to counter negative perceptions and stereotypes. Recent research shows that 
this is far from clear: The UNHCR report on press coverage of the refugee 
crisis in Europe shows that in many countries refugees have been presented 
in a negative light, primarily as a problem, and not as a resource that could 
benefit the receiving country (Finnish Institute, 2016; Berry, Garcia-Blanco, 
& Moore, 2016). Also our content analysis (chapter 3 in this book) proved 
these negative orientations in both national contexts investigated in the 
IM²MEDIATE project, i.e., Sweden and Belgium, with an equal emphasis on 
collectivization, although Swedish newspapers do attach more importance 
to the topic if we take the amount of coverage as an indicator.
Moving on to the results of our cluster analyses (Research question 3), 
Sweden—one of the most welcoming countries during the recent refugee 
crisis—typifies countries with both a tolerance-oriented journalism culture 
and strongly tolerance-oriented policies and public opinion. Nevertheless 
Sweden has a journalistic workforce that does not adhere to interventionist 
ideals. This means that Sweden has a more positive approach toward refugees 
than Belgium, as was pointed out in Chapter 3 of this book.
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Our exercise identified different clusters of Southern countries, always 
including Turkey. Promoting tolerance in these countries is an important 
journalistic value, and this echoes interventionism in journalism culture, 
so as to remedy the lack of a tolerance-oriented policy and public opinion.
Clusters including other Northern and Southern countries are less straight-
forward. Eastern Europe occasionally joins the Southern cluster, but it also 
stands out of the latter because it has a lower focus on promoting tolerance 
and cultural diversity in journalism.
Some Western European countries join the cluster which includes Sweden, 
but not always. They are characterized by a noninterventionist journalism 
culture and adhere to migrant-friendly values (emancipative values index 
and MIPEX). However, promoting tolerance and cultural diversity is less 
important in their journalistic culture.
The Iberian countries, Spain and Portugal, are special in that they share 
similarities with Western European countries, especially in developing 
migrant-friendly policies, but they are also more interventionist in their 
journalism cultures.
When making a two-by-two comparison of Belgium and Sweden, the 
differences already set out in the cluster analysis were clearly confirmed. 
Swedish journalism is more tolerance oriented (Hypothesis 3a), monitorial 
(Hypothesis 3b), and interventionist (Hypothesis 3d), but less collaborative 
(Hypothesis 3c) and accommodating (Hypothesis 3e) than Belgian journal-
ism. Belgian journalism itself consists of a merging of two language cultures 
that also are somewhat different, with more tolerance oriented (Hypothesis 
4a), monitorial (Hypothesis 4b) and interventionist (Hypothesis 4d) ac-
cents in Francophone Belgium and more collaborative (Hypothesis 4c) and 
accommodating (Hypothesis 4e) accents in Flanders. Hence, Francophone 
role perceptions of journalists are closer to their Swedish counterparts than 
the Flemish ones.
These results raise the question of the specific values and discourses 
shared by journalism as a distinct field in societies. We see that journalists 
often claim to defend and promote tolerance and diversity, even in countries 
where the data point at a weaker culture of tolerance. Cultural and political 
causes of this particular discourse warrant further study. We must keep in 
mind that journalists’ discourses ought to be considered in their norma-
tive dimension. Discourses about core values of journalists often embrace 
broad notions such as freedom of speech, respect, and tolerance. They are 
well developed in journalistic cultures and play an identity role that anchor 
journalism’s autonomy in society (Hanitzsch & Vos, 2018), even if those 
values and roles are not followed in day-to-day practices. The promotion of 
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tolerance and diversity—just like other traditional values that underscore 
the links between western journalism and democratic systems—is thus a 
complex issue that requires a distinction between its declarative dimension 
(seen in databases such as the WJS Study) and its concrete expression in 
news stories and editorial lines.
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Discordance between Public Opinion 
and News Media Representations of 
Immigrants and Refugees in Belgium and 
Sweden
David De Coninck, Hanne Vandenberghe, and Koen Matthijs
Introduction
Currently, the migration issue is high on the agenda of European policy, news, 
and public. On June 29, 2018, EU leaders announced that they had reached a 
long-awaited agreement on aspects of (re)settlement of refugees and asylum 
seekers. Member states agree to send rescued refugees on EU territory to 
‘check centers’ across the EU. This agreement was the result of an EU summit, 
dominated by the political crisis on how to handle irregular immigration 
into Europe. This summit is seen as a delayed political reaction to Europe’s 
2015 refugee crisis. Although refugee numbers have been decreasing since 
2015 (UNCHR, 2018), the migration issue has swayed elections in France, 
Germany, Austria, Italy, and Hungary. For instance, the Hungarian Parliament 
has recently voted on the so-called ‘Stop Soros’ law, which criminalizes 
helping illegal asylum seekers both as individuals or groups, defying both 
the European Union and human rights groups.
Migration is also a dominant issue in the public debate in the two countries 
under study, Belgium and Sweden. In May 2018, the Belgian Federal Finance 
Minister Van Overtveldt asked the National Bank of Belgium to calculate 
the economic impact of migration in order to bring some ‘objectivity’ into 
the debate on this issue. A Swedish report published in June 2018 from the 
Expert Group for Economic Studies (ESO), operating under the Swedish 
Finance Ministry, states that an average immigrant costs the Swedish tax 
payer about SEK 74,000 per year (€7,200). However, these figures are in 
contrast with the general discourse in Swedish media that immigration is 
economically beneficial.
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This chapter will focus on how news media consumption and trust have 
an impact on attitudes about immigrants and refugees both in Belgium 
and Sweden. Moreover, we will analyze if and to what extent the level of 
importance of the migration issue and the presence of intergroup contact 
are mediators of news consumption. Generally, in Belgium the debate is 
more negative than in Sweden (De Cock et al., 2018). This study will also 
analyze whether there are any differences between Belgians and Swedes on 
attitudes about immigrants and refugees. We begin our research by outlining 
the theoretical frame, focusing on how news media and attitudes toward 
minority groups are linked. Subsequently, we outline the three research 
questions which ask whether or not there are any attitude differences between 
Belgium and Sweden, to what extent media consumption and media trust play 
a role in the formation of these attitudes, and how direct intergroup contact 
and the subjective importance of the migration issue relate to attitudes. In 
the section on data and methodology, we describe how our sample of 3,000 
respondents was collected and how we operationalized concepts such as 
media trust, news consumption, and the importance of the migration issue. 
Finally, we will present and discuss the results of the analyses, to end with 
a brief conclusion.
Literature review
News media play a major role in the attitude formation of the audience with 
regard to the migration issue (Jacobs, Hooghe, & de Vroome, 2017). By select-
ing certain perspectives from which to report news, they can contribute to 
or prevent the stereotyping of (sub)groups in the population (De Cock et 
al., 2018; Leavitt, Covarrubias, Perez, & Fryberg, 2015; Segijn, Bartholomé, 
Pennekamp, & Timmers, 2014). This influence of news media is embedded 
in two communication science theories that take a central position in this 
chapter: agenda-setting theory and framing theory. Agenda-setting theory 
suggests that news media can influence the public agenda by prioritizing 
certain topics in their reporting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). For example, 
the increasing attention of the news media to the migration issue could 
raise awareness amongst the audience. The salience of media coverage on 
immigration is therefore not necessarily related to actual migration numbers 
(Jacobs, Claes, & Hooghe, 2015; Vliegenthart & Boomgaarden, 2007), which 
often misleads the audience and causes them to under- or overestimate the 
influx of migrants (Alba, Rumbaut, & Marotz, 2005; Semyonov, Gorodzeisky, 
& Glikman, 2012; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Strabac, 2011). Moreover, framing 
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theory, or second-level agenda-setting, suggests that emphasizing specific 
aspects of reality in a news story such as a specific problem definition or a 
causal interpretation, can systematically affect how the news users interpret 
news events (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999).
The reason news media representations have such an impact on attitudes 
can be explained by the social identity theory (Van Klingeren, Boomgaarden, 
Vliegenthart, & De Vreese, 2014), which constitutes the third theory around 
which we build this chapter. This theory states that people’s self-concept is 
dependent on the social groups they belong to (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). People 
tend to categorize individuals into groups and assign positive characteristics 
to members of the social groups they belong to (in-group favoritism), and 
negative characteristics to members of social groups they do not belong to 
(outgroup discrimination) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Klingeren et al., 2014). 
Stereotypes that are disseminated through news media can lead to prejudices 
about outgroups in question, causing members of the ingroup to attribute the 
negative characteristics which are presented in the news to every member of 
a given outgroup (Allport, 1954; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1977; Jacobs et al., 2017).
The plurality of cultural and ethnic identities is inherent in current Western 
multicultural societies, such as Belgium and Sweden. Following social identity 
theory, to stimulate integration it is crucial to embrace the different identities 
within multicultural society instead of emphasizing the differences between 
‘us’ and ‘them’ (Hogg, 2016). Consequently, European media policy stipulates 
that media build bridges within societies and between subpopulations to 
ease tensions by promoting inter-ethnic understanding rather than using 
stereotypes and misrepresentations (Campion, 2005; Mattelart & d’Haenens, 
2014). However, previous research on the representation of refugees and 
immigrants in news media has established that these minority groups are 
often problematized. In British newspapers, refugees, asylum seekers, and 
immigrants are presented as a problem, emphasizing the migration issue 
instead of the people behind the stories (KhosraviNik, 2010). A cross-country 
analysis on news coverage on immigration (Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, 
and Dutch-speaking Belgium) concluded that immigrants are given little at-
tention in the news and are often victimized (Masini et al., 2018). A large-scale 
content analysis of Flemish television news (N = 1,630 news items) revealed 
that almost all news about immigration was framed as a problem (Jacobs, 
Meeusen, & d’Haenens, 2016). Moreover, more than 70 percent of the news 
items had a negative tone and stated that immigrants are causing problems 
or seemed focused on the negative consequences of immigration. Although 
this negative representation of immigrants can be observed on both public 
and commercial broadcasters, the reporting on commercial broadcasters was 
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generally found to be more negative than on public broadcasters (Jacobs et 
al., 2016). Studies have also found that people who mainly consume news on 
commercial television hold more negative attitudes toward minority groups 
than people who follow the news on public television (De Coninck et al., 
2018; Jacobs et al., 2016).
Literature has shown that the way in which media represent immigrant 
groups influences public opinion on these groups in the general population 
and in journalists who report this news (Dixon & Williams, 2015). However, 
the (negative) impact of news media representations on public opinion can 
be reduced by direct intergroup contact—a final theory that we will turn to 
in the context of this chapter. On this matter, the contact hypothesis states 
that direct intergroup contact can reduce prejudice and stereotypes between 
groups. The absence of such direct contact may lead to greater sociocultural 
differences and interethnic conflict (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). 
Not just the frequency of interethnic contact, but also the perceived quality 
of that contact plays an important role in reducing prejudice (Ahmed, 2017). 
However, a majority of the population still does not have direct contact with 
migrant groups (Leavitt et al., 2015), which makes news media the primary 
source through which they form their attitudes (Van den Bulck & Broos, 2011).
Not only is the content of news media reporting important when consider-
ing attitudes toward minority groups, but the audience’s trust in news media 
coverage also plays a role. When people mistrust mainstream news media, they 
will seek other sources of information such as alternative media (e.g., social 
media) or real-life information (Jackob, 2010). When we look at the Belgian 
and Swedish contexts, we find that trust in news media is high when compared 
to other European countries. According to the Eurobarometer results of 2016, 
64 percent of Belgians and 77 percent of Swedes believe that their national 
media provide trustworthy information (European Commission, 2016). 
In comparison, the average European trust in news media is at 53 percent. 
Newspapers, radio, and television are considered reliable by respectively 71, 
76, and 73 percent of the Belgian population and 70, 88, and 79 percent of the 
Swedish population, which is once again higher than the European average 
of 55 percent for both newspapers and television, and 66 percent for radio 
(European Commission, 2016).
Taking into account these considerations, we will attempt to provide an 
answer to the following research questions:
RQ1. Are there any differences between Belgium and Sweden with regard to at-
titudes toward immigrants and refugees?
RQ2. To what extent are news media consumption and trust related to attitudes 
toward immigrants and refugees in Belgium and Sweden?
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RQ 3. Do the issue importance of migration compared to other news topics and 
intergroup contact mediate the relation of news media consumption and attitudes 
toward immigrants and refugees?
Data and method
To answer our research questions, we used data from an online questionnaire 
distributed among the population aged between 18 and 65 years old in Belgium 
and Sweden. This took place in September and October of 2017, in cooperation 
with the Belgian polling agency iVOX and its partner company in Sweden, 
which drew a sample of 3,000 respondents (1,500 per country) out of its 
large-scale panels. We selected this methodology for its cost-effectiveness 
in cross-national research, and its efficient way of data collection. As public 
opinion on this subject can quickly be swayed by extreme events (e.g., a 
terror attack), it was important to gather the data in a timely fashion to 
ensure that such a scenario did not take place. Respondents were contacted 
though e-mail with the request to cooperate in a survey, without specifying 
a subject. Incentives in the form of coupons were provided, as respondents 
could enter a pool from which a limited number of winners were drawn. Our 
sample is representative for age and gender in both countries, and additionally 
for regions in Belgium. In table 7.1 we present a breakdown of our sample 
by country, age, gender, household income, migration background, and 
educational attainment.
Measures
Attitudes on immigrants and refugees
In order to measure the difference in public opinion on immigrants and refu-
gees we adapted a scale used in the European Social Survey (ESS). This scale 
was developed to measure attitudes toward immigration and was included in 
round 1 (2002) and round 7 (2014) of the ESS. It consists of seven items, asking 
which groups of immigrants should be allowed to come and live in Belgium 
or Sweden: “Immigrants of the same race or ethnicity as most of [country]’s 
population.”; “Immigrants of a different race or ethnicity as most of [country]’s 
population.”; “Immigrants of the richer countries in Europe.”; “Immigrants of the 
poorer countries in Europe.”; “Immigrants of the richer countries outside Europe.”; 
“Immigrants of the poorer countries outside Europe.”; and “Immigrants coming 
from Muslim countries who wish to work in [country].”. Answer categories range 
from “1 = Allow none” to “4 = Allow many”. We used the scale in its original 
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form, but added an extra item concerning immigrants from Muslim countries. 
The reason for the inclusion of this item lies in the fact that a majority of 
immigrants and refugees entering Belgium and Sweden in the current refugee 
crisis originate from Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan—predominantly Muslim 
countries (Pew Research Center, 2017). Before completing this block of 
items, we presented respondents with a definition of immigrants, as stated 
by the United Nations (UN). Later in the questionnaire we presented an 
alternate version of this scale in which the term ‘immigrant’ in the items 
was swapped for ‘refugee.’ Prior to completing each block, respondents were 
presented with the UN definition of immigrants and refugees respectively. 
Table 7.1. Descriptive results of socio-demographic variables (in %, unless otherwise 
specified)
Belgium Sweden Total
Age (in years) 42.9 41.4 42.2
Gender N = 1500 N = 1500 N = 3000
Male 50.3 50.0 50.1
Female 49.7 50.0 49.9
Household income N = 1191 N = 1263 N = 2454
Less than €1500 14.7 13.8 14.2
€1500 – €2499 29.8 19.3 24.4
€2500 – €3499 24.5 18.6 21.4
€3500 – €4499 20.0 17.2 18.6
€4500 – €5499 6.1 15.5 10.9
Over €5499 5.0 15.7 10.5
Migration background N = 1484 N = 1389 N = 2873
No migration background 90.8 74.4 82.9
Migration background 9.2 25.6 17.1
Educational attainment N = 1421 N = 1362 N = 2783
No degree/Primary education 4.4 8.8 6.5
Secondary education 44.6 55.2 49.8
Tertiary education 50.6 35.1 43.0
Note: Respondents who did not want to reveal or did not know their household income (n = 546) 
were indicated as missing. In Sweden, household income was asked for in Swedish krona, with 
categories corresponding with Belgian categories in Euros.
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We clearly highlighted these two definitions so that respondents would be 
able to distinguish between immigrants and refugees.
News media consumption
Respondents were asked about their news media consumption patterns 
during the past month (“To what extent did you watch/listen to news pro-
grammes on the broadcasters mentioned below in the past month?”), with answer 
categories ranging from “0 = Never” to “7 = Every day”. Both television and 
radio consumption were split into two groups: public and commercial. For 
the newspaper and online news consumption, the most commonly read 
newspapers and commonly visited news webpages in each country were 
included separately (“To what extent did you read newspapers/online news 
mentioned below in the past month?”). In order to provide a clear picture of 
the impact of newspaper and online news consumption, we calculated the 
country mean of quality and popular newspaper consumption, and quality 
and popular online news consumption separately. This newspaper typology 
is based on previous news media research that sets popular apart from quality 
papers (De Bens & Raeymaeckers, 2010; De Cock et al., 2018).
News media trust
We measured trust in the aforementioned news media brands by means of 
a five-point scale with answer categories ranging from “1 = No trust at all” 
to “5 = A lot of trust”. Trust was measured separately for public and com-
mercial television and radio. Trust in newspapers was aggregated into two 
groups: trust in quality newspapers (De Standaard, De Morgen, De Tijd, 
Le Soir, La Libre, L’Echo, Dagens Nyheter, Svenska Dagbladet) and trust in 
popular newspapers (Het Laatste Nieuws, Gazet van Antwerpen, Het Belang 
van Limburg, Het Nieuwsblad, Metro, La Dernière Heure/Les Sports, L’Avenir, 
Métro, Aftonbladet, Expressen), corresponding to the categories of news media 
consumption. Trust in news websites or apps was also measured on the same 
scale, but without the distinction between popular and quality online news 
consumption.
Importance of the migration theme
Based on previous categorizations of media themes (Carroll et al., 1997; De 
Bens & Paulussen, 2005; Diakopoulos & Naaman, 2011; Stempel III, 1988; 
Vandenberghe, 2017), we presented our respondents with 14 news media 
categories and asked them how important they considered each of these. 
Although previous typologies generally combine welfare and migration into a 
single category, we decided to split these because of the particular importance 
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of the migration theme in this chapter. The categories presented were: national 
politics; justice; crime; economy and trade; welfare; migration; environment; 
culture and entertainment; science, technology, and education; disasters; 
transport; war and peace; sports; and international and European politics. 
Respondents had to answer on a five-point scale, with answer categories 
ranging from “1 = Not at all important” to “5 = Very important”.
Direct intergroup contact
In order to map direct intergroup contact, we again used a measure from 
the European Social Survey, asking how often respondents have contact 
with people of a different race or ethnic group when they are out and about 
(e.g., on public transport, in shops, on the street, or in their neighborhood). 
They could indicate this on a seven-point scale ranging from “1 = Never” to 
“7 = Every day”.
Analytic strategy
To provide an answer to our research questions we will carry out t-test com-
parisons of mean scores on attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, news 
media consumption, news media trust, and the importance of the migration 
theme. Belgian and Swedish respondents are the two groups to be compared 
in the analyses. Subsequently, we will estimate linear regression models for 
each country and attitude separately using SPSS, to investigate which (if any) 
indicators on news media consumption, media trust, the importance of the 
migration theme, direct intergroup contact, or socio-demographic indicators 
are more important in relation to attitudes in Belgium than in Sweden, or vice 
versa. In order to use immigrant and refugee attitudes as dependent variables 
in the regression analyses, an exploratory factor analysis was carried out on 
the seven items for each set of attitudes. With Cronbach’s alpha values of .94 
(for attitudes toward immigrants) and .95 (for attitudes toward refugees), 
we can confirm that both scales are reliable. These factor scores will be the 
dependent variables in the linear regression analyses.
Results
The results of the independent samples t-tests in table 7.2 indicate that Bel-
gium and Sweden differ significantly on attitudes toward immigrants and 
refugees, and on media use and trust. Swedes are found to hold significantly 
more positive attitudes on both immigrants and refugees than Belgians. 
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Differences in attitudes toward immigrants and refugees cannot be found 
in either country. In terms of media consumption on television and radio, 
we observe that Belgians consume more public service news than Swedes, 
although this difference is only significant for radio. Swedes, on the other hand, 
are found to consume more commercial news than Belgians—particularly on 
Table 7.2. Independent samples t-test on mean differences in immigrant attitudes and 
refugee attitudes, media consumption and trust, and the subjective importance of 




Immigrant attitudes (α = .94) 2.53 2.72 -6.69***
Refugee attitudes (α = .95) 2.54 2.72 -5.98***
Media consumption
Public broadcast consumption – television 4.28 4.27 0.06
Commercial broadcast consumption – television 3.78 4.17 -3.98***
Public broadcast consumption – radio 4.02 3.23 8.06***
Commercial broadcast consumption – radio 3.10 3.20 -1.19
Quality newspapers 1.51 1.81 -6.16***
Popular newspapers 1.72 2.79 -17.50***
Quality online news 2.10 2.05 0.91
Popular online news 2.36 3.66 -18.05***
Media trust
Public service television 3.79 3.31 11.29***
Commercial television 3.32 3.10 5.54***
Public service radio 3.73 3.31 9.97***
Commercial radio 3.27 2.62 17.56***
Quality newspapers 3.65 3.20 11.28***
Popular newspapers 3.23 2.62 16.04***
News websites/apps 3.40 2.86 14.78***
Importance of migration theme 3.45 3.58 -3.34**
*: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001
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television. For written and online media, we note that Swedes consume this 
more frequently than Belgians, with the exception of quality online news. It 
is also apparent that Swedes consume far more popular written and popular 
online media than quality (online) media. This is also the case for Belgians, but 
much less pronounced. Furthermore, Swedes and Belgians differ significantly 
on all types of media trust. T-tests show that Swedes have lower levels of trust 
in their media—for each media type under consideration—than Belgians. 
We do find, in both countries, that media trust is lower for commercial 
broadcasters and popular newspapers than it is for public broadcasters and 
quality newspapers. As for the importance of the migration theme, Swedes 
consider this issue to be significantly more important than Belgians.
The results of the regression analyses in table 7.3 show that in Belgium 
age is negatively associated with both sets of attitudes. Respondents with 
a migration background are found to hold more positive attitudes toward 
immigrants and refugees than those without a migration background. We 
observe that educational attainment is significantly related to attitudes toward 
refugees only: respondents with a tertiary degree hold more positive attitudes 
toward refugees than those with no degree or a primary degree. Neither gender 
nor household income is associated with attitudes. Three types of media 
consumption are related to attitudes. Firstly, we find that commercial televi-
sion news consumption is negatively related to both sets of attitudes—with 
this association more pronounced for attitudes toward refugees than toward 
immigrants. Secondly, we also observe that quality online news consumption 
is positively related to both sets of attitudes. Thirdly, popular online news 
consumption is negatively associated with attitudes toward refugees only. For 
media trust, we note that trust in public service television news is positively 
associated with both sets of attitudes, whereas trust in commercial television 
news is positively associated with attitudes toward immigrants only. As for 
radio news, we find that trust in commercial radio is negatively associated 
with attitudes toward immigrants. A final finding on trust tells us that trust in 
popular newspapers is negatively associated with attitudes toward refugees. 
The importance of the migration theme proves to be a predictor of attitudes 
toward refugees, with a higher importance of the migration issue related to 
more positive attitudes toward refugees. Finally, we note that direct intergroup 
contact is positively related to both sets of attitudes.
In Sweden, age has a similar negative relation to both sets of attitudes as it 
does in Belgium. Gender does play a role here, as females are found to hold 
more positive attitudes on both minority groups than males. Educational 
attainment proves to be more important in Sweden than in Belgium: re-
spondents with a secondary or tertiary degree are found to hold more positive 
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attitudes on both immigrants and refugees than those with no degree or a 
primary degree. Migration background and household income are not related 
to attitudes. Media consumption is not found to play a role here, as popular 
online news consumption is the only type that exhibits a significant (negative) 
relation to attitudes. Media trust proves to be more important, however. Trust 
in public service television and radio is positively associated with both sets of 
attitudes. Trust in quality newspapers relates positively to attitudes toward 
immigrants only. The importance of the migration issue is not found to play 
a role here, but direct intergroup contact does. As in Belgium, the frequency 
of this contact is positively related to both sets of attitudes.
To summarize in terms of country differences, t-test results show that 
Swedes hold significantly more positive attitudes to both immigrants and 
refugees than Belgians. Regression results illustrate that gender, educational 
attainment, and media trust are important predictors of attitudes in Sweden, 
whereas in Belgium migration background, news media consumption, and 
the importance of the migration theme are more important. Age (negatively) 
and direct intergroup contact (positively) are associated with attitudes in both 
countries (RQ1). Furthermore, we can say that news media consumption is 
more strongly associated with attitudes in Belgium than in Sweden, whereas 
trust in news media is an important predictor of attitudes in both countries 
(RQ2). The importance of the migration theme is only related to attitudes 
toward refugees in Belgium, but direct intergroup contact is found to be 
positively associated with both sets of attitudes in both countries (RQ 3).
Table 7.3. Linear regression models with attitudes towards immigrants and refugees 












Age -.13*** -.10*** -.12*** -.12***
Male - - - -
Female -.01 .00 .06* .06*
No degree/Primary degree - - - -
Secondary degree -.01 .01 .13** .11*










Tertiary degree .09 .14* .18*** .18***
Low income - - - -
Average income -.00 .00 -.04 -.04
High income .03 -.02 -.01 -.03
No migration background - - - -




.06 .03 -.02 -.02
Commercial broadcast 
consumption – television
-.10*** -.14*** .01 .00
Public broadcast consump-
tion – radio
-.02 -.02 -.02 -.01
Commercial broadcast 
consumption – radio
-.02 -.05 -.03 -.02
Quality newspapers .02 .03 -.01 .03
Popular newspapers -.03 -.04 .03 .04
Quality online news .13*** .12*** .04 -.01
Popular online news -.04 -.06* -.08* -.10***
Media trust
Public service television .13* .12* .18** .21***
Commercial television .11* .05 -.07 -.07
Public service radio .06 .07 .17** .17**
Commercial radio -.15** -.06 -.03 -.03
Quality newspapers .06 .05 .10* .06
Popular newspapers -.04 -.08* .06 .03
News websites/apps -.02 -.01 .01 .02
Importance of migration .04 .05* .02 -.02
Direct intergroup contact .15*** .16*** .17*** .17***
Adjusted R-squared .21 .23 .23 .21
*: p < .05; **: p < .01; ***: p < .001
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Discussion
Recently, migration has become a prominent topic in Europe amongst 
scholars, the media, policy makers, and the public at large. One of the main 
drivers behind this is the scale of the refugee crisis, which many European 
countries are forced to cope with. Along with this increasing attention to the 
migration issue, we also note a growing polarization of public opinion on 
minority groups. Although news media are considered to be an important 
actor in influencing public opinion and building bridges within inter-ethnic 
societies (Mattelart & d’Haenens, 2014; Müller et al., 2017), news media are 
fairly negative and fall back on terminology of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, which can 
be seen as a mild form of cultural racism (Malik, 2014). In this study, we 
selected two groups (immigrants and refugees) to study the influence of 
Belgian and Swedish news media consumption and trust in these media on 
public opinion for the two groups in question. This chapter helps clarify the 
role of news media consumption and trust in media on the attitude formation 
on these groups in Belgium and Sweden.
Considering the discordance between media representations and public 
opinion, we find conflicting evidence. Literature suggests that, although 
news media in general are fairly negative in their portrayal of minority groups 
(KhosraviNik, 2010; Masini et al., 2018), public service media are more positive 
in their media representations of minorities than commercial media (Jacobs 
et al., 2016). Public opinion on these groups may therefore be influenced by 
the type of broadcasting the audience consumes (De Coninck et al., 2018). 
In Belgium, we find that commercial television consumption is negatively 
associated with attitudes toward immigrants and refugees, while public service 
consumption is positively (but not significantly) so associated. Quality online 
news consumption is positively related to both attitudes, whilst popular 
online news consumption is negatively related to attitudes toward refugees. 
In Sweden, the relationship between media consumption and attitudes seems 
much less pronounced. Here, the only media type which is associated with 
attitudes is popular online news consumption. This indicates that media 
representations are not necessarily linked to corresponding attitudes, par-
ticularly in Sweden. That means there is support for framing theory in the 
Belgian results only, as framing theory suggests that emphasizing or silencing 
specific aspects of reality in a news story (e.g., positive or negative aspects of 
the migration issue) can affect how news users interpret these events (Entman, 
1993; Scheufele, 1999). However, a selection effect could also be at play here. 
We cannot make causal inferences based on our cross-sectional data, which 
means it is possible that individuals with positive attitudes on immigrants and 
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refugees are drawn to public service/quality media, and those with negative 
attitudes consume more commercial/popular media. As news content on the 
refugee issue has been found to differ between media types and countries (see 
Chapter 3), individuals may select media which correspond to their existing 
preconceptions about this (or other) issues.
Media trust is found to play a role as well. We find that Swedes generally 
hold lower levels of trust in their news media than Belgians. In relation to 
attitudes, Belgians are mostly influenced by their trust in television news; 
trust in public broadcasting is positively related to both sets of attitudes, and 
trust in commercial broadcasting is positively related to immigrant attitudes 
only. Trust in commercial radio news and popular online media is negatively 
associated with respectively immigrant and refugee attitudes. In Sweden, the 
picture is much clearer. Trust in public service media, and quality newspapers 
to a lesser extent, is indicated to be an important driver in attitude formation. 
Trust in public television and radio is positively associated with immigrant 
and refugee attitudes. It is important to keep in mind in this regard that 
Swedes are found to consume public and commercial media equally, whereas 
in Belgium public service consumption is found to be much higher than 
commercial news consumption.
We find only limited support for the agenda-setting theory in our data. 
This theory suggests that news media can influence the public agenda by 
prioritizing certain topics in their reporting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), 
which in turn may have an effect on public opinion on such topics (e.g., the 
overestimation of migration numbers due to the large-scale reporting on 
migration). We do find that the importance of the migration theme in Belgians 
is positively related to their attitudes toward refugees. The effect size is small, 
however, and for immigration attitudes in Belgium and both sets of attitudes 
in Sweden no relationship is found. Far more evidence can be found in support 
of the contact hypothesis, which states that direct intergroup contact can 
reduce prejudice and stereotypes, whereas the absence of such contact can 
lead to greater interethnic conflict (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). 
In Belgium and Sweden, direct intergroup contact is positively associated 
with both sets of attitudes. Previous literature on Belgium indicates that 
citizens of the Brussels Capital Region, where 34.8 percent of the popula-
tion does not have Belgian nationality (Statistics Belgium, 2017), hold the 
most positive attitudes toward both minority groups of all three regions 
(Flanders and French-speaking Belgium being the other two) in Belgium, 
which underscores our findings that direct contact improves attitudes on 
immigrants and refugees.
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Although this research is innovative in the sense that we investigated 
the association between news media consumption and trust—which we 
broke down in a detailed manner—and attitudes on two separate groups 
of newcomers in Belgium and Sweden, some limitations must be noted. We 
stressed the anonymity of the respondents’ participation in the questionnaire, 
but it is still possible that certain items that measure sensitive attitudes (e.g., 
whether or not groups of immigrants/refugees should be allowed to enter the 
country) were subject to social desirability. Self-report questionnaires may 
suffer from other types of error as well. We measured direct intergroup contact 
by gauging how often respondents had random interactions with people from 
other ethnic groups. It is possible that respondents under- or overestimated 
their contact. Finally, we note that there are quite a large number of missing 
values for the household-income indicator. This is a common occurrence in 
the social sciences, as people are often hesitant to reveal their income. This 
may result in a biased image of Belgian and Swedish income distribution 
(Yan, Curtin, & Jans, 2010). We recommend that future research adopt an 
internationally comparative research design. By comparing our results with 
those of neighboring countries, or with attitudes of countries which are 
known to hold more negative views, further insight could be gained in how 
news media consumption affects attitudes toward both groups. Another 
addition could be through an effect study, in which an experimental design is 
used to further illuminate the link between media exposure, minority group 
framing, and both sets of attitudes (see also Chapter 9 in this book). Finally, 
connecting our quantitative survey data to a quantitative content analysis 
of news media reporting will also contribute to identifying the specific role 
of media representations of these minority groups on attitude formation.
In summary, in this chapter we have outlined the association between news 
media consumption and trust, and public opinion on immigrants and refugees 
in Belgium and Sweden. The attitudes under study were chosen because of 
their societal relevance, as migration issues are increasingly prevalent in the 
public domain, and public opinion on this issue is polarizing. News media 
consumption and trust were identified as two important elements that influ-
ence public opinion, while the subjective importance of the migration theme 
and direct intergroup contact were expected to have a mediating effect. Our 
results point to a larger influence of media consumption on public opinion 
in Belgium than in Sweden, while the reverse is found for media trust. The 
importance of the migration theme is only marginally related to attitudes, 
but having direct contact with people with a migration background is proven 
to affect both attitudes in a positive way in both Belgium and Sweden.
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Chapter 8 
Online News Consumption and Public 
Sentiment toward Refugees : Is there a 
Filter Bubble at Play? Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden: A Comparison
Stefan Mertens, Leen d’Haenens, and Rozane De Cock
Introduction
Pariser’s seminal book, “The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from 
You,” came out in 2011 and supporters and opponents are still debating whether 
there is such a thing as an online filter bubble. First of all, the term itself is not 
as universally used within the scholarly field as one might think. A number 
of academic investigations of the purported phenomenon use alternative 
terminology. Following in Sunstein’s footsteps (2004), Garrett mentions 
“online echo chambers” (2009). Haim et al. refer to “partial information 
blindness” (2018). Others talk of “social polarization”, “fragmentation,” or 
“self-segregation” (Vaccari, Valeriani, Barberá, Jost, Nagler, & Tucker, 2016), 
or call on earlier communication studies’ concepts such as the more widely 
applicable ‘selective exposure’ (Knobloch-Westerwick, & Meng, 2011). What’s 
more, the actual matter under debate is in flux as well. While originally two 
clearly defined positions were pitted against one another, a third group of 
scholars now holds a more nuanced and complex position. As this chapter 
will show, online reality and its impact on viewpoints and opinions is more 
complex, less straightforward, and more difficult to pinpoint than originally 
thought by both proponents of the democratic power of online (news) media 
and opponents pointing at detrimental effects. We will investigate the role of 
traditional and online news consumption on public sentiment toward refugees, 
a topic that has seen intense media coverage in recent years (see Chapter 3) 
and a topic on which opinions are much divided (see Chapters 1 and 7). We 
will test the assumption that online news users have more clear-cut viewpoints 
on refugees owing to a narrower focus in their consumption, and we will do 
so in a cross-cultural setting (Belgium, Sweden, France, and the Netherlands).
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Digital opportunities vs. online threats to democracy
In the early digital days, optimism about technological change within (news) 
media—cheap online publishing, SNS use and omnidirectional communica-
tion flows, permanent and unlimited online access to previously inaccessible 
information sources, the power of ‘prosumers’—led to the firm belief that the 
public was going to benefit from ever-increasing exposure to highly diverse 
perspectives. No longer confined within a narrow inner circle of information, 
people would see their field of vision open up thanks to a wide and diversified 
news platform—from a myopic to a panoramic or hyperopic view. As the 
digital era went on, more pessimistic voices began to make themselves heard, 
but the optimists have remained strong, stressing the benefits of digital access, 
a broader social network, and unlimited access to online news. Such studies 
emphasize the increased exposure to heterogeneous viewpoints that comes 
with people being able to pick their information from a wider pool of voices: 
online social networks, recommendation systems, political fora (Garrett, 2009; 
Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010). Results show, for instance, that friends tend 
to disagree more on a given topic than they think they do, resulting in a gap 
between perceived and actual agreement and lower political polarization than 
generally thought within inner circles of online social network groups (Goel 
et al., 2010). Garrett’s study on selective exposure among online news users 
indicates that longer reading times are associated with opinion-challenging 
information, and thus contact with heterogeneous political ideologies. “People 
do not seek to completely exclude other perspectives from their political 
universe, and there is little evidence that they will use the Internet to create 
echo chambers”, according to Garrett (2009: 279). These studies, though, are 
not based on representative samples. We attempted to fill this gap using four 
representative samples of the adult population between 18 and 65 years of age 
in four different countries (for more information, see methods section) to 
test the filter bubble hypothesis—both on representative population samples 
and through an intercultural comparative study model involving Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
Across from those who see online exposure to news, social networks, 
and news comments as a mostly positive development, others worry it may 
increase ideological segregation and generate effects that are detrimental to a 
democratic system built on a diversity of voices and opinions. Walter, Brügge-
mann, and Engesser (2018: 204) focus on the negative impact of online news 
use, stating that “User comment sections serve as echo chambers rather than 
as corrective mechanisms”. Proponents of the filter bubble theory stress that 
within non-diverse, closed online groups where there is no room for alternative 
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voices, opinions tend to ‘echo’, which locks users into their own—possibly 
false, but certainly limited—beliefs. Pariser (2011) warns against the rise of 
online ‘micro-universes’ of personalized information—bubbles that filter 
out any contradicting information, letting in only what we want to hear. 
People may thus be under the false impression that they have full control 
and responsibility over what comes in and what stays out of their news media 
menu. According to Pariser the public is unaware of any information that does 
not reach them due to obscure filtering mechanisms in global search engines, 
programmed algorithms, and digital recall of searching patterns, preferences, 
and interests. The result is a skewed information diet that only mirrors a 
user’s preferences, harming the democratic equilibrium. Sunstein (2004) 
also clearly describes the filtering effect of online culture. While the Internet 
has proved highly useful—bringing people together over huge geographical 
distances, lowering the costs of distributing and consuming news, opening 
up countless avenues of self-expression—it also has negative effects. When 
people use online tools in ways that filter out alternative opinions, they 
isolate themselves and their inner group from the rest of society, in effect 
dwelling in “echo chambers” of like-minded people. Sunstein (2004) warns 
against excessive personalization, pleading for unplanned encounters of a 
diversity of information—a prerequisite for a healthy democracy. The danger 
is “cyberbalkanization”—increasingly segregated groups or ecosystems which 
are never exposed to one another. This favors the extremes within the filter 
bubble ingroups, jeopardizing democratic cooperation and understanding. 
Sunstein does not blame the medium as such but holds accountable both the 
people who use it and those who develop algorithms, personalization options, 
etc.: making constructive use of the Internet is up to them.
In a democracy, different sides of the political spectrum need to be aware 
of each other’s standpoints to engage in fruitful debates that lead to societal 
solutions in the long run (Pariser, 2011). This is especially the case when a society 
wants to think out-of-the box and implement creative, innovative ideas—some-
thing that runs counter to repetitive filter bubble thinking patterns. A serious 
look at the core theme of this book and chapter—the refugee situation which 
Europe has been facing and which intensified from 2015 on—shows that our 
societies need to be more flexible in their approaches, not only for the sake of 
the refugees entering Europe, but also in the interest of the countries under 
study, their democratic values, their resilience, and their representations of 
themselves. Having available a wide range of views and reliable facts on the 
topic is a prerequisite for constructive thinking. Since a majority of the public 
is dependent on information on the refugee situation stemming from new and 
traditional media (see Chapter 7), the role of a possible online filter bubble 
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functions as an important factor in the search for sustainable answers. Some 
of the previous studies testing the filter bubble hypothesis have zoomed in on 
other controversial yet highly socially relevant issues such as climate change 
(Walter et al., 2018), personal health (Holone, 2016), or elections (Vaccari et 
al., 2016). To our knowledge, it is the first time that the filter bubble hypothesis 
has been studied in the context of the refugee issue and in a cross-cultural 
sample (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden).
Recent studies find partial support for both sides of the filter bubble debate, 
painting a more nuanced picture of the phenomenon (Dubois & Blank, 2018; 
Flaxman, Goel, & Rao, 2016; Haim et al., 2018; Resnick, Garrett, Kriplean, 
Munson, & Stroud, 2013; Vaccari et al., 2016). Haim et al. (2018) point to a 
possible “bursting of the filter bubble,” but state in their conclusion that there 
is evidence in favor of both sides of the argument. While they found some 
“implicit personalization on content diversity” (p. 330), they did not find enough 
evidence in support of the filter bubble thesis. What they did find, though, 
was an overrepresentation of specific news brands and an underrepresenta-
tion of others by a global news aggregator. Flaxman et al. (2016) had mixed 
results as well when testing for links between social networks (SN) /search 
engines (SE) and potential filter bubbles. Both SN and SE are associated with 
a higher mean ideological distance between individuals, thus creating ‘isles’. 
Counterintuitively, the authors also found that online news platforms were 
linked with an increase in people’s exposure to their less preferred political side, 
a factor likely to widen their perspectives. In addition to finding that online news 
consumption mostly led people to the home pages of their mainstream, offline 
news outlets, Flaxman et al. mention the tempering (positive and negative) 
consequences of online technical innovations. This is in line with the outcome of 
the Twitter study by Vaccari et al. (2016), who state that the users of this highly 
successful social medium do engage more within likeminded networks, but that 
disagreement still plays an important role in conversations. In their opinion 
there is an immediate risk of viewpoint segregation. This is supported by Dubois 
and Blank’s recent study (2018), in which they show that people interested in 
politics and exposed to a diverse media menu tend to avoid echo chambers.
To conclude, there is evidence in support of both sides of the filter bubble 
debate, and no final conclusion has been drawn. That said, recent studies 
pointing to the existence of filter bubbles mention relatively modest effects 
(Flaxman et al., 2016), and not everyone among the general public is likely 
to be susceptible to the lure of the echo chamber (Dubois & Blank, 2018). 
Our research makes use of an intercultural study to test for the existence 
of a potential filter bubble among online news consumers, affecting their 
attitudes toward refugees.
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Method
In the Fall of 2017, to map out public sentiment on refugees in relation to 
news consumption patterns, we looked at media menus through an online 
survey of a representative sample of the adult population (N = 6,000) of 
four European countries: Belgium, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands 
(n = 1,500 in each country). We chose these as part of a focus on neighboring 
Western European countries—with the addition of Sweden, a country that 
is internationally recognized for its exemplarity in the refugee debate. The 
‘Swedish exception’ refers to Sweden’s extraordinary tolerance of cultural 
diversity. As such, Sweden may be an example for other European countries 
pursuing interculturalism and social cohesion (Schierup & Ålund, 2011). 
Next to Belgium and Sweden, the key countries in the IM²MEDIATE pro-
ject, France and the Netherlands, are interesting added cases, because they 
represent two different policy orientations (Willem, 2010: 47). France has 
historically chosen an assimilationist integration policy while the Netherlands 
have chosen a multicultural integration policy.
Measures
Respondents were asked to indicate gender, birth year, total net household 
income, and educational attainments. To measure their media consumption, 
we asked them to report how many minutes they tended to devote each day 
to four news channels: television, radio, newspapers, and online platforms. 
In all four countries television was the most popular news source in terms 
of time spent, with an average of 54.13 minutes. Radio came in second with 
42.50 minutes on average. Online news was third with a daily average of 32.25 
minutes. Newspapers (in printed form) were found to be the least popular 
news channel, with an average of only 22.14 minutes a day. Cross-country 
differences among medium-specific consumption profiles are presented 
in Table 8.1. The Swedes tend to be the keenest users of print and online 
platforms, while the French were clearly the most avid television viewers. 
Belgium follows Sweden as the second most online and print news oriented 
country, while registering the lowest mean score of television news consump-
tion. The Netherlands scored highest for radio news consumption, coming in 
second for television and third for online and print channels. While Belgium 
scores higher than the Netherlands for print and online news, the difference 
between the two countries is very small. In summary, Sweden scores high 
for print and online channels, while France is more television oriented and 
Belgium and the Netherlands tend to be more middle-of-the-road.
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Cross-country differences as to radio news consumption are not statistically 
significant according to an ANOVA test (F(3,5595) = 1.432, p > .05). Cross-
country differences as to television news consumption (F(3,5595) = 27.023, 
p < .001), print news consumption (F(3,5595) = 8.923, p < .001, and online 
news consumption (F(3,5595) = 5.298, p < .001) do reach the level of statistical 
significance.
A 13-item scale (Arlt & Wolling, 2018) was used to measure the degree to 
which respondents feel more or less favorable toward refugees. Each item was 
used as a question with five potential answers: “do not agree at all,” “somewhat 
disagree,” “neutral,” “somewhat agree,” and “fully agree.” Fully agreeing 
with an item was coded as 5 in all items, except for items 10 and 11, two items 
formulated in the other direction to make the scale less repetitive. The last 
items were subsequently recoded. The degree of coherence between items 
proved to be very good (Cronbach’s alpha = .850). These are the 13 statements:
1. Educated refugees should be given the chance to use their degree here.
2. My country can do more to provide dignified accommodation for refugees.
3. Each country in Europe should accommodate its share of refugees.
4. There ought to be binding rules that determine how many refugees each 
country can accommodate and how they need to be sheltered.
5. The media blow problems out of proportion and neglect positive aspects 
in the refugee debate.
6. We cannot leave the care for refugees in Europe solely to Greece and 
Italy.
7. The way in which Europe treats refugees is humiliating.
8. While their applications for refugee status are being considered, refugees 
should be allowed to work in the country.
9. The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for 
refugee status.
Table 8.1: Media consumption patterns in four countries with mean of minutes spent 
on the consumption of each medium
Television Radio Print Online
Belgium 47.05 41.17 21.20 32.40
Sweden 50.15 44.02 26.56 36.13
France 68.32 40.33 19.10 27.40
The Netherlands 50.22 45.29 21.13 32.28
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10. Most applicants for refugee status aren’t in real fear of persecution in 
their own countries.
11. While their case is being considered, applicants should be kept in deten-
tion centers.
12. While their case is being considered, the government should give financial 
support to applicants.
13. Refugees whose applications are granted should be entitled to bring in 
their close family members.
The mean score of positivity was the highest in Sweden (3.23). The Nether-
lands came in second with a mean positivity of 3.17 on a scale of 5. Belgium 
had a mean positivity of 3.13, while France had the lowest positivity with a 
mean of 3.01. This cross-country difference was significant in an ANOVA test 
(F(2,5595) = 19.525, p < .001). Moreover, additional Chi-square testing (not 
presented in detail here) showed statistically significant differences across 
the countries on each of the 13 statements.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
We begin with testing for positive or negative sentiment in relation to different 
types of news consumption. While the main interest of this research relates 
to nonneutrality, the latter’s ‘directions’ (i.e., positivity or negativity) are 
obviously important aspects.
RQ1: Does the number of minutes spent on news consumption on different media 
types correlate with more positive or more negative sentiment?
After having shown the direction, i.e., the positive or negative sentiment, 
we will focus on this study’s core hypothesis on neutrality. Increased online 
news consumption is expected to coincide with less neutral opinions. These 
less neutral opinions might be either more positive or more negative. This 
assumption is tested by correlating the time spent on news consumption on 
four media types with the number of statements regarding which respondents 
choose a neutral stance. We argue that the more time people will spend 
reading news online, the less often they will choose neutral statements to 
illustrate their opinions on refugees.
H1: People who consume more online news will tend to hold non-neutral views.
This media-specific assumption implies that people with less neutral sentiment 
will on average devote less time to radio, television, or print media for their 
news consumption.
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H2: People who tend to consume less radio, television, and print news will hold 
non-neutral views.
Furthermore, we will test how a neutral sentiment might be correlated with 
socio-demographic characteristics (Hypotheses 3a, 4a, 5a, and 6a). We know 
from prior research that online news platforms have more appeal to people 
depending on their specific demographics (e.g., Media Insight Project, 2014; 
Preston, 2015; Jensen, 2017). Hence, we will test this dimension further 
(Hypotheses 3b, 4b, 5b, and 6b). Our other hypotheses (Hypotheses 3c, 4c, 
5c, and 6c) pertain to attitude, suggesting more positive sentiment among 
women, younger people, highly educated and more affluent people.
We will calculate correlations to provide more insight on the relations 
found. We performed a stepwise regression with two dependent variables—
i.e., the number of items with a neutral response (measuring the degree of 
neutrality) and the mean direction of sentiments (i.e., the degree to which 
respondents express a positive or a negative sentiment). This provided an-
swers to the second research question: do socio-demographic characteristics 
outweigh the importance of media consumption variables, or is it the other 
way around when it comes to sentiment toward refugees?
H3a: Men hold less neutral opinions.
H3b: Men consume more online news than women.
H3c: Men hold less positive opinions.
H4a: Younger people hold less neutral opinions.
H4b: Younger people consume more online news than older people.
H4c: Younger people hold more positive opinions.
H5: Higher educated people hold less neutral opinions.
H5b: Higher educated people consume more online news than less educated people.
H5c: Higher educated people hold more positive opinions.
H6a: More affluent people hold less neutral opinions.
H6b: More affluent people consume more online news than less affluent people.
H6c: More affluent people hold more positive opinions.
RQ2: Are socio-demographic characteristics more influential than media consump-
tion variables in the formation of the opinions expressed based on a) the number of 
items to which a neutral answer was given and b) the degree to which respondents 
hold positive or negative opinions on refugees?
Since we rely on a cross-country database (Belgium, France, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands), a final research question deals with differences between 
these countries.
RQ 3: In what way are these significant results (types of news media consumption 
on the one hand and positive and neutral opinions on refugees on the other hand) 
country-specific?
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Apart from the last research question that deals with international differences 
the main focus of the article is on outweighing the influence of media and 
demographic variables and their relation with the neutrality of sentiments 
toward refugees and the direction of sentiments toward refugees. The direction 
of sentiments could be both positive and negative. For the sake of clarity a 
figure integrating all the hypotheses and research questions on media and/
or demography is presented.




Media: online versus 
classical media 
Direc�on of sen�ments: RQ1
Neutrality: H1 & H2
Media influence versus 
demography: RQ2
Demography: gender, age 
educa�on and income
Demography & neutrality: H3a, 
H4a, H5a, H6a 
Demography & online 
news consump�on: 
H3b,H4b,H5b,H6b 
Demography & direc�on 
of sen�ments: H3c, H4c, 
H5c, H6c
Results
Table 8.2 shows the correlations between time spent on different types of 
news and negative or positive sentiment (1 is negative and 5 is positive). The 
13 items were merged into one mean score. The two items that were negatively 
formulated were recoded.
The only type of news consumption that significantly correlates with 
the refugee sentiment is television news consumption (r(5998,2) = -.057, 
p < .001). People who consume more news on television hold significantly 
more negative views on refugees. The other types of news consumption do 
not correlate with opinions on refugees.
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Furthermore, people who consume online news tend to hold the most 
polarized opinions on immigration (r(5998,2) = -.058, p < .001), meaning that 
their sentiment happens to be the furthest removed from a neutral stance. 
A similar correlation was not found for the other news platforms under study. 
As we intended to measure not only neutral and nonneutral sentiment, but 
slightly negative/positive views as well, we recoded neutral answers as 3, 
rather positive and rather negative answers as 2, and positive and negative 
answers as 1, which resulted in Table 8.4.
Tellingly, two types of news media consumption imply less than neutral 
opinions. Television news consumption (r(5998,2) = -.050, p < .001) is related 
to less neutral opinions, reflecting the relative prevalence of negative opinions 
associated with it. Another significant correlation emerges between online 
news consumption and degree of neutrality (r(5998,2) = -.057, p < .001), 
although (see Table 8.3) online news is not related to negativity as such, but 
rather to more clear-cut (as opposed to neutral) opinions on either side of the 
Table 8.2: Correlations between time spent on news media platforms and sentiment 
on refugees 





Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***, p < .001
Table 8.3: Correlations between time spent on news media platforms and number of 
neutral opinions on refugees





Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, ***, p < .001
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spectrum. Radio and newspaper news consumption does not hold significant 
relations with the degree of neutrality.
Table 8.5 provides results on hypotheses 3b, 4b, 5b, and 6b regarding the 
correlations between online news consumption and socio-demographic 
background variables. Individual characteristics such as age and gender prove 
to be explaining variables, while educational attainment does not. Younger age 
goes together with higher consumption of online news (confirming hypothesis 
4b (r(5998,2) = -0.053, p < .001). Hypothesis 3b also gets confirmed, implying 
that men are keener consumers of online news (r(5998,2) = -.102, p<0.001) 
There are no education (r(5998,2) = 0.010, p > .05) or income (r(5998,2) = 0.0, 
p > .05) related differences in the amount of online news consumed, refuting 
hypotheses 5b and 6b.
Table 8.5 shows the correlation between background variables (age, gender, 
highest educational attainment, net income) and the number of items to 
which respondents responded in a neutral fashion. Hypothesis 5a is confirmed 
Table 8.4: Correlations between time spent on media types for news consumption 
and degree of neutrality among respondents 





Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Table 8.5: Background variables and online news consumption: correlations




number of items 
to which a neutral 
answer was given
Correlation with 
the direction of 
sentiments
Age -.053*** -.032* -.064***
Gender -.102*** .045*** .081***
Educational attainment -.010 -.049* .173***
Income .000 .014 .013
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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(r(5998,2) = -.049, p < .001), while for hypothesis 4a the opposite is true 
with older people holding less neutral opinions (r(5998,2)= -.0.32, p < .001). 
Hypothesis 3a is confirmed since women tend to hold more neutral opinions. 
(r(5998,2) = .045, p < .001). There is no relation with income level, which 
refutes hypothesis 6a (r(5998,2) = .014, p > .05).
A third correlation analysis deals with the relationship between socio-
demographic factors and direction of sentiment (i.e., positive or negative). 
The results on direction of sentiment once again prove the importance of 
gender (confirming hypothesis 3c (r(5998,2) = .081, p < .001), age (confirm-
ing hypothesis 4c (r(5998,2) = -.064, p < .001), and educational attainment 
(confirming hypothesis 5c, r(5998,2) = .173, p < .001). There is no link between 
level of affluence and sentiment toward refugees (which refutes hypothesis 
6c, r(5998,2) = -0.013, p < .001). Women have more positive attitudes, and the 
same holds for higher educated and younger people.
Furthermore, a stepwise regression was performed. All the socio-demo-
graphic variables (age, gender, educational attainment, income) as well as all 
the media consumption variables (online news consumption, television news 
consumption, radio news consumption, newspaper consumption) were included 
as independent variables. The number of items on which a neutral answer was 
given was the dependent variable. The highest R-square reached was only .011 
in a model with five variables. The most influential variable on neutrality is 
the degree of online news consumption (added R² = .003), again confirming 
our basic hypothesis. Further variables adding additional explained variance 
included educational attainment (added R² = .002), age (added R² = .002), 
gender (added R² = .002), and newspaper consumption (added R² = .001).
A second stepwise regression was added with the same independent variables 
and the direction of sentiments as a dependent variable. Once again the total 
explained variance was very low, with an R-square of .038. Only three variables 
were important for this model: educational attainment proved to be the most 
influential variable (added R² = .030), followed by gender (added R² = .007) 
and the already reported small influence of television news consumption on 
the development of less positive attitudes toward refugees (added R² = .001).
To further probe the relationship between online news consumption and 
less neutral opinions, we tried to see whether it also holds within both age 
groups and the age and education quartiles in which we divided the sample. 
The results are shown in Table 8.6.
The results show that the relationship between online news consumption 
and less neutral opinions exists among both men (r (2,5598) =-0.40, p < .05) and 
women (r(2, 5598)=-.074, p < .001). A division in age groups also shows a similar 
trend across all age groups. The relationship between the two phenomena 
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does not hold only in the third quartile of the age categories (45-54 years old). 
Among the other age groups statistical significance is reached.
On table 8.6 the most interesting result is to be found in the education 
quartiles divisions. The relationship between online news consumption 
and less neutral sentiment does not hold in the three less educated quartiles, 
but is especially strong in the highest education quartile (r(2,5598) = -.239, 
p < .01). The relationship between online news consumption and diminishing 
neutrality—which is indicative of the presence of a filter bubble—is especially 
strong among highly educated media consumers, and non-existent among 
the three less educated quartiles.
We further calculated the correlations between the direction of opinions 
and the amount of online news consumption. The negative correlation be-
tween sentiment on refugees on the one hand and online news consumption 
(r(2,5598) =-.170, p < .05) on the other hand implies that there is indeed a filter 
bubble in the case of highly educated people who consume a lot of online 
news and have negative views toward refugees.
Finally, let us move on to the analysis of the cross-country differences in our 
dataset. The basic assumption that online news consumption and less neutral 
opinions go together is confirmed in the complete data set, but a country-by-
country analysis proves that Sweden is an exception as this correlation is not 
Table 8.6: Subgroups and correlation between online news consumption and neutral 
sentiment
Subgroup Correlation between 





Age quartile 1 (18-31) -.061 .017*
Age quartile 2 (32-44) -.065 .013*
Age quartile 3 (45-54) -.049 .060
Age quartile 4 (55-65) -.068 .008**
Education quartile 1 (lowest) .019 .722
Education quartile 2 -.073 .074
Education quartile 3 -.021 .696
Education quartile 4 (highest) -.239 .001**
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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present there (r(2,5598) = .013, p > .05). In Belgium (r(2,5598) = -.073, p < .05), 
France (r (2,5598) = -.092, p < .001), and the Netherlands (r(2,5598) = -.062, 
p < .05) the basic assumption (RQ 3) is confirmed.
Sweden is also an odd case as far as the relation between positive opinions 
and online news consumption is concerned. Indeed Sweden (r(2,5598)= 
-.068, p < .05) is the only country where more online news consumption 
and more negative opinions on refugees go together. As is the case in the 
total cross-country dataset, for the other countries there is no correlation 
between positivity or negativity of opinions on refugees on the one hand 
and online news consumption on the other hand (r(2,5598) = .002, p > .05 
in Belgium; r(2,5598) = .048, p > .05 in France, and r(2,5598) = .002, p > .05 
in the Netherlands).
Belgium is the outlier when it comes to the relationship between television 
news consumption and neutral opinions on refugees, because it is only in 
Belgium that higher television news consumption goes hand in hand with 
less neutral opinions (r(2,5598) = -.065, p > .05). Sweden (r(2,5598) = -.003, p > 
.05), France (r(2,5598) = -.033, p > .05), and the Netherlands (r(2,5598) = -.042, 
p > .05) follow the trend of the total cross-country dataset in this respect.
Finally, it should be added that while in the total cross-country dataset a 
higher television news consumption correlates with more negative opinions, 
the country picture is more differentiated. Belgium (r(2,5598) = -.087, p < .05) 
and Sweden (r(2,5598) = -.095, p < .001) significantly follow the trend of the 
total cross-country dataset, but France (r(2,5598) = -.024, p > .05) and the 
Netherlands (r(2,5598) = .026, p > .05) do not.
Table 8.7: Cross-country comparison of correlations between media use (television 

























Belgium -.087** -.065* .002 -.073**
Sweden -.095*** -.003 -.068** .013
France -.024 -.033 .048 -.092*** 
The Netherlands .026 -.042 .002 -.062*
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Conclusion
Notwithstanding the prominent place that refugees take in news and political 
discussions both in Europe and around the world, public opinion is split (if 
not negative) and generally uninformed or misinformed on the issue, tending 
to overestimate both the numbers of the newcomers and any association with 
crime and terrorism. This chapter explored the perceptions of refugees by the 
general population of four European countries (Belgium, France, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands) through a look at news media menus. We compared 
the views of the public regarding these cross-border flows of people as well 
as the underpinning of such views by looking at neutral versus positive and 
negative sentiment toward refugees.
There is ample evidence that negative sentiment is growing (see Chapter 1): 
people in Europe worry that newcomers may not integrate successfully in their 
host countries, and that they may not be able or willing to adopt ‘European 
values’, however fluid the interpretation of the concept may be. Europeans 
are not uniform in their sentiment toward refugees: The Swedes are the 
most positive, and the French the least positive, while the Belgians and the 
Dutch sit in the middle of the Migrant Policy Index (MIPEX), established to 
document countries’ immigration policies (see Chapters 1 and 2). As indicated 
by the latest MIPEX report (2015), politicians and policy makers either resist 
anti-immigrant sentiment or cultivate it and thrive on it: “Political will may 
matter more than a country’s tradition of immigration, since more inclusive 
integration policies may encourage more immigrants to settle permanently 
and the public to trust immigrants more” (MIPEX quoted in Adams, 2017: 29).
Furthermore, perspectives on the refugee issue in our four-country study 
vary somewhat across age groups, with more negative sentiment most widely 
voiced by older people, by men, and by the less educated. We also know from 
other survey research (see Chapter 7) that people with a migration background 
(which colors their expectations regarding refugees) tend to be more positive.
Looking at media use in particular, Chapter 7 assesses the crucial role of 
the public service broadcaster in shaping people’s news media menus as well as 
their overall trust in those news sources that mediate their sentiment toward 
immigrants and refugees. Studies found that people who mainly consume news 
on commercial television hold more negative attitudes toward minority groups 
than people who follow the news on public television (De Coninck et al., 2018; 
Jacobs et al., 2016). Both the content of news media reporting (see Chapters 
3, 4, and 5) and the audience’s trust in such coverage play a crucial role.
This research tapped into the debate about the ontology of the filter bubble. 
We empirically tested its existence with respect to news about refugees, in the 
156 stEfan MERtEns, LEEn d’HaEnEns, and ROzanE dE cOck
sense that heavy online news users tend to be exposed to a less diverse offer 
which merely echoes their ideological preferences and interests, which may 
foster less open, less diverse, and less neutral views about refugees. Notably, 
two types of news media consumption implied less neutral sentiments: 
television news consumption and online news consumption. This bears 
explaining: while television news consumption reflects the relative prevalence 
of negative sentiment, online news is not related with negativity as such, but 
rather with more clear-cut (as opposed to neutral) sentiment on either side 
of the spectrum. Radio and newspaper news consumption does not link to 
type of sentiment in a statistically significant way. Interestingly, our results 
point to the presence of a filter bubble among highly educated people who 
consume a lot of online news and hold negative sentiments toward refugees. 
Nevertheless, in line with recent, more nuanced findings on the filter bubble 
issue (Flaxman et al., 2016; Haim et al., 2018), our study uncovered rather 
small but statistically significant evidence pointing to the importance of a 
diverse online and traditional news consumption pattern.
As far as the country policy and media use context is concerned, this 
was only a four-country study focusing on Western Europe, which showed 
remarkable differences as to news media use linked to types of sentiment 
on refugees. Consequently, we recommend more cross-country research, 
especially looking at more countries in Central, Southern, and Eastern 
Europe. The latter countries are known to hold a more uniform negative 
sentiment toward ‘the other’ regardless of their socio-demographics, so 
that further insight could be garnered in how news media menus—with a 
focus on legacy and social media use—are profoundly impacted by digital 
disruption (e.g., algorithms steering news users in certain directions based on 
their preferences) and drive people’s and political responses in quite opposite 
directions, characterized by a growth of both radical left- and right-wing 
populist movements, at the expense of a fractured centrist consensus (see 
also Michael Adams, 2017).
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Chapter 9 
The Effects of Dominant versus Peripheral 
News Frames on Attitudes toward 
Refugees and News Story Credibility
Willem Joris and Rozane De Cock
Introduction
Earlier in this book, authors stipulated that news media are one of the key 
factors having an impact on the public’s negative opinions and attitudes 
toward minority groups such as refugees and immigrants (e.g., Müller et al., 
2017; Van Klingeren et al., 2017). News media provide citizens with frames 
enabling them to know exactly how to understand and make sense of policy 
themes (Brewer & Gross, 2010). Moreover, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) 
argued that media use their power of influence by interpreting reality as a 
way to emphasize specific frames and downplay others. As news media are 
highly interconnected with politics and public perception (e.g., Entman, 2003; 
2004; Orgad, 2012), they contribute to or combat stereotyping of minority 
groups (see also Chapter 7 in this book; De Coninck et al., 2018).
Typically, in crisis situations such as the current refugee issue, people start 
looking for information about causes and effects more than they usually do 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2004). As the majority of citizens have limited real-life 
contact with refugees, media are their main source of information on this 
topic (e.g., Bleich, Bloemraad, & de Graauw, 2015; Jacobs, Hooghe, & de 
Vroome, 2017). Not only do the media select the topics they report on, they 
also define the way they cover them when it comes to news angle, tone of 
voice, etc. Through the information made available and the way it is accessed 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) the media shape the perception of events. 
The news coverage of the refugee issue (see also Chapter 3 in this book) has 
created highly prominent portrayals, which may have substantial implications 
for public opinion formation toward minority groups and ordinary citizens’ 
understanding of the refugee issue. Therefore, research into the effects of 
frames on attitudes is greatly needed since coverage of the current refugee 
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issue may have a tangible effect on public opinion. In contrast to Chapter 7 
in this book, which distinguishes between attitudes toward migrants and 
refugees, we focused only on the attitudes toward refugees as a minority group.
How do frames affect individuals’ opinions and attitudes?
The news framing approach is central to our study. Frames are schemes of 
interpretation that may be used to organize information and to manage it 
efficiently (Lecheler & de Vreese, 2012). As defined by Entman (1993: 52), to 
frame is to “select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communicating context, in such a way to promote a particular problem definition, 
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.” Thus, 
frames are certainly not neutral (Berinsky & Kinder, 2006). A frame might 
cause significant changes in attitudes when participants are exposed to them 
separately in different experimental conditions (Chong & Druckman, 2007).
As we use Entman’s definition (1993), built around ideas of selection and 
salience, the frames under study are salience or emphasis frames (Cacciatore, 
Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016). This refers to the identified elements in the news 
that are emphasized by the communicator. In other words, this suggests that 
news framing functions by making some aspects of an issue or event more 
accessible, visible, or salient to the public. With a focus on salience, the frame 
analysis in this study is related to agenda-setting and priming which are also 
related to accessibility.
Frames in the news coverage of the refugee issue can be considered as 
properties of informational texts that condition the processes of both news 
reception and news impact (Igartua & Cheng, 2009). The framing effect refers 
to two differentiated processes. News frames about immigration not only 
induce cognitive channeling effects (frame-setting), they also affect attitudes 
and beliefs with regard to a topic. For example, Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 
(2008) discovered that a news item focusing on the negative consequences 
of migration, in contrast to an item pointing out its benefits, encouraged 
more negative attitudes toward migrants, higher levels of anxiety, and a 
greater perception of threat. Furthermore, a study by Cho, Gil de Zuniga, 
Shah, & McLeod (2006) pointed out that reading a news article in which 
Arab citizens are described as both immigrants and extremists stimulated 
a negative opinion on Arabs and consequently a rejection of immigration. 
In addition, Van Gorp (2005) asserted that the media play a critical role in 
generating public support for or condemnation of the immigration policy. 
Focusing for example on women and children that are left behind, being 
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unprotected and traumatized, would eventually recall sentiments such as 
compassion with innocent people (Information Center about Asylum and 
Refugees, 2012). These findings indicate that the way refugees, migrants, and/
or asylum seekers are portrayed in news media directly (by frame-setting) and 
indirectly (by forming judgments on the topic) influences attitudes toward 
these minority groups among media audiences (Igartua & Cheng, 2009).
The framing effect has been linked to the concept of accessibility (memory-
based model), but also to the applicability of the knowledge triggered by the 
news story (e.g., Igartua & Cheng, 2009; Matthes, 2007; Nelson, Oxley, & 
Clawson, 1997; Scheufele, 2000). Petty and Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) (1986) can be considered as a general model for understanding 
the effect of news stories. Within ELM the effects of framing are explained 
as the result of peripheral route processing. ELM theorizes a dual route 
describing attitudinal change: central and peripheral route processing. Central 
route processing means that the receiver of the news message tries to make 
a critical and exhaustive evaluation of it. This process is mainly rational and 
conscious. As arguments are fundamental, this central route involves a high 
level of elaboration. Peripheral route processing is automatic and based on 
peripheral cues (e.g., credibility of the source) instead of arguments. As the 
peripheral route does not require a high level of elaboration, durable change 
in attitudes is less likely to occur than when the central route is activated.
Shen (2004) found that the framing effect is moderated by an individual’s 
level of knowledge and awareness of the topic under study. For example it is 
more difficult to persuade a person of a different angle on a topic if he or she is 
motivated or has the ability to process the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
However, taking into account the role of diverse individual-level moderators, 
news reception is usually presided over by a low level of capability and/or 
motivation. So, the framing effect is usually governed by peripheral route 
processing (Igartua & Cheng, 2009).
Six dominant frames in the coverage of the refugee issue
This contribution measures the effects of the six most dominant frames in 
the news coverage of the refugee issue, based on research of Philo, Briant, 
and Donald (2013) and Joris, d’Haenens, Van Gorp, and Mertens (2018). 
Philo et al. (2013) identified eight frames to explain public reactions toward 
asylum seekers in the United Kingdom. These frames are seen as the most 
comprehensive set of frames encompassing all the frames that were mentioned 
previously. These eight frames include (1) representing asylum seekers as 
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illegal immigrants or economic migrants, (2) exaggerated numbers (“we 
take too many”), (3) asylum seekers as a burden on the job market and the 
welfare system, (4) asylum seekers as potential criminals and terrorists, (5) 
advocating stronger controls and deportation of failed refugees, (6) positive 
impacts of immigration on economy and culture, (7) problems and suffering 
faced by migrants, and (8) the role of the West and its responsibility in the 
refugee crisis.
The first five frames entail an intruder frame and threats to the economy, 
security, and/or identity. The three other frames aim to look at the issue in 
a different way. The sixth frame stresses the resilience and the potential of 
refugees, their positive characteristics which may result in benefits for society 
as a whole instead of describing them in black-and-white terms such as mere 
victims or criminal welfare scroungers. Lastly, the seventh (‘asylum seeker as 
a victim’) and the eighth frame (‘role of the West’) incorporate respectively 
the victim frame, and the solidarity and responsibility frame.
A quantitative content analyzis by Joris et al. (2018) examined the relative 
occurrence of the eight frames identified by Philo et al. (2013) in the Austrian, 
Belgian, British, French, and German press coverage of the refugee issue 
between 1 June 2015 and 31 December 2015. The “asylum seeker as a victim” 
frame turned out to be the most frequently used frame, followed by the “role 
of the West,” “we take too many/exaggerating numbers,” “increased insecu-
rity,” “burden on welfare and the job market,” and “benefits of immigration” 
frames. The “increasing deportations” and “abuse of the asylum system by 
illegal immigrants” frames were hardly present. Overall, the news coverage 
of the refugee issue was rather negative. However, the study by Joris et al. 
(2018) showed that the use of the “‘role of the West” frame claimed that the 
European and national governments need to shoulder their responsibilities 
and solve the crisis.
In this study we examined the influence of frames on individuals’ opinions 
and attitudes, assuming that the frames in the coverage of the refugee issue 
may affect ordinary citizens’ attitudes along the same lines as the reasoning 
reflected in these frames. The general research question thus reads as follows:
RQ: Do news frames of the refugee issue affect readers’ opinions and attitudes in 
accordance with the reasoning as reflected in these frames?
The frames under study go beyond what is often done in studies on fram-
ing effects, that is using a one-sided design with two or more contrasting 
experimental conditions (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Igartua & Cheng, 2009): 
positive versus negative, black versus white. Most of these studies have found 
that clearly opposing frames have a significant impact when compared to one 
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another. In our research, the six frames (i.e., ‘asylum seeker as a victim,’ ‘role 
of the West,’ ‘we take too many,’ ‘increased insecurity,’ ‘burden on welfare 
and the job market,’ and ‘benefits of immigration’) are not opposing frames. 
This more subtle approach of providing alterations in news reporting wants to 
do justice to the nuances of a complex reality and is more in line with actual 
reporting on the issue. Overall, we expect that the participants will more 
often express their opinions about the refugee issue with a reference to the 
frame elements activated in their experimental condition.
H1: News frames on the coverage of the refugee issue will sway people’s opinions 
in the direction of the frame.
In recent years, the public and scholarly attention for ‘fake news’ and what 
is perceived by the public as fake news is on the rise. In this regard, framing 
effects are also interrelated with important news concepts such as news 
credibility (Fico, Richardson, & Edwards, 2004; Tsfati & Cappella, 2005) 
and its anti-pole, perceived story bias. Framing effects can be the result of 
both conscious and unconscious mental processes, but when readers fail to 
believe the story they are reading, this may have immediate impact on their 
willingness to go along with the story’s content and to adopt the included 
frame. This might hinder the public’s reception of new, nonmainstream news 
angles and points of view. In the abovementioned studies on the actually 
used news frames on the refugee issue, we see that predominantly negative 
news frames come to the fore and only a small fraction of positive frames are 
present in the newspaper coverage on refugees. Therefore, we formulate the 
following hypothesis:
H2: More peripheral news frames on the refugee issue will result in lower levels 
of news credibility and higher levels of story bias perception of the news story 
among readers.
Although the media are the main source of information on the refugee issue 
for the majority of Europeans (Jacobs et al., 2017), the news coverage of the 
crisis evidently does not affect all citizens equally. The potential effects may 
be moderated by individual-level factors as well as contextual moderators 
(e.g., Lecheler & de Vreese, 2011; Shen, 2004; Waheed, Schuck, Neijens, 
& de Vreese, 2015). Furthermore, the degree to which people rely on the 
media for understanding and interpreting events and surroundings affects 
the perceptions of the news (Morton & Duck, 2001): the higher the media 
dependency, the higher the magnitude of the media effect.
In our study, we added ‘awareness of the refugee issue’ as an individual-level 
moderator, measured by the extent to which the participants came across news 
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on refugees and the extent to which refugees came up in conversations with 
others during the past year. As it is more difficult to persuade a person who is 
motivated or has the ability to process the message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; 
Shen, 2004), the frames will have less effect on individuals who can rely on 
more awareness of the refugee issue. The ability to process the message may 
also be dependent on the level of education. Therefore, hypotheses 3 and 4 
are formulated as:
H3: News frames will affect readers with more awareness of the refugee issue to a 
lesser extent than participants with lower levels of awareness of the refugee issue.
H4: News frames will affect readers with higher educational attainment to a lesser 
extent than participants with a lower educational attainment.
Method
Design
We conducted a randomized post-test only between-subjects survey ex-
periment (see, among others, Brewer & Gross, 2010). Besides the six framing 
conditions, a control group was included, exposing participants to the news 
story without frame elements. The control group provided a reference point 
against which to judge the influence of the six frame conditions. Consequently, 
the design resulted in seven experimental conditions.
Participants
The data collection occurred between June 26 and July 11, 2018. In total, 
the online survey experiment included 1,400 Flemish participants (aged 18 
to 65), carefully recruited by iVOX, a Belgian research company (ww.ivox.
be), controlling for different attributes of the members of the sample, and 
representing the adult population in Flanders: 699 women (49.9 percent) and 
701 men (50.1 percent); aged 18 to 34 (32.3 percent), 36 to 54 (44.2 percent), 
and 55 to 65 (23.5 percent). After completing an initial questionnaire, these 
participants were randomly assigned to one of the six frame conditions and a 
frameless control condition: control condition (n = 208), conditions ‘victim’ 
(n = 217), ‘benefits of immigration’ (n = 193), ‘increased insecurity’ (n = 198), 
‘role of the West’ (n = 207), ‘we take too many’ (n = 183), and ‘burden on 
welfare and the job market’ (n = 194).
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Stimulus material and manipulation
The participants in both samples received an e-mail message with a link to the 
online survey. First, questions were asked to measure the media use and the 
prominence of the refugee issue in the daily lives of the participants: (1) How 
important is following current events to you personally?; (2) How often did you 
come across news on refugees during the past year?; (3) How often did refugees 
come up in conversations that you had with others during the past year?; (4) 
To what extent do you use the following media to follow current events: print 
(newspapers, magazines), audiovisual (television, radio), and online (digital 
newspaper, social media)? The first question used a five-point Likert scale, 
going from ‘not important at all’ to ‘very important’; the other questions used 
an eight-point Likert scale, going from ‘never’ to ‘every day’. After completing 
these questions, participants were randomly assigned to one of the seven 
conditions and asked to read through a news story dealing with the refugee 
issue. The core of the news story was identical, except for the frame elements 
of the corresponding frame conditions. The sentences and frame elements in 
the article are actually used in the news coverage of the refugee issue, based on 
previous content analyses on this topic (e.g., Joris et al., 2018; De Cock et al., 
2018). In this way, the news story gave the impression of a realistic news article.
The effect measurement of the frames consisted of two components: evalu-
ation of the news story on the one hand, and opinion and attitudes toward 
refugees on the other hand. These components will be presented in what follows.
Evaluation of the news article
Two types of questions were asked of the participants: (1) To what extent do 
you find the article you read incredible/credible, heartless/understanding, 
biased/objective, lacking quality/of high quality, pessimistic toward the 
future/positive toward the future, complex/simple, all using a five-point 
semantic differential scale with antonymic adjectives; (2) What was the 
stance of the article toward refugees? A five-point Likert scale was used going 
from ‘very negative regarding refugees’ to ‘very positive regarding refugees.’
Opinion on and attitude toward refugees
Furthermore, the effects of framing on the opinion on and attitude toward 
refugees were measured. The first question asked ‘to what extent do you think 
refugees mentioned below should be allowed to come over and live here?’, 
using a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘allow none to live here’ to ‘allow 
many to live here’. This question contained seven types of refugees: (1) refugees 
of the same race or ethnicity as most of Belgium’s population; (2) refugees of 
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a different race or ethnicity than most of Belgium’s population; (3) refugees of 
the richer countries in Europe; (4) refugees of the poorer countries in Europe; 
(5) refugees of the richer countries outside Europe; (6) refugees of the poorer 
countries outside Europe; (7) refugees coming from Muslim countries.
Next, twelve statements with five-point Likert scales were used to measure 
the frame effects, ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree’:
1) Educated refugees may strengthen our labor market.
2) Belgium can do more to provide dignified accommodation for refugees.
3) Each country in Europe should accommodate its share of refugees.
4) There ought to be binding rules that determine how many refugees each 
country can accommodate and how they need to be sheltered.
5) We cannot leave the care for refugees solely to Greece and Italy in Europe.
6) The way in which Europe treats refugees is humiliating.
7) The government should be generous in judging people’s applications for 
refugee status.
8) Most applicants for refugee status are in real fear of persecution in their 
own countries.
9) While their cases are being considered, applicants should be kept in 
detention centers within Europe.
10) While their cases are being considered, applicants should be kept in 
detention centers outside Europe.
11) While their cases are being considered, the Belgian government should 
give financial support to applicants.
12) Refugees whose applications are granted should be entitled to bring in 
their close family members.
Finally, the study made use of six questions with an 11-point semantic dif-
ferential scale to measure the frame effects:
1) Have Belgium’s crime problems increased or decreased by refugees 
coming to live here from other countries?
2) Would you say that refugees who come to live here generally take jobs 
away from workers in Belgium, or generally help to create new jobs?
3) Many refugees who come to live here work and pay taxes. They also use 
health and welfare services. Do you think refugees who come here take 
out more than they put in or put in more than they take out?
4) Would you say it is generally bad or good for Belgium’s economy that 
refugees come to live here from other countries?
5) Would you say that Belgium’s cultural life is generally undermined or 
enriched by refugees from other countries coming to live here?
6) Refugees make the country a worse or better place to live in.
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Results
Preliminary analyses
No significant differences were observed among the seven experimental condi-
tions in the variables gender (X²(6) = 5.853, p = .440), age (F(6,1392) = .689, 
p = .659), the extent to which they came across news on refugees during the 
past year (F(6,1392) = .620, p = .715), and the extent to which refugees came 
up in conversations with others (F(6,1392) = .971, p = .444). Neither were 
there statistically significant differences in the consumption of print news 
(F(6,1392) = .458, p = .839), audio-visual news (F(6,1392) = 1.368, p = .224), 
and online news (F(6,1392) = .872, p = .514).




































































Control condition 46.5 44.8 5.6 2.9 3.9 6.5 6.3
Benefits of immigration 52.4 45.1 5.5 3.1 3.7 6.4 6.7
Increased insecurity 56.8 46.2 5.8 3.0 3.9 6.7 6.5
Victim 50.2 43.7 5.8 3.2 3.7 6.2 6.4
Role of the West 49.2 44.9 5.6 3.1 3.9 6.5 6.4
We take too many 46.9 45.5 5.7 2.9 3.6 6.7 6.3
Burden on welfare / job market 48.7 45.8 5.5 2.8 3.6 6.5 6.4
*(1 = never – 8 = every day)
In order to verify the effectiveness of the experimental manipulation, we 
analyzed the evaluation of the news story in the different conditions. To verify 
experimental manipulation, we analyzed the evaluation of the news story, 
based on the question ‘what was the stance of the article toward refugees?’ 
using a five-point Likert scale going from ‘1 = very negative regarding refugees’ 
to ‘5 = very positive regarding refugees.’ A significant difference in stance 
across the frame conditions was found, F(6,1392) = 39.832, p < .001. As 
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would be expected, the news stories in the ‘increased insecurity’ condition 
(M = 2.90) and ‘burden on welfare and the job market’ condition (M = 3.18) 
turned out to be perceived as the most negative toward refugees, followed 
by the control condition (M = 3.54), ‘we take too many’ (M = 3.69), and the 
‘victim’ frame conditions (M = 3.77). The participants assessed the ‘role of 
the West’ (M = 3.81) and ‘benefits of immigration’ frames (M = 3.98) as most 
positive regarding refugees. This is in line with the set-up and intention of 
the experiment. The frames were thus adequately designed and perceived 
by our audience sample.
Different opinions across frame conditions?
To answer hypothesis 1, which postulated that frames in the coverage of the 
refugee issue will sway people’s opinions in the direction of the presented 
frame, the mean scores on all statements in the survey experiment will be 
compared between the frame conditions. First, no significant differences 
were found across the conditions on the question ‘to what extent do you think 
refugees mentioned below should be allowed to come and live here?’. However, 
one steady pattern could be noticed, namely that participants exposed to the 
‘role of the West’ frame condition were always more willing to allow refugees 
to come and live in Belgium (see table 9.2).
Furthermore, the twelve statements to measure the frame effects were 
compared across the frame conditions. No statistically significant differences 
were observed in ten of the twelve statements considered. There were two ex-
ceptions: only the statements ‘each country in Europe should accommodate their 
share of refugees’ (F(6,1392) = 2.746, p < .05) and ‘most applicants for refugee status 
are in real fear of persecution in their own countries’ (F(6,1392) = 2.997, p < .05) 
differed significantly. Participants in the ‘increased insecurity’ (M = 4.04), 
‘we take too many’ (M = 4.02), and ‘role of the West’ conditions (M = 3.95) 
significantly more often found that each country should accommodate its 
share of refugees, whereas participants in the ‘burden on welfare and the job 
market’ (M = 3.67) and ‘refugees as victim’ conditions (M = 3.71) more often 
disagreed with this statement. Regarding the statement on the ‘real fear of 
persecution’, the participants exposed to the ‘increased insecurity’ condition 
agreed significantly more than those taking part in the control condition, 
t(403,604) = -3.502, p < .001.
To measure the frame effects, this study included six questions with an 
eleven-point semantic differential scale regarding the impact of the refugee 
issue on criminality, the job market, health and welfare services, the economy, 
cultural life, and living conditions. No significant differences were found 
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across the seven frame conditions of the survey experiment. These findings 
regarding the effects of the different framing conditions point out that the 
first hypothesis is mainly not confirmed. Only two statements turned out 
to be significantly different.
Do more peripheral news frames lead to other evaluations?
Statistically significant differences were found in five of the six evaluative 
attributes measured: criteria ‘incredible/credible’ (F(6,1392) = 3.291, p < .001), 
‘heartless/understanding’ (F(6,1392) = 14.920, p < .001), ‘biased/objective’ 
(F(6,1392) = 5.032, p < .001), ‘lack of quality/high quality’ (F(6,1392) = 5.425, 
p <  .001), ‘pessimistic toward the future/positive toward the future’ 
(F(6,1392) = 11.045, p < .001). As would be expected, the news stories that 
used the ‘burden on welfare and the job market’ frame or the ‘increased 
insecurity’ frame were assessed more as pessimistic toward the future and 
Table 9.2: Attitudes toward refugees’ acceptance by frame condition on a five-point 


































































Refugees of same ethnicity as most Belgian 
citizens
3.18 3.27 3.35 3.16 3.23 3.27 3.24
Refugees of different ethnicity 2.83 2.78 3.00 2.88 2.94 2.74 2.89
Refugees of the richer countries in Europe 2.69 2.87 2.95 2.71 2.85 2.89 2.69
Refugees of the poorer countries in Europe 2.87 2.91 3.08 2.93 2.97 2.86 3.02
Refugees of the richer countries outside 
Europe
2.59 2.65 2.98 2.64 2.77 2.61 2.58
Refugees of the poorer countries outside 
Europe
2.86 2.71 2.99 2.90 2.96 2.72 2.95
Refugees coming from Muslim countries 2.57 2.51 2.79 2.53 2.63 2.49 2.57
Note: no significant differences, respectively F(6,1392) = .649, p = .691; F(6,1392) = 1.257, p = .275; 
F(6,1392) = 1.528, p = .165; F(6,1392) = .949, p = .459; F(6,1392) = 1.752, p = .106; F(6,1392) = 1.835, 
p = .089; F(6,1392) = 1.336, p = .238.
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heartless. Furthermore, these two news frames were also more frequently 
perceived as biased. In contrast, the ‘role of the West’ frame was evaluated 
more as positive toward the future, objective, and understanding. However, 
this does not automatically mean that the readers agree with this frame.
The participants in the ‘benefits of immigration’ frame condition signifi-
cantly more often assessed the news story being told as incredible than the 
stories told in the other six conditions. This might be explained by the fact 
that this frame is a less frequently used, atypical news frame in comparison 
with the other frames under study. Besides the fact that previous content 
analyses of the refugee issue (e.g., Joris et al., 2018, Philo et al., 2013) found 
only one positive news frame (i.e., benefits of immigration), the study by 
Joris et al. (2018) showed that this frame was least used in comparison to the 
other five frames in the survey experiment. Consequently, the ‘benefits of 
immigration’ frame might diverge from the news coverage in the previous 
months and years that focused more on the other predominantly negative news 
frames under study. As readers are mainly confronted with negative frames 
in the coverage of the refugee issue, they are less inclined to believe a news 
story in which journalists use the ‘benefits of immigration’ frame or another 
peripheral positive frame. As the positive ‘benefits of immigration’ frame 
is clearly not mainstream, this more peripheral frame does not seem to be 
working, in that it is not considered a credible story. These findings regarding 
the influence of peripheral news frames on the level of news credibility and 
story bias perception among readers point out that the second hypothesis is 
partly confirmed: peripheral news frames on the refugee issue significantly 
result in lower levels of news credibility, whereas these peripheral frames do 
not lead to higher levels of story bias perception of the news story.
Role of individual-level moderators
Similarly to previous research (e.g., Chapter 7 of this book), educational 
attainment is significantly related to refugee attitudes (for each statement or 
question under study). Participants with a higher level of education hold more 
positive refugee attitudes than those with a lower educational attainment. 
However, if we check for the individual-level moderators under study, it 
appears that there is no significant effect of the level of education nor the 
awareness of the refugee issue on the frame effect on the attitudes toward 
refugees’ acceptance. Besides, statistically significant framing effects were 
observed neither regarding the twelve statements on attitudes on refugees 
using a five-point Likert scale, nor regarding the six questions with an eleven-
point semantic differential scale. We may conclude that hypotheses 3 and 
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4 are not confirmed in this study. Although educational attainment and 
the awareness of the refugee issue have a significant effect on the attitude 
toward refugees, these individual-level moderators do not have an effect on 
the framing effect.
Conclusion and discussion
In a survey experiment among the general public between 18 and 65 years 
old in Flanders (Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) (N = 1,400), we analyzed 
the possible effects of a set of commonly used and peripheral, atypical news 
frames on individuals’ opinions and attitudes on refugees.
Similarly to Chapter 7 in this book that only found limited support for the 
agenda-setting theory, in this chapter only two of the statements or questions 
of the survey experiment proved to be significantly differently received across 
the framing conditions. This means that an overall direct effect on attitudes 
toward refugees in the same direction as suggested by the frame was not found. 
A possible explanation for this result might be related to the continued year 
after year exposure of our Flemish participants to predominantly negative 
news coverage on refugees in the Flemish newspapers (see Chapter 3 in this 
book; Joris et al., 2018; Philo et al., 2013). Ideally intercultural comparative 
experimental studies should test this assumption in the future as other media 
landscapes such as the Swedish and French-speaking press in Belgium have 
been writing in a more positive way, and this for several years, resulting in an 
overall more positive sentiment toward refugees, as seen in Chapter 7 in this 
book. News consumption is only one factor in the complex attitude formation 
process, but repeated exposure to negative framing of refugees in the long 
term is difficult to counter by other frames offered in a short-term experiment 
such as this study. This survey experiment was performed almost three years 
after the peak of the refugee crisis (summer 2018 versus fall 2015). This might 
have influenced the results of our study, since framing effects are less likely 
to happen on established or long-term topics (Chong & Druckman, 2007).
Furthermore, when exposed to a more positively framed story contradicting 
the viewpoint one is usually exposed to in the media our results show this 
has a negative impact on readers’ willingness to adopt this atypical frame. 
Readers fail to believe the story presenting clear economic and cultural 
benefits of migration and attribute a lower level of credibility to the story. 
Seen from that angle, non-dominant frames seem to hinder the public’s 
reception of nonmainstream points of view on the refugee issue. This can 
only be countered by holding an intensive plea for a sustained more diverse 
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news menu and offer of a variety of news angles in investigative journalism 
pieces, offering other takes and viewpoints than the dominant ones, in an 
effort to avoid a media-driven spiral of silence feeding a negative public 
sentiment, irrespective of sociodemographics. Future research therefore 
must continue to perform long-term content analyses including frame-shift 
studies combining public opinion and media effects measurement.
Moreover, our study found no evidence that individual-level variables’ 
‘awareness of the refugee issue’ and ‘level of education’ moderated the frame 
effect. These results are in contrast to previous research (e.g., Igartua & Cheng, 
2009; Shen, 2004; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) that found that individuals’ level 
of knowledge and awareness moderate the framing effect, as people who 
are motivated or have the ability to process the message are less affected 
by framing. The already long-lasting attention for the topic in the news 
might play a role in this matter, resulting in a dimming of otherwise crucial 
characteristics. Furthermore, the data collection was based on an online 
nonprobability survey that may raise questions about accuracy. In future 
research, traditional probability-based surveys need to confirm our findings. 
Another explanation may be found in a possible weakness of our study: the 
measurement of awareness of the refugee issue by using self-reports. For 
future studies, we recommend incorporating more objective measurement 
forms of factual knowledge on the topic.
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Introduction
How do refugees and asylum seekers experience and react to the way they 
are being represented? Such is the central question addressed in this chapter, 
where we will share stories of a group that is rarely heard from in discussions 
about migration. Visuality and visibility have become central themes in studies 
on media and migration, and humanitarianism more broadly (Chouliaraki 
& Stolic, 2017). There is a wealth of research on visual representations of 
refugees and how their Otherness is constructed by presenting them as social, 
economic, or security threats or as victims (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski, 2017; 
Wright, 2002). In humanitarian communication, a growing genre of the field, 
the “regime of pity” and its negative representation strategies are dominant 
(Ongenaert & Joye, forthcoming). This current study moves beyond the 
traditional analysis of media content, since it is important to recognize that 
media (mis)representations might be experienced as harmful by historically 
disempowered groups such as refugees (Perez Portilla, 2018). We are inspired 
by Horsti’s call to “refract our analytical gaze” on media representations 
and to study how people engage with the images and texts that circulate. 
She pleads for a co-analytical perspective in which researchers listen to and 
see with migrants (Horsti, forthcoming). Thus, we will concentrate on how 
asylum seekers and refugees make sense of how they are represented, and how 
those representations connect to broader issues of victimization, recognition, 
and identity. The stereotypes embedded in these representations are very 
powerful, as they have an influence on social representations and practices. 
As Machillot (2012: 81-82) argues, stereotypes harbor a power of structuration, 
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which “through the language and practices they carry” are “a force acting 
on practices.”9
While there are plenty of content analyses focusing on representations 
of cultural others, research rarely includes the perspective of those (sup-
posedly) being represented. This is striking, given the continued calls by 
scholars and civil society actors to include the perspective of vulnerable 
and voiceless groups into knowledge production and mediated discourses 
(Georgiou, 2018; Rajaram, 2002). Aiming to make a humble contribution to 
this matter, this chapter presents findings from voice-centered, participatory 
research with asylum seekers and refugees living in Belgium. The study, 
conducted with forty-four Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian men and women who 
arrived in Belgium after 2015, included biographic interviews as well as 
participatory visual workshops regarding migrants and refugee media 
representations.
Early on in our conversations, it became clear that participants were highly 
critical of two main tropes, i.e., the refugee as a (political, economic, religious 
or cultural) threat, and the refugee as a victim. These two stereotypes echo 
recent research on discourses on refugees (Bozdag & Smets, 2017; Chouliaraki 
& Stolic, 2017; De Cleen et al., 2017). In this chapter, we have chosen to focus on 
the figure of the refugee-victim, as this turned out to be a theme that was also 
connected to how participants experience their lives in Belgium. Although a 
priori more positive than the refugee as a threat, the refugee-victim trope also 
conceals painful and problematic experiences for refugees, as it is regarded as 
a limiting marker that prevents them from being seen as full-fledged citizens 
and individuals.
In the first part of this chapter, we briefly describe the methodologi-
cal setup of the study. The second part is devoted to the analysis of the 
participants’ accounts. We first discuss the political context and asylum 
procedures in Belgium and Europe, showing that suffering has become 
an integral part of legitimate asylum applications, and that this ‘selection 
process’ is increasingly grounded in a division between good migrants (real 
victims) and bad migrants (parasites and cheaters). Next, we explore how 
participants’ experiences are articulated along a so-called triple violence: 
the violence faced with in the national contexts they fled, the violence 
encountered during their journeys to Europe, and the insecurity and pre-
cariousness during the asylum procedures. Analytically, we distinguish 
between lived sufferings, representations of the self and others, and the 
enclosure within the refugee-victim figure. In the third part, using the results 
9 All translations from French sources are the responsibility of the authors.
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of our participatory visual study, we analyze how participants perceived, 
probed, and deconstructed mainstream representations of refugees. The 
findings reveal their counter-discourses on a range of topics such as asylum, 
their countries of origin, host societies, and suffering itself. Finally, the 
fourth part of the chapter focuses on the challenge for our interlocutors 
to recognize suffering while not being confined by it. We show that this 
challenge requires a meticulous deconstruction of the representation of 
the refugee as a complete ‘Other’.
Before continuing, it is important to clarify certain terms used throughout 
the chapter. When discussing findings from our own study, we refer to 
refugees and asylum seekers because this best describes our participant 
sample. Throughout other sections of the chapter we usually use the terms 
preferred by the authors we cite, for instance, migrants, refugees, forced 
migrants. When referring to the ‘victim position’ or ‘victimization’ of refugees, 
we specifically mean the discursive structure with which participants describe 
or accentuate episodes of their migration during which they experienced 
suffering, injustice, or mistreatment. When using the figure of the ‘migrant-
victim’ then, we particularly point at the perspective whereby refugees and 
asylum seekers are reduced to victims. This concept echoes strongly the way 
in which migrants are represented in certain media and political discourses 
as well as in public opinion. Through the rich and personal accounts of how 
asylum seekers and refugees experience their journeys and their reception 
in a sometimes-hostile society, we mainly focus on how victimization is 
perceived and deconstructed and how it is negotiated in the context of asylum 
procedures.
Methodological approach
Overview and participant sample
This study is the result of an interdisciplinary collaboration between two 
research teams, respectively rooted within media studies and anthropol-
ogy, from two different Belgian universities. This collaboration was fruitful 
and led to an interesting methodological interdisciplinarity that enabled 
complementary methodological approaches and accents. Regular interaction 
and exchange guaranteed the development of a shared, coherent approach. 
Reflecting the interdisciplinarity within the research team, we used various 
participant selection processes based on formal and informal strategies. As 
a result, some members of our team organized the majority of individual 
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interviews, combined with a few collective workshops, while the other part 
of the team organized the focus group interviews. Most of our data were 
collected between July 2017 and February 2018.
We selected research participants by contacting several major agencies, 
organizations, and NGOs working with and for refugees (e.g., providing moral 
support, integration, or language classes etc.) in Brussels and Wallonia. We 
also reached out to smaller, more informal organizations in our own Dutch- 
and French-speaking networks. In other cases, for instance in the search for 
(female) Afghan and Iraqi participants, we wrote a social media post in Arabic 
and English, explaining the aim of the study on a publicly available Facebook 
group supporting refugees and asylum seekers in their daily life in Belgium. 
Finally, a number of participants were found through snowball sampling, a 
widespread sampling technique in social sciences whereby informants recruit 
future participants amongst their own networks and acquaintances (Bryman, 
2012: 202-203). That way, we ended up working with ten organizations based 
in Wallonia or Brussels. The recruitment process via these organizations was 
intensive, taking, on average, three months between the first contact and the 
first interviews. These efforts resulted in fifteen focus group interviews and 
individual interviews with another fifteen participants (several of whom were 
interviewed a number of times), which took place in locations chosen by the 
participants themselves (i.e., their homes or public spaces such as cafés).
In total, forty-four asylum seekers and refugees participated in the research. 
They all came from Syria (24), Afghanistan (11), and Iraq (9) and have been 
living in Belgium since 2015. The participants were thirty-one men and thirteen 
women, between the ages of 17 and 60 (Appendix 10.1). The majority of the 
participants in our sample had gone through higher (post-secondary) educa-
tion. However, some of the younger participants had been unable to finish 
secondary or post-secondary education.
Interview procedures
Our study combined both focus group interviews and individual ethno-
graphic interviews (Beaud, 1996), and was inspired by participatory visual 
methods. Generally speaking, the focus group interviews consisted of three 
parts. In the first part, we explained the research project to the participants 
and introduced ourselves. In the second part, participants were invited to 
talk about their lives prior to coming to Belgium, decisions they had to 
make related to migration, experiences with migration journeys, with life 
in Belgium and the role of media in their everyday lives now and before. 
Some participants shared relatively ‘rich’ stories, while others found it 
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more difficult to discuss precise details. The third part of the focus group 
interviews then consisted of probing participants’ views on the roles of 
media in processes of migration and integration, and a conversation on 
stereotypes and prejudices about refugees and migrants in everyday life as 
well as in the media.
Two participatory visual methods, photo elicitation and photovoice, 
inspired these collective interviews. Such methods allow for more bottom-up 
perspectives and alternative, non-verbal, output. They also enable participants 
and researchers to produce stories together. Firstly, photo elicitation implies 
the use of images to elicit thoughts, feelings, and ways of talking that are 
more difficult to address through talk-based interviews with participants 
(Rose, 2014). It has been argued that visual methods provide participants 
with power and choice because they can choose what to capture and how to 
express their experiences. Participants were asked to categorize and interpret 
widely used photos from major press and photo agencies (Reuters, Associated 
Press, Belga, Time, Magnum) that had accompanied articles in major national 
and international newspapers, and that represented key themes in the press 
coverage of refugees and the refugee ‘crisis.’ These were selected based on a 
review of key literature and content analyses regarding media coverage of 
refugees and migration (see e.g., Berry et al., 2015; Bozdag & Smets, 2017). 
We identified fourteen recurring themes, each representing migration and 
refugees in a particular way, and selected twenty-nine photos. Participants 
were asked to categorize the photos on a continuum that ranged from ‘negative 
media coverage’ to ‘positive media coverage’ (What do you think of this photo? 
What story or message does this photo contain? Do you think it is a rather ‘good’ 
or a rather ‘bad’ story or message? Why so?) and to collectively discuss this 
continuum.
Secondly, photovoice is a participatory research process through which 
people can “identify, represent, and enhance their community through a 
specific photographic technique” (Wang & Burris, 1997: 369). Participants did 
not produce their own images but were asked to select one of the twenty-nine 
photos used during the photo elicitation exercise they found most striking. 
Once a photo was chosen and discussed, participants were invited to identify 
with at least one character in the photo and give the selected character a 
‘voice’ through messaging or making use of text balloons (If the character(s) 
in the photo could speak to the photographer about this photo, what would they 
say?) and postcards (If the character(s) in the photo could speak to the Belgian 
people about this photo, what would they say?). The participants were specifically 
asked to address the photographer (i.e., the media professional) and the wider 
Belgian population.
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In the individual ethnographic interviews, we employed an informal 
structure. Although we had prepared a topic guide for all individual eth-
nographic interviews, the priority was to let people express themselves 
freely about their own migration and life stories. As they were previously 
informed about the research, the conversations often led us to discuss the 
main theme of prejudices, stereotypes, and racism in daily life in Belgium. 
The less formal character of these conversations resulted in rich personal 
accounts, to which we sometimes added participatory visual exercises for 
additional depth.
The majority of the interviews were conducted in a combination of English, 
Dutch, and French, depending on the languages spoken by the participants. 
In some cases, a translator was present during the interviews. For example, a 
team member of a center for language learning and integration attended the 
focus group there, and translated parts of the interview in Arabic. In other 
instances, the translator was a friend of the participants, which helped in 
making them feel comfortable during the interview.
Ethical issues
Given the highly sensitive nature of some topics discussed with the par-
ticipants, the research was based on informed participation. Prior to the 
interviews, informed consent was established through a thorough discussion 
of the main elements of common informed consent procedures, including 
research aims, potential implications of the project results and participa-
tion, duration of participation, and issues such as privacy, anonymity, and 
confidentiality. Moreover, we paid particular attention and care when 
formulating questions that probed for sensitive or highly personal informa-
tion. Participants were asked to share only as much as they felt comfortable 
with. The names of all organizations and participants have been replaced 
by pseudonyms. Participants did not receive financial compensation, but 
in several cases they were treated to lunch with the researchers after the 
interviews.
Visual participatory methods raise specific ethical concerns. In our study, 
for example, some pictures appeared to be violent for participants and they 
sometimes brought them to relive their own traumas or reminded them of 
their current insecurity and psychological difficulties. While we avoided 
such direct confrontations, we did pay significant attention to assuring the 
wellbeing of all participants during the interviews.
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Critical analysis of migrant-victim representations
Asylum and the suffering body
What has become known as the 2015 refugee crisis10 should be situated within 
long-term shifts in the perceptions of asylum seekers in Europe (De Cleen et 
al., 2017). These shifts are notable for the growing climate of suspicion and the 
emergence of a distinction between real and false refugees and asylum applicants 
(Bohmer & Shuman, 2018; Fassin & Rechtman, 2007). This distinction has 
become a leading paradigm in European politics (Valluy, 2004: 17). Currently, 
only families of “real victims”, those whose lives are under threat and who come 
from countries officially recognized as war zones are welcome to enter through 
the asylum process. According to Lacroix, this selection lies at “the heart of 
the liberal paradox”, for it is built as a “conditional opening for some, a closing 
for others, all against the backdrop of deregulated exchanges and of the free 
flow of capital, goods and information” (Lacroix, 2016: 14). At the same time, 
we have seen an increased convergence between criminal law on the one hand 
and immigration policy on the other, giving rise to what Stumpf (2006) coined 
as “crimmigration.” The convergence between the two spheres again marks 
divisions between new categories of people: “innocent versus guilty, admitted 
versus excluded or, as some say ‘legal’ versus ‘illegal’” (Stumpf, 2006: 380).
As a consequence, the mediated figure of the refugee has been re-imagined 
quite profoundly. The romanticized and heroic image of the 1960s and 70s 
has ceded to an image of the refugee as extremely vulnerable, “stripped off 
everything, without a name, without an opinion” (Vanoeteren & Gehrels, 
2009: 494). While the figure of the migrant-hero—the activist who, at great 
pains, finally came to reach his host country—still prevails among, for 
instance, social workers (Kobelinsky, 2007), it seems in total discordance 
with the legal and administrative realities of current asylum procedures. 
We have, as Vrancken argues, shifted from “a history mainly devoted to the 
celebration of winners … to the narrative of hurt memories” (2010: 52).
The amplification of these categories reflects a general climate of suspicion 
(Vianna, 2007), within which displaced persons have to demonstrate the legiti-
macy of their presence and requests. The asylum procedure is an ordeal (“une 
mise à l’épreuve”, Vrancken, 2010) articulated around a central question: how 
10 We use the term here in full awareness of the critical stance many scholars have taken toward 
the “crisis vocabulary” and the powerful practice of labelling humanitarian events and populations 
as “crisis”. See Carastathis et al. (2018), Dines et al. (2018), and Sigona (2018), among others, for 
more elaborate discussions.
184 kEvIn sMEts Et aL.
can one prove that one merits asylum? Procedures require a declaration, and 
display of hardships, which become the indisputable evidence for legitimate 
asylum demands. For policy makers, these are mostly articulated around 
“… the impact on physical and mental health of experiencing persecutions, 
torture, exile and related traumas”, which increasingly necessitates medical 
and psychological expertise supporting asylum procedures (Vanoeteren & 
Geherels, 2009: 495). Moreover, the body has become the ultimate evidence 
of the threats migrants endure (Vrancken, 2010). Increasingly then, refugee 
status becomes granted on the basis of humanitarian and health reasons 
rather than political ones (Fassin, 2005: 368). A large group of people have 
become reduced to their suffering bodies, rather than being citizens with 
rights, much in the same way as Agamben (1998) defines the “bare life.” Not 
surprisingly, the body occupies a central role in analyses of the spectatorship 
of suffering (Chouliaraki, 2006) and in studies on the visual representation 
of refugees (Bleiker et al., 2013).
The triple encounter with violence of refugees
The description of suffering is part and parcel of the asylum procedure, and 
it is established legally and institutionally. Acquiring refugee status becomes 
an individual responsibility, whereby the utterance of suffering alone may 
lead to “the right to have rights” (Mazzocchetti, 2017a: 111). The good, “real”, 
refugee is the one who can prove their suffering and capitalize on victimhood. 
Although a certain “staging” of suffering is taking place (Mazzocchetti, 
2017a; 2017b), physical and psychological wounds are not imaginary. The 
trajectories of the individuals encountered during this study were marked by 
multiple traumatic episodes. Suffering and trauma are related to decisions to 
migrate, and amplified by the brutality of protected boundaries (Agier, 2018). 
They are anchored often in both the bodies and the minds of refugees. Our 
participants often described how difficult it was to simply continue to live. 
We argue that these lived sufferings should not be ignored, but taken into 
account in a non-exclusivist, non-classifying, and non-discriminatory way.
While our participants’ individual routes differed significantly (e.g., length, 
means of transportation), the risks, violence, and harm related to land and 
sea crossings have been widely reported. Many participants have also talked 
about discrimination, degradation, and neglect. To capture the scope of these 
sufferings and the different types of (symbolic) violence, we refer here to a 
“triple violence” experienced by participants: the violence of the country 
fled (violent conflicts and its effects on society), the violence of the perilous 
journey (often including serious life risks), and the violence of unstable and 
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uncertain new lives (see also Kobelinsky, 2012). References to this triple 
violence were interlaced in our participants’ accounts. More specifically, many 
of the conversations focused on the third, more symbolic layer of violence 
that is experienced when one has little certainty during asylum procedures. 
This discourse was particularly strong among Iraqi and Afghan participants 
whose trajectories had been more chaotic, as several had already been refused 
asylum once or twice. This was the case, for instance, for Amir, a 32-year old 
Iraqi. Having arrived in Belgium in late 2015, his asylum application had 
already been refused twice. When we met him, he had just prepared a new 
application, as he had been able to accumulate more evidence of the threats 
he faced in Iraq, where he had denounced one of his military superiors:
I want security, and to continue my life. I am a person like… all others. 
What I want is to continue living a normal life. But Belgium, unfortunately, 
deprives me of that. It has shackled me, broken my wings. [silence] What 
do we do? [very long silence] It’s sad… my life experience. I wish Belgium 
would have been more generous. That it would… give me what I deserve. 
But unfortunately that’s not the case. … And so, psychologically, waiting 
is… painful. Two years and three months is a lot, it’s too much. … I lost 
everything and I want to restart with simple things… but those simple 
things are not available. … The problem is that my memories are scarred 
in this body. And when I think of that… my… body trembles. Because I 
could have been dead with the others. My situation is not very different from 
someone who has been killed.11
Most of our interlocutors tried desperately to re-humanize themselves, and 
legitimize their presence in Belgium by demonstrating their individual 
and collective sufferings. Their search for legitimacy went through three 
discourses, reflecting the triple violence of asylum seekers and refugees 
previously mentioned: the impossibility of simply continuing their lives in 
their countries of origin, the difficulties encountered during their journey, 
and the inhumane uncertainties experienced in the host country; either 
institutional or interpersonal. As Vida, a 30-year old Afghan participant, 
stated particularly on that last point:
And they [refugees] are suffering in these conditions. And these are also 
humans, they also had their goals, and their dreams and ambitions and now 
11 Our translation from French. Italics in this and following quotes indicate insistence in the 
original conversation.
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it’s all being blocked, the world should see this … these are people from all 
over the world, from all different families, that have come not because they 
want to but as a necessity, to try to make a better life. But now, what the 
world has done is block these people, so their living conditions are worse 
than they’ve ever been…
Other participants also referred to suspicion and the lack of understanding 
they experienced after arriving. Turan, an Afghan man in his thirties stated 
“… people here do not understand. … For me it’s important to show how we 
have arrived in Belgium. … It’s really hard.” As we will develop further below, 
this narration of various lived sufferings does not have a restrictive character 
per se. Talking about the three different layers of (symbolic) violence is above 
all an attempt to claim a subject position with rights (legal status, housing, 
employment). This means having the right to a dignified life and not being 
reduced to particular types of suffering.
Counter-discourses: toward ‘realistic’ representations
Despite the centrality of the triple violence in the lives of the participants, 
there was a strong pushback by asylum seekers and refugees of being reduc-
tively thought of solely as victims. Instead, they formulated more nuanced 
counter-discourses regarding the humanity of refugees, their countries of 
origin and arrival, and the suffering of asylum. We will explore and illustrate 
these counter-discourses below.
First of all, for many participants the dominant victim position has a 
connotation of inability or inferiority. This sometimes leads to feeling ashamed 
about being a refugee, and developing ways to conceal their status or make it 
less prominent. A case in point is Hicham, a 27-year-old Syrian from Damascus 
who came to Belgium with a student visa. Although he was already working as 
a professional for more than a year in Syria, he started over again in Belgium, 
now studying two master programs at the same time:
… I feel like I’m looked at better if I’m a student than a refugee. So this 
is really direct and it… it really directs me to introduce myself as… I’m 
Hicham and I’m a student in KU Leuven … just in order to not be looked 
at… a low position [low voice tone].
While the victim position legitimizes refugees’ presence and legal recognition, 
as described earlier, it also hinders the feeling of being someone, or to have 
been someone before—an individual, embedded in a social and family life 
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and with a vast array of assets (see Kisiara, 2015). Losing that sense of being 
someone comes with a certain “mourning of the self,” as Métraux (2011) has 
described it. The socio-economic situation of refugees, too, is perilous in many 
cases, and often linked to the non-equivalence of diplomas, which hinders 
them in continuing their previous profession. How the dominant discourse 
of victimization deters refugees from a humane and subjective position can 
be illustrated with the story of Nour and Vida.
When we met the sisters Nour and Vida for the first time, they had been 
residing in a Fedasil center (i.e., the federal agency for the reception of asylum 
seekers) for nearly two years. Coming from a family of nine, they were 30 and 
32 years old respectively. They had lived in Kabul, Afghanistan, all their lives 
but decided to flee after the death of their mother. Both sisters completed 
university education against their father’s will, and saw themselves becoming 
double victims, both of their status as women as well as highly educated gradu-
ates. It proved impossible for them to find decent jobs, and after having been 
chased from their home by their father, they decided to leave their country 
together with one of their brothers. During several of our conversations, 
Nour and Vida argued for a recognition of their suffering instigated by their 
migration plans as well as restrictive European border policies. However, 
according to both sisters, such recognition should not lead to an exclusive 
labeling as a victim in an inferior position. As Nour explained:
When people come, you should not make them feel like victims, because 
you should… say, ok, like “something was done to… bring you guys the 
situation and now… … you are given the resources to make the way right”. 
But not… to make them feel so small, and so little and incapable. … And 
people see us as very lazy. … [But] you know, I know people are not dumb 
or lazy or incapables [sic]. It’s the situation that… that made it this way. 
(Nour, Afghan, 32)
In the next part of the interview, Nour and her sister Vida discussed how 
a violent context—be it political, economic, or social—pushes people to 
leave their home countries. The act of migration itself becomes not simply 
an individual choice; it also becomes part of a more collective or even global 
story. At the same time, by emphasizing such universality, they plead for 
humanity and compassion.
A second counter-discourse refers to the countries of origin. Within the 
dominant discourse of the victim-migrant, refugees’ countries of origin are 
seen as underdeveloped—the scene of nothing but misery, war, and terror. Our 
participants deconstructed the stereotypes of their fellow Afghans, Iraqis, or 
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Syrians as uncivilized nonintellectuals by insisting on the fact that, despite the 
difficult national contexts, there are many university-educated people. Trying 
to reverse the dominant image of the migrant who is nothing and who comes 
from nothing, several interlocutors reminded us of the similarity of our academic 
trajectories. Searching for common ground or a more universal outlook was 
often a way to overcome boundaries and show an image that extended beyond 
victimhood. Thus, new images transpire, notably that of (rather) young individu-
als with an open outlook to the world and with transnational backgrounds.
However, certain participants also held more ambiguous or negative views 
toward their countries or regions of origin. For many, those in power—the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, conflicting Shiites 
and Sunnis in Iraq—have threatened them in a violent way, either physically 
or mentally. For them, arrival in Belgium symbolizes the end of a difficult and 
chaotic trajectory. Still, while some see this arrival and the ensuing asylum 
procedure as a positive experience, others spoke of a strong deception. Take for 
instance Adnan, a 41-year-old business administrator from Baghdad. After a 
long journey across the Middle East, the Mediterranean Sea, and the European 
mainland, he thought he had arrived in “the capital of human rights”. But, 
unfortunately, his hopes were crushed the moment he arrived in Brussels:
As an Iraqi, for me, Brussels represented the center of Western democracy, 
I knew it from the Iraqi and Arabic news channels as the city with all the 
human rights organizations and institutions, the NATO headquarters, the 
European Parliament. When the war started, I knew that’s where I wanted 
to live. … When I stepped into Brussels North Station, police razzias 
were taking place, and I was arrested together with a bunch of others and 
sent to a closed detention center outside of Brussels. It was horrible. I was 
detained for a couple of days …. The atmosphere was grim, and people were 
aggressive. I saw a lot of violence, people had knives and fights broke out 
between groups. Some people had been there for a longer time. I quickly 
learned that democracy does not come without a price and that human 
rights are not distributed equally, even in the West.
After a couple of days, Adnan was released and he was able to start asylum 
procedures. He now has temporary residence status, but was still visibly 
shaken when recounting his first acquaintance with the world’s “capital of 
human rights.” Such accounts of disappointment, as well as testimonials of 
hostile or unjust reception in Belgium constitute a third counter-discourse, 
which is part of nuancing the dominant discourse of the refugee-victim from 
uncivilized regions arriving in the “superior” Western European host regions.
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It is important to note that these counter-discourses relate very much to 
how participants experience representations of migration, and refugees in 
particular, in the media. They want their suffering to be represented, but not 
in the way it is now. In general, participants were disturbed by one-sided 
emphases in the press on either the threats posed by refugees or their suffering, 
and deemed it necessary for more balanced representations—in words and in 
images—to be produced and circulated. They believe that this would lead to 
a less suspicious but also less miserabilist approach to refugees. Participants 
largely confirm what previous content analyses on media coverage have 
demonstrated: the key themes in representation and the key discourses are 
negatively connoted. However, it also became clear that asylum seekers and 
refugees might interpret photographic media coverages differently. While 
the associations and suggestions that are made in some photos (for example 
between law enforcement, disorder, criminality, and refugees), or by some of 
the elements in the pictures (including health masks, balaclavas, and weapons), 
can be disturbing, the asylum seekers and the refugees themselves saw and 
‘read’ the importance of showing how dangerous refugee experiences can 
be. Or, as Younes, a 38-year-old business administrator from Iraq, said: “It 
is important to show ‘the ugly truth’. Such media coverage shows the reality 
of what refugees are going through and it informs and prepares those who 
still want to leave their countries”.
In general, the importance of showing ‘the ugly truth’ was emphasized 
by participants throughout our study and across the interviews. They all 
underlined the importance of a ‘realistic’ representation of the difficult and 
dangerous journey refugees have to take. Photos that are brutally hard, for 
instance showing physical suffering, were often experienced and categorized as 
‘positive’ media coverage. Firas, a 22-year old Syrian, for instance, emphasized 
that these photos were important, not only as messages to other refugees, 
but also to confront ‘detached’ European audiences and remind them about 
notions of humanity, human rights, and solidarity. For Nour, the 32-year 
old Afghan woman who was already introduced above, more realistic and 
sometimes harsh visual representations might not only stimulate empathy 
but provoke real change. When discussing the pictures used during our 
participatory visual workshop, she stated that:
You should know how… it’s so hard to tell someone without seeing a picture 
or experiencing it, the difficulties… they should know. How many nights 
we’ve been sleeping in the streets, how many nights we’ve had hunger, 
how much pain and stress we saw on our way here and… they [European 
people], they need to see those images because no words could bring it… 
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… but these pictures, the point of them is that they should make a change, 
they should make the general public to make a change. Not just to see a 
picture and say “Ow…”.
Being seen can thus be regarded as a condition for real understanding. It is 
precisely this connection that we will investigate further in the next section, 
as we will explore how participants’ experiences of dominant representations 
and their alternative suggestions are connected to a deep-rooted need for 
recognition within Belgian society.
From pity to empathy: the need for recognition
We will complete the analysis section of this chapter by weaving together 
the participants’ experiences of suffering, the triple violence experienced as a 
refugee, and their counter-discourses to how refugees are represented. Linking 
these themes, we argue that participants solicit a paradigmatic shift in the way 
refugees are approached from pity to empathy. Our participants feel the need 
to be acknowledged as victims, not in general, but at a particular moment 
and in a particular context. Their violent experiences in their countries of 
origin or on the road to Europe are vastly different from the victimization 
often experienced in their daily lives as well as in the context of international 
protection more generally. As the victimization of refugees takes place in a 
context of suspicion, classification, and competition among refugees, it leads 
to a certain loss of individual identities. Participants have a strong desire for an 
empathic gaze to re-value and re-humanize themselves and seek connections 
with others. This is expressed well by Salima, a 48-year old Syrian who was 
a lawyer in her country:
Sometimes I feel that I’m in the middle of the sea… and I have no boat, I 
can’t swim… … [silence]. What can I do? [low tone voice]. You feel like… 
The people… are against you. There is no money, there is no job, there is 
no… your family is not here… you feel cold… you feel… depressed… 
The language is different, everything is different. And… extra, people are 
coming saying … “why are you here?”… [long silence]. … The important 
thing that I can say [to people in Belgium] is “Please try to put yourself in 
my situation”. What can I do? [silence].
Yet, empathy needs to be distinguished from pity. As Kobelinsky, fol-
lowing Hannah Arendt, argues that compassion, or empathy, consists of 
“being struck by the others’ suffering as if it was contagious” (Kobelinsky, 
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2007, s.n.), while pity “is not stricken in the flesh and keeps its sentimental 
distance” (Arendt, 1990: 89). Kobelinsky adds that compassion “cannot 
be inspired by the suffering of an entire class. It cannot go further than 
the suffering of a single individual without ceasing to be what it is by 
definition: a co-suffering” (2007: s.n.) Thus, while empathy supposes a 
relation of proximity with the person suffering, pity generalizes and is “felt 
from a distance of the one suffering” (2007: s.n.). This is a highly relevant 
observation, and distinction: when analyzing participants’ accounts, it is 
clear that while many strive for a more universal recognition of refugees 
and asylum seekers, they also have an individual battle to fight. The demand 
for a balanced visibility of suffering seems to be the symptom of a more 
profound wish to be recognized as a human being. In the words of Hicham, 
a 27-year old Syrian:
… And we should stop think that… yeah, … I mean,… we should really 
deliver the message that we are not less successful or less human. We can 
be as… any as other human if we… feel safe enough. Emotionally and also 
physically. Physically we started to feel it, completely. Emotionally… we 
should work on ourselves and our ideas and then to deliver this message 
it will… it will need time.
Recognition thus becomes a central node in many of the conversations 
we had. The work of Honneth (2001) is particularly enlightening in this 
context, as he argues that processes of recognition are intimately related to 
(in)visibility. Distinguishing literal and figurative invisibility, he states on 
the one hand that figurative (or metaphorical) invisibility links to the human 
capacity to “show our disregard to persons who are present by behaving 
toward them as if they were not actually there in the room” (Honneth, 2001: 
112). He refers to the expression of “looking through something”: the other 
is intentionally not watched. This form of invisibility is part of a complex 
social situation (rather than being a cognitive “fact”). Physical invisibility, 
on the other hand, can be analyzed by looking at physical visibility first. 
The latter supposes basic individual identifiability. This is why the feeling 
of being figuratively invisible supposes a visibility in the literal sense. “The 
subject must have already made the assumption that he has been taken 
cognizance of as an individual within the spatio-temporal order” (Honneth, 
2001: 114). Consequently, Honneth links physical visibility to “cognizing”, 
and figurative visibility to “recognizing”, i.e, “an expressive act through which 
this cognition is conferred with the positive meaning of an affirmation” 
(Honneth, 2001: 115).
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Making suffering visible becomes a gateway for our participants to 
express frustration, or at least disappointment, with the fact that there is a 
lack of realistic media representations about their histories and individual 
trajectories. This connects to a broader sense of societal misconceptions 
about refugees. It is not so much the question of suffering as such, but the 
wish to be made visible, in the metaphorical sense described by Honneth. 
The refugees among our participants, on the one hand, want to simply exist, 
as legitimate and dignified individuals. Perhaps even more than other forms 
of recognition (such as affective or legal recognition), they need genuine 
solidarity—or social esteem, as Honneth (2004: 351) calls it. Those who 
were applying for asylum while living in reception centers, on the other 
hand, saw this somewhat differently and stressed the wish to be recognized 
legally and to survive physically and mentally. Making their suffering visible 
to the Belgian society fulfills a more critical goal of survival. Those with 
refugee status, who felt they had more time to accustom to Belgium and 
had the possibility to exercise their rights, emphasized the need for social 
esteem. Participants felt that this need for recognition was considerably 
discordant with the perceived hostile and skeptical political climate. For 
many participants, the road to recognition and legitimacy departs from a 
strong personal commitment and, crucially, the search for employment. The 
following quotation by Hakim, a 29-year old Syrian, shows how recognition, 
visibility, and identity are interconnected in very concrete ways for our 
participants:
I try to construct this legitimacy… by integrating codes, references, by 
learning the language … being somehow indebted to this country. … 
For me personally, it is impossible to say I feel invisible… But maybe, 
psychologically, I have been searching this visibility, I committed myself 
a lot. My main motivation is ethical. But I told myself: “I want to…” and 
there is a kind of mission given to me… to make a little bridge between 
the misunderstandings. (Hakim, Syrian, 29 years old)
The visibility of suffering is thus a complex issue, as it is both ‘formatted’ 
discourse and counter-discourse. It is inscribed into the framework where 
suffering requires proof and merits a certain status. The victim position and 
the tensions it entails are, however, not intractable. Participants clearly take 
issue with the misinterpretation of victim as a pan-identity for refugees, which 
strips them of dignity and agency.
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Conclusions
One of our key aims when we embarked on this study was to give voice to those 
who often remain voiceless, and to reflect on representations of migration 
together with those supposedly being represented. A nuanced picture has 
emerged that shifts the dominant perspective of discussion on migration. 
Rather than analyzing media content in abstracto, we have started reflecting 
on regimes of representation with asylum seekers and refugees. Our central 
focus on suffering and the thorny issues of legitimacy and recognition was 
prompted by the accounts of the participants. If we leave aside the utterly 
hostile representations and portrayals of refugees as (cultural, economic, or 
security) threats, the ‘refugee as a victim’ is a very dominant media figure. 
This powerful image hinders refugees from being seen as reflexive agents, and 
only grants them legitimacy with proof of suffering. It also leads to feelings 
of inferiority vis-à-vis the members of the host society. How to move beyond 
that, while at the same time recognizing the real suffering experienced by 
refugees? The stories of participants show that despite being trapped in legal, 
administrative, economic but also symbolic immobility, they are above all 
individuals with capabilities, dreams, and future plans. By reducing them to 
a suffering, anonymous population—or suffering bodies, rather—it becomes 
difficult for them to show their abilities and resilience.
The participants in this study sense that the dominant image of the refugee-
victim is being perpetuated by mainstream media representations. In order 
for them to feel more legitimate, and thus recognized as actors with agency 
in new societies, more realistic media representations are needed. The harsh 
realities of refugees’ different struggles ought to be shown, but they should 
not be all-encompassing. We have discussed several counter-discourses 
formulated by refugees that, according to them, could lead to more nuanced 
representations such as providing more refined representations of refugees’ 
personal stories and questioning the dichotomy of civilized versus uncivilized 
countries. Participants expressed the hope that this will enable a shift from 
pity and victimization to empathy and recognition. These findings, despite 
their simplicity, are not banal. The study demonstrates that reflecting on 
representations with asylum seekers and refugees is a useful and necessary 
exercise that touches upon issues fundamental to their experienced well-being. 
Studies conducted among journalists reporting on refugees (Pantti & Ojala, 
2018) and the Syrian conflict (Vandevoordt, 2017) as well as press officers of 
refugee organizations (Ongenaert & Joye, forthcoming) point at structural 
constraints and difficulties to change regimes of representation, but also offer 
signs of hope for more reflexive media representations. Raising awareness 
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among media producers, policy makers, and public opinion about the impacts 
of those representations for refugees, and considering possible alternatives 
to current representations therefore remains crucial.
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Appendix
Appendix 10.1: overview of participants (pseudonyms) according to sex, age and 
country of origin
Pseudonym name Sex Age Country of origin
Omar Male 47 Syria
Asma Female 41 Syria
Haya Female 28 Syria
Lina Female 31 Syria
Adnan Male 41 Iraq
Fathi Male 37 Iraq
Hussein Male 43 Syria
Najib Male 18 Afghanistan
Dawood Male 18 Afghanistan
Farid Male 18 Afghanistan
Saleh Male 18 Afghanistan
Firas Male 22 Syria
Younes Male 38 Iraq
Mohammed Male 33 Syria
Mounir Male 29 Iraq 
Karim Male In his thirties Syria
Abdel Male 36 Syria
Soran Male 21 Iraq
Hicham Male 26 Syria
Malek Male In his thirties Syria
Zohra Female In her thirties Syria
Rania Female 23 Syria
Raed Male 21 Syria
Vida Female 30 Afghanistan
Nour Female 32 Afghanistan
Hakim Male 29 Syria
Salima Female 48 Syria
Selim Male 26 Iraq
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Pseudonym name Sex Age Country of origin
Jasmine Female In her thirties Syria
Nawal Female 28 Syria
Farida Female 28 Iraq
Loubna Female Late forties Afghanistan
Mehdi Male 20 Syria
Ahmed Male 19 Syria
Samir Male 19 Syria
Fouad Male 18 Afghanistan
Amir Male 32 Iraq
Shabir Male 17 Afghanistan
Zinedine Male Late forties Syria
Oualid Male 29 Syria
Nacer Male 19 Syria
Shaima Female 22 Iraq
Turan Male In his thirties Afghanistan





Immigration defines our time. People moving across national borders, once 
seen as a welcome benefit of European integration and worldwide globaliza-
tion, is again the focal point of attention and an exceptionally efficient tool 
in the hands of fearmongers who successfully thrive on ethnic bigotry and 
antagonism. Migrants, refugees, and other visible minorities have proved to 
be the perfect scapegoats for the scourge of the moment: economic crisis, 
unemployment, poverty, criminality, terrorism, health hazards, cultural 
homogenization; populists of all sorts have, once again, effectively convinced a 
sizeable portion of the people, of a causal link between the presence (let alone 
the influx) of populations of foreign origin and most of the issues Western 
societies are grappling with.
A great many underlying factors are shaping our representation of 
immigration and our capacity to understand the extent to which it is, or 
isn’t, related to current issues and concerns. In spite of the major systemic 
transformation prompted by digital information and communication tech-
nologies, traditional news media are still front and center in nurturing our 
representations of the world. The events that make it through the mysterious 
mazes of gatekeeping, the way that they are framed, and the interpretation 
that they are given weave the fabric of the backdrop against which we see 
our world, shape the public debate and the policy agenda and, ultimately, 
we vote (or decide not to).
In Western Europe, a surge of refugees coming from war zones (promi-
nently from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq recently), in conjunction with a 
steady flow of economic immigration and an increased mobility of workers 
and students, combine to create a confused impression of demographic and 
cultural pressure on autochthonous populations (or rather on those who 
perceive themselves as such). Political figures, intellectuals, civil society 
organizations, and loud mouths of all kinds are wrestling for attention in 
the public sphere, resulting in patterns of representation that are diverse and 
unpredictable in their shape, their substance and their reach.
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Analyzing the image of immigrants and refugees is key to untangling the 
nexus of perceptions and attitudes toward ‘the other’ and alterity in general. By 
combining a study of representation in the media and among the population, 
including among the refugees themselves, with an investigation within news 
production, the research presented in this volume provides a much-needed set 
of facts supporting a better understanding of how contemporary immigration 
is shaping public opinion, politics, and policy. Such understanding is all the 
more important, knowing that political tensions surrounding the refugee 
crisis develop above layers of tension regarding European integration itself 
and how it puts national identities and cultures at risk (see Chapter 2).
Combining existing and original data on migration, policy, public opinion, 
media content, and the work of journalists, and mobilizing the conceptual and 
theoretical arsenal of gatekeeping, agenda-setting, and framing, this research 
offers a novel glimpse comparing in particular depth the situation in Belgium 
with that in Sweden, while including other countries on specific aspects. The 
deep focus on two countries does not seek to extrapolate generalizations. 
Instead, by showing significant differences between these two small Western-
European countries of similar population size which were once emigration 
countries but became immigration countries (we call them ‘divergent cases’), 
the study signals the potential magnitude of differences within Europe. The 
social, political, economic, and cultural contexts are so diverse across Europe 
(some countries initially organizing themselves to welcome or even attract 
refugees, while others deploy spectacular measures to deter them), as are the 
nature and magnitude of immigration, that no one-size-fits-all analysis can 
possibly grasp such a complex issue at the level of the continent.
What has soon been referred to as a ‘refugee crisis’ does show some 
similarities in newspaper coverage in Belgium and Sweden (e.g., the over-
representation of Syrian refugees: see Chapter 3). Analysis of left-wing quality 
newspapers in Belgium and The Netherlands shows a shared caution not 
to cast refugees as intruders or malicious individuals, but also a striking 
lack of voice and agency for those refugees (see Chapter 5). News media 
exposure has more influence on public opinion in Belgium than it does in 
Sweden, but trust in news media shows a stronger correlation in Sweden. 
Within Belgium, an analysis of television news coverage compared the main 
commercial channel and the main public service channel, revealing some 
differences (fewer but longer segments on public service and more focus on 
emotions on the commercial channel) and many similarities (see Chapter 4). 
French-speaking Belgian journalists also appear to feel more strongly that they 
should promote tolerance and cultural diversity than their Dutch-speaking 
colleagues. Significant differences within such a small country as Belgium are 
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a reminder of the factors at play in understanding and perceiving immigration 
and the refugee crisis, and the ensuing expectations for policy making and 
political action, are deeply embedded in a complex mesh of cultural values and 
attributes. These observations revealing signs of multidimensional diversity 
are humbling at a time when all eyes are on European Union institutions for 
concerted efforts, policy, and action.
Attitudes toward immigration and perception of the magnitude and nature 
of the refugee crisis show intriguing differences even among neighboring 
countries. Trying to identify regional clusters showing some convergence in 
interventionist journalism culture promoting tolerance in various contexts 
of public opinion and policy only reveals more signs of multidimensional 
diversity as the clusters of countries vary in shape and size depending on 
the variables under consideration (see Chapter 6). Unexpectedly, countries 
where journalism culture substantially promotes tolerance tend to display 
less emancipative values and migrant friendly policies.
In Belgium, public service television news consumption is more associated 
with a positive attitude toward immigrants and refugees than commercial 
television (Chapter 7). This is not the case in Sweden, but there, the overall 
attitude toward immigrants and refugees is more positive than in Belgium. 
Signs were also found showing that exposure to television news is associated 
with more negative views on refugees (Chapter 8), while online news consum-
ers tend to be more polarized on the topic, particularly among people with 
higher levels of education. There are signs of a filter bubble among highly 
educated heavy consumers of social media for online news consumption 
who hold negative views toward refugees.
Furthermore, an experiment conducted among the population of Flanders 
showed how positively framed news stories (which is unusual in a context 
where, for many years, the dominant news framing is rather negative) tends 
to meet resistance as audiences find these unusually positive news stories less 
credible (Chapter 9). This finding does not mean that positive news framing 
is useless, but rather that a better balance between positive and negative news 
framing would leave people more open to nuanced opinions.
As for refugees and asylum seekers themselves, our research reveals that 
they resent being portrayed as threats, but also as victims, even though proving 
their suffering as victims is key to their being recognized as legitimate refugees 
(Chapter 10). They regret not being portrayed and recognized enough as 
reflexive agents with skills, ambitions, and dreams of their own. Journalists 
would presumably be welcome to approach them to tell that side of the story 
and add an element of positive and constructive news framing to their repre-
sentation in the news media and, consequently, within the broader population.
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Whether or not news media are part of the problem, a number of findings 
gathered in this volume seem to indicate that there is a real potential for 
them to be part of the solution. By deliberately avoiding clichés and going 
beyond classic newsworthiness provided by stories and framing oriented 
toward immigrants as threats and victims to enhance abilities, projects, and 
ambitions, news sources in their newly expanded diversity would improve 
the relevance of their coverage while pleasing their audience. For although 
it is assumed that individuals find cognitive comfort in news stories that are 
consonant with their representations and world views, many will also find 
comfort in associating such anxiety-provoking topic with glimpses of hope, 
positive outcomes, and happiness. Faced with the challenge of represent-
ing a complex reality, journalists must resist the line of least resistance of 
reproducing the clichés. Instead, they must strive to convey the rich diversity 
otherwise hidden behind a wall of shallow, simplistic stereotypes.
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